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ABSTRACT  
 
In 2000 the South African government enacted the Preferential Procurement 
Policy Framework Act (PPPFA) to give effect to Section 217 of the Constitution 
pertaining to the use of public sector procurement to achieve socio-economic 
objectives. This research examined the effectiveness of the PPPFA in promoting 
the establishment and development of South African construction enterprises 
whose shareholders were historically disadvantaged individuals (HDI’s).  
 
Both primary and secondary quantitative data sources were used to achieve the 
research objectives. Procurement data from national and provincial governments 
covering a period of five years (from April 2006 to March 2011) were sourced 
from the National Treasury. These were supplemented with primary data 
collected through a survey questionnaire administered to a stratified sample of 
HDI-owned construction enterprises.  
 
The findings indicate that the application of the preferential procurement policy 
contributed to increased participation of HDI-owned construction enterprises in 
the government tendering process, and greater success in winning government 
contracts. The findings also show that the financial premiums incurred in 
implementing the PPPFA were only 2% of cumulative project value, therefore 
substantially lower than contemplated by government when the preference 
points scoring formula was originally formulated.   
While the analysis of government procurement data indicates that HDI-owned 
enterprises benefited as a direct result of the PPPFA, the survey results suggest 
that supply side constraints limited the pace and extent of their business growth. 
Taking into account the challenges and realities of the SA construction industry, 
the findings indicate that a strategy of unbundling large value government 
construction contracts is needed to provide greater business opportunities for 
small and medium-sized construction enterprises. Given the low premiums 
incurred as a result of implementing preferential procurement, it is contended 
iii 
 
that the application of the 80/20 and 90/10 points scoring system should be 
reviewed to create more targeted contract opportunities for HDI’s and to 
provide an enabling environment to achieve the socio-economic goals as 
stipulated in the PPPFA. 
This research is the first in-depth investigation into the PPPFA’s effectiveness in 
promoting the establishment and development of HDI-owned construction 
enterprises. Its findings therefore provide relevant empirical basis to review 
current preferential procurement practices and inform future national policy 
decisions. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
The Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act No. 5 of 2000 (PPPFA) was 
published in the South African Government Gazette No. 97 on 03
 
February 2000. 
The Act was intended to give effect to the Constitutional provisions relating to 
socio-economic objectives as contemplated in Section 217 of the Constitution 
(RSA, 1996b) pertaining to public sector procurement policy.  
The Act is one of many mechanisms that the democratically elected South 
African Government, post 1994, established to reverse the discriminatory and 
unfair practices of the past which prevented a number of groups from accessing 
government contracts (Bolton, 2004). The Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP), as published in Government Gazette No. 16085 dated 23 
November 1994, identified economic empowerment to be a key focus in the 
policy framework of the post-1994. It became evident that the continued 
exclusion of the majority population from the mainstream economy due to 
centuries of systematic disempowerment was destined to have serious long term 
consequences (RSA, 1994).  
Accordingly, even before the democratic elections were held on 27 April 1994, an 
urgent need was identified to ensure that the empowerment of the majority 
kept pace with economic growth. Many strategies and related legislated 
mechanisms were put in place to ensure that the expected economic growth 
advanced human development, sustained employment and achieved economic 
equity in South Africa. 
In most countries public sector procurement as a market for business 
opportunities tends to be substantial in relative terms, regardless of whether a 
country is industrialized, developing or transitional. It therefore provides 
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enormous potential in realizing socio-economic gains (Arrowsmith, 1995). The 
World Bank has estimated that the procurement of goods and services accounts 
for approximately 25 per cent of a country’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
(Noble, 2010). Within this context public sector procurement as an instrument of 
policy can make a critical contribution to the transformation and 
democratization of developing countries.   
Although there is widespread recognition of public procurement as a policy tool 
to achieve socio-economic objectives, a review of the literature shows that there 
is a lack of research to inform a proper understanding of the effectiveness of 
preferential procurement in general, and for the purposes of the present study, 
with particular reference to the construction industry sector in South Africa. 
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The PPPFA makes provision for organs of state to pursue specific socio-economic 
goals through public sector procurement. Almost 12 years after the 
promulgation of the PPPFA there appears to be widespread concern and criticism 
that the primary objectives and intended outcomes of promoting socio-economic 
development through public sector procurement, via the Preferential 
Procurement Policy, have not been achieved in South Africa (Brun, 2011; Mbeki, 
2009; Monare, 2006; Siluma, 2009). This perception is clouded by allegations of 
fraudulent and corrupt procurement practices in the form of fronting by 
businesses, and the manipulation of the tender processes by government 
officials (Nkuna, 2011; Mokone, 2010; Pressly, 2010; Ancer, 2005).   
According to the World Bank, there is uncertainty and a lack of predictability in 
the South African procurement system together with potential for abuse of the 
preferential procurement policy (World Bank, 2003). In its June 2011 Diagnostic 
Report, South Africa’s National Planning Commission cautioned that contributing 
to the creation of a small, black elite, affirmative action in whatever form could 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
3 
 
divert attention from wider policy priorities, and would ultimately result in far 
greater racial inequalities (RSA, 2011). 
Even where justifiable benefits can be achieved through the use of preferential 
procurement policies the related cost implications may be substantial, which 
leads to critical questions being raised about the level of financial premium 
incurred by government when implementing such policies (Bolton, 2004). This is 
particularly relevant in instances where the lowest financial offer of responsive 
tenders are rejected in favour of others that meet preferential criteria. As a 
result, governments that implement preferential procurement must identify and 
monitor the associated costs involved in implementing these policies, as well as 
their impact on empowerment and economic growth.  
Bolton (2006) contends that costs will always apply when using procurement as a 
policy tool. Although, the relevant literature discusses the advantages and 
disadvantages of using public procurement policies to achieve socio-economic 
objectives, it offers no clear solutions to the perceived problems associated with 
their practical implementation, particularly regarding the setting of price 
preference levels and sunset clauses. The literature appears to attribute the 
cause of the problem to the inadequacies of monitoring, evaluation and 
reporting systems (Watermeyer, 2004; Gounden, 2000). 
The PPPFA specifies that these goals must be: 
 measurable;  
 quantifiable; and  
 monitored for compliance. 
The PPPFA makes provision for preference points to be allocated during the 
tender adjudication process as a basis for the awarding of contracts, as shown in 
Table 1.1.  
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Table 1.1: Framework for the  Implementation of the Preferential 
Procurement Policy 
(i) For contracts with a value exceeding R 500 000.00, a maximum of 10 
points may be allocated for specific goals provided that the lowest 
acceptable tender scores 90 points for price; and 
(ii) For contracts less than or equal to R 500 000.00, a maximum of 20 points 
may be allocated for specific goals provided that the lowest acceptable 
tender scores 80 points for price.  
The specific goals referred to above may include any one or a combination of 
the following 
(a) Contracting with persons or categories of persons historically 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the basis of race, gender or 
disability 
(b) Implementing the programmes of the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme. 
Source: (RSA, 2000a) 
 
The PPPFA includes an implementation framework which allows an organ of 
state the flexibility to develop its own preferential procurement policy and 
implementation system in accordance with the broad provisions of the Act. A 
review of practice has shown that this provision for flexibility to develop policy 
and systems for implementation of the Act has resulted in varying and unequal 
forms of application of the PPPFA (Watermeyer, 2003). There appears to be little 
uniformity in defining these “specific” goals amongst the different organs of 
state apart from the definition of Historically Disadvantaged Individuals (HDI). 
The regulations relating to the Act provide a requirement that all government 
departments report to the National Treasury, through the Norms and Standard 
Division, on the attainment of socio-economic goals. Specifically, the information 
required is related to contracts awarded to historically disadvantaged individuals 
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on the basis of race and gender. However, in the data submitted by departments 
to the National Treasury the third category of disability has not been reported in 
any consistent manner because of the ambiguous definitions regarding disability, 
and subsequent inconsistent application of preference points for disabled 
persons.   
Specifically, the regulations require that all organs of state submit regular 
procurement reports to National Treasury that include the following: 1) details of 
contracts awarded during the reporting period; 2) the extent of HDI 
participation; and 3) the financial premiums involved, if any. National Treasury 
captures and sorts this data into the various industry sectors and related 
categories, and retains it for analysis and reporting purposes. 
The present research study examines the effectiveness of preferential 
procurement in the South African construction industry, with the procurement 
data collected by National Treasury over the five year period from April 2006 up 
to March 2011 serving as the primary data resource.  
A compelling reason to examine the effectiveness of preferential procurement at 
this time is that, with effect from 07 December 2011, the South African 
government has introduced new PPPFA regulations. These revised regulations 
now allow for preference points to be awarded to tenderers on the basis of their 
Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) status level and not on HDI 
ownership only. This new concept of BBBEE will be discussed in detail in    
Chapter 2.  
It should be noted that the researcher of this study has a particular interest in 
preferential procurement and its implementation. In his official capacity as the 
head of the Public Sector Procurement Reform Task Team, appointed jointly by 
the Minister of Finance and Minister of Public Works in 1994, he was 
instrumental in driving the reform and development of new procurement 
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policies on behalf of the newly elected democratic South African government. 
The work of the Ministerial Task Team emphasised the development of 
procurement strategies to promote the achievement of broader socio-economic 
objectives and, in particular, Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). Under the 
researcher’s leadership, the Procurement Reform Task Team initially developed a 
10-Point Plan which served as an interim strategy document to guide immediate 
implementation from 1995. Thereafter, the Task Team produced the Green 
Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform and other Affirmative Procurement 
documents which led directly to the enactment of preferential procurement 
legislation in the form of PPPFA. 
In spite of these achievements in the development of the necessary legislative 
framework, very little analysis or research has been done that provides empirical 
evidence on the effectiveness of government efforts to implement the PPPFA. It 
is considered good practice for governments to be guided by the implementation 
outcomes of its policies in order to make informed changes and improvements 
going forward. The present study attempts to address this gap, with a specific 
focus on the construction industry. It also aims to further the research conducted 
by Gounden in 2000 on the performance of Affirmable Business Enterprises 
(ABE’s) within the National Department of Public Works. It is noted that the 
Gounden study was completed prior to the promulgation of the PPPFA in 
February 2000.   
The primary benefits of the present study are:  
1) To present to the South African government the findings of an  
empirical assessment of the effectiveness of the PPPFA in achieving 
its socio-economic goals; and 
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2) To use the findings of the study to develop a set of key indicators for 
consideration in future policy making related to public procurement 
in general, and preferential procurement in particular. 
1.3 AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The primary aim of the present study is to assess the effectiveness of the PPPFA 
in achieving its objective of providing economic opportunities to businesses with 
HDI shareholding as contemplated in Section 217 of the Constitution through the 
application of a preference scoring mechanism. The study focuses specifically on 
contractors in the construction industry 
The study also attempts to identify the degree to which preferential 
procurement had a positive impact on the development and growth of HDI 
owned construction businesses over the five year period 2006/07 – 2010/11, 
with particular reference to the contractors registered with the Construction 
Industry Development Board (CIDB) in General Building (GB) Grades 2 to 9. 
The following research activities were undertaken in order to achieve the 
following aim and objectives:    
(i) to measure the number and value of contracts awarded to 
businesses with HDI shareholding in comparison with the total 
number of contracts awarded;  
(ii) to analyse the distribution of contracts awarded to HDI’s on the 
basis of race and gender as provided for in the PPPFA at both 
national and provincial levels;  
(iii) to determine the financial cost premiums incurred through the 
implementation of the preferential procurement policy, if any,;  
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(iv) to establish whether or not the preferential procurement policy 
helped HDI owned enterprises to grow their businesses; and  
(v) to assess qualitatively whether or not HDI owned enterprises, as 
beneficiaries of the policy, understand the application and intention 
of the preferential procurement policy.  
1.4 THE PROPOSITIONS 
The statement of the research problem, review of the relevant literature, 
researcher’s first hand involvement in developing the PPPFA and the general 
public perceptions on preferential procurement provided the background to the 
formulation of the propositions. 
In order to determine whether, during the period under review, the use of 
preferential procurement was effectively implemented in the construction 
industry such that measurable outcomes were attained towards achieving the 
socio-economic goal of promoting HDI-owned businesses, the researcher 
examined the following propositions: 
1. That government policy has contributed to the increased 
participation of enterprises with HDI shareholding in public sector 
construction contracts through the application of the preferential 
procurement policy in terms of the PPPFA of 2000; 
2. That the application of preferential procurement resulted in 
excessive cost premiums in relation to that contemplated in the 
initial formulation of the policy; and 
3. That preferential procurement served as an effective mechanism 
for construction related enterprises with HDI shareholding to grow 
their businesses. 
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1.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
There are distinct relationships between preferential procurement opportunities 
and industry sectors with regard to available capacity and skills, 
entrepreneurship, and the ability of emerging businesses to achieve socio-
economic objectives. 
The study was confined to the construction industry to enable the researcher to 
work with a manageable data set, and because it is an industry with which he is 
knowledgeable and has strong professional linkages. Therefore, National 
Treasury data that were selected for this study pertained to the “commodity” 
type defined as “Building and Construction”. It should be noted that the data set 
obtained from Treasury applied to all national government departments and all 
nine provincial governments, but excluded local government and state owned 
enterprises (SOE’s). The regulations governing the PPPFA only make provision for 
national and provincial government departments to report on preferential 
procurement contracts.  According to National Treasury, local governments have 
preferential procurement frameworks that are location specific and which 
require them to use a combination of socio-economic factors with outcomes that 
are not necessarily compatible with data collected by National Treasury.  
The present study was limited to HDI contractors from Grades 2 to 9GB who are 
registered on the CIDB Register of Contractors.  The decision to exclude Grade 1 
contractors was taken because there are minimal criteria for CIDB registration at 
this entry level meaning that many of these emerging contractor businesses are 
unlikely to reflect growth or development. Another compelling reason for the 
exclusion of Grade 1 contractors is that this category is also commonly used by 
unemployed work seekers as a mechanism for gaining access to economic 
opportunities in the construction sector (Gounden, 1997; Watermeyer, 1998). 
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According to the PPPFA, persons historically disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination are categorized on the basis of race, gender and disability. The 
present study, however, was limited to the categories of race and gender only 
because the data set obtained from the National Treasury did not record 
contracts awarded to businesses owned by disabled persons. This omission by 
Treasury was probably due to the fact that when the PPPFA was promulgated it 
lacked a clear and consistent definition of “disability”. While the South African 
legal context provides constitutional protection from discrimination for persons 
with disabilities in the form of the Bill of Rights and the Promotion of Equality 
and Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination Act, No. 4 of 2000, government does not 
provide a precise definition of the term “disability” (Beck, 2011). 
1.6 MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNMENT’S 
IMPLEMENTATION OF PREFERENTIAL PROCUREMENT 
The primary purpose of the present study was to examine whether the 
implementation of preferential procurement policy had a positive effect on the 
South African construction industry. The literature shows that various criteria can 
be used to measure government effectiveness or performance. The Oxford 
dictionary defines the term “effective” as “producing a desired or intended 
result”. 
While it may be relatively easy to check whether a government has implemented 
certain policy changes, it is more difficult to establish whether such changes 
achieved the desired outcomes. According to Nkuna (2011), recent experience of 
BEE implementation in South Africa shows that while there are many good 
intentions, the results are often unsatisfactory. 
Beryl Radin, in her book Beyond Marchiavelli: Policy Analysis Comes of Age 
stated that the single most important theme that characterizes the public sector 
is the demand for performance (Radin, 2000). 
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Research on organizational effectiveness consists of two parts: the development 
of measurement criteria and studies that predict organizational effectiveness 
using sets of independent variables (Campbell, 1977). However, while 
commentators emphasize the need to measure organizational effectiveness, 
studies have yet to develop clear and concise ways of defining and assessing 
effectiveness (Rainey, 2003). 
Effectiveness is seen as a measure of the quality of output that answers the 
question of how well the policy implementation achieved the desired outcome 
(Lee & Whitford, 2008). Accordingly, a government’s action is effective when the 
specific desired end is attained.  Lee et al (2008) go on to explain that 
effectiveness can be used to assess the overall state of an organization seeking 
to fulfill goals related to its mission, rather than effectiveness with regard to 
specific performance indicators.  
It is proposed that the difference between what are considered “objective” and 
what are considered “subjective” measures can therefore be used as the 
distinguishing factor to categorise performance measures. Essentially, it is the 
source material from which the information is gathered that makes the 
difference (Lee et al, 2008). Objective measures are usually constructed from 
records that are considered impartial and independent. In contrast, subjective 
measures are constructed from survey responses gathered from stakeholders 
about performance assessment (Andrews, 2006; Parks, 1984). According to Lee 
et al (2008), subjective measures of effectiveness are generally considered to be 
perceptual assessments derived from the use of a survey or questionnaire, 
whereas objective measures are seen as reflecting “reality”, based on the 
analysis of recorded data.  
Notwithstanding this, objective measures pose their own challenges. Relevant 
records or complete data sets are often unavailable or difficult to obtain, as was 
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experienced by this researcher in his protracted interactions with National 
Treasury to access a complete data set for the present study. 
In this study the definitions provided above regarding objective and subjective 
measures of effectiveness were used in the following manner: 
1. The 5-year dataset from the National Treasury constituted the 
“objective measures” to assess the effectiveness of the PPPFA in 
achieving its socio-economic goals; and 
2. The survey questionnaire developed by the researcher and 
administered to stakeholder participants to ascertain their opinions 
on government’s procurement policy constituted the “subjective 
measures” to assess effectiveness. It was also used to examine the 
findings of the National Treasury data.  
1.7 RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY 
The implementation of preferential procurement in South Africa followed the 
promulgation of the PPPFA in 2000.   A review of the literature since 2000 shows 
that very limited research has been conducted on this topic even though 
preferential procurement is viewed as playing a pivotal role in efforts by the 
South African government to achieve its socio-economic objectives.  
Kajimo-Shakantu (2007) emphasised a need to conduct more empirical research 
to gain deeper insights on preferential procurement. The present research was 
also reinforced by Watermeyer (2000) who noted that there was limited 
empirical research and data on most policy programmes in general, and on the 
effectiveness of the use of public sector procurement as an instrument of social 
policy in particular. 
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Previous studies confirm that preferences in public sector procurement policies 
and procedures are being implemented in South Africa as a mechanism to attain 
government’s socio-economic objectives and are underpinned by the principles 
of the RDP (Gounden, 2000). Gounden (2000) states that preferential 
procurement policies were first tested by the National Department of Public 
Works (NDPW) on the Malmesbury Prison infrastructure project in the Western 
Cape in 1996. The fact that the NDPW did not release a detailed report on the 
achievements of the pilot project, suggests that the process was not effectively 
documented. The only available information related to this test project is from 
Gounden (2000) who conducted extensive research on the impact of the NDPW’s 
Affirmative Procurement Policy on the participation and growth of targeted 
businesses referred to as Affirmable Business Enterprises (ABE’s). ABE is defined 
as a small business enterprise owned, managed and controlled by black South 
Africans. Gounden’s research, however, was limited because it only considered 
projects in the South African construction industry during the period August 
1996 to July 1998. This preceded the promulgation of the PPPFA in 2000.  
Also, Gounden’s research focused primarily on the participation of ABE’s and was 
limited to data provided by NDPW. In a subsequent study conducted by 
Haripersad (2003) on public procurement management in South Africa, the 
National Ministry of Public Works was used as a case study. The study attempted 
to establish what management structure, policies and processes were being 
employed by the Ministry to implement public procurement as a mechanism for 
promoting socio-economic goals. Thereafter, Kajimo-Shakantu (2007) 
investigated the responses of contractors to preferential procurement in South 
Africa to understand how construction firms interpreted the government’s 
preferential procurement policies, and to establish the strategies that 
construction firms adopted in response to these policies. 
The present study attempts to build on and extend the body of knowledge 
established by previous studies on the application of preferential procurement in 
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South Africa by examining the effectiveness of the implementation of the 
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework. The study is considered to be timely 
and relevant to the country in general, and to the construction industry sector in 
particular, since as of 07 December 2011 the preferential procurement 
regulations were amended to utilise a BBBEE scorecard system rather than using 
only the criteria of HDI shareholding to award preference points.  
The research study can benefit both government policymakers and the 
construction industry in several ways. The study findings offer an analysis of 
substantive and trustworthy research data that can be used to identify gaps in 
policy implementation; modify existing processes; and inform decisions on 
sunset clauses. Sunset clause refers to a predetermined time frame within which 
specific policies either end or are reviewed for future implementation. A key 
lesson on strategy implementation that can be learned from business is that 
nothing much improves until management starts to measure outcomes precisely 
(Nkuna, 2011). Most importantly, this research contributes to best practice with 
regard to monitoring, evaluating and reporting on measurable outcomes, and 
provides a reliable benchmark for measuring the outcomes of future preferential 
policies and programmes. 
1.8 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is comprised of 7 chapters. The outlines of Chapters 2 - 7 are 
described below. 
Chapter 2:  The Role of Public Procurement as a Mechanism to Promote Socio-
Economic Objectives 
This chapter presents a review of literature relating to the theoretical concepts 
of preferential procurement and its relationship to affirmative action and black 
economic empowerment goals. A chronology of the development of preferential 
procurement legislation in South Africa is included. The chapter also examines 
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international experiences on preferential procurement from the USA, Malaysia, 
India and other relevant countries. It shows that although the South African 
experience can be described as unique in many ways, the outcomes of 
international experience provide useful insights on key lessons learnt. 
Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology 
This chapter describes the research methodology and philosophical paradigm 
that guided the selection of the research methods and data analysis. The 
quantitative research paradigm which underpins the research is discussed in 
detail. This is followed by the research methods and techniques that were used 
to collect and analyze the data. 
Chapter 4: Results and Discussion of Treasury Data  
This chapter presents the results and findings of the data analysis of the Treasury 
data. 
Chapter 5: Results and Discussion of Survey Data 
This chapter presents the results and findings of the data analysis of the 
questionnaire survey data. 
Chapter 6: Interpretation and Discussion of Results  
This chapter interprets the results and empirical findings as they relate to the 
research objectives.  
Chapter 7: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter summarizes the research by revisiting the core research problem 
described in Chapter 1. It contextualizes the findings in relation to issues 
discovered in the literature review. The chapter also summarizes the key 
empirical findings and demonstrates the extent to which the research aim and 
objectives were met. Conclusions are drawn and the “contribution to 
knowledge” is highlighted with due consideration given to the research 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
16 
 
limitations of the study. Finally, a set of recommendations are proposed as a 
basis for further research endeavors. 
1.9 SUMMARY 
In this chapter the background to the research which forms the basis of this 
thesis was provided. The research problem was identified and the aim and 
objectives of the research stated. The relevance of the research, together with its 
contribution to the body of knowledge was also stated. The context of examining 
effectiveness was presented and the limitations of the study were identified. The 
structure of the thesis was outlined as an introduction to Chapter 2, which 
contains a detailed review of the literature that pertains to the research topic. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AS A 
MECHANISM TO PROMOTE SOCIO-ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this chapter is to establish the potential of public procurement 
as a mechanism to promote socio-economic objectives with particular attention 
to the construction industry. In addition, it attempts to identify the 
circumstances and factors that determined specific policies and legislative 
instruments as applied in other countries and the extent to which these have 
influenced policy making in South Africa. 
The chapter is structured in four parts. The first represents public procurement 
as an instrument of social policy and discusses social interventions from an 
international perspective with the particular focus on the experiences of 
Malaysia and the USA, because of their influence on preferential procurement 
policy development in South Africa. The second section looks at the evolution 
and implementation of preferential procurement in South Africa and examines 
the development of legislation and regulations pertaining to this policy. The third 
section examines the development and application of preferential procurement 
policies in the South African construction industry and identifies related 
legislation and support mechanisms that promote emerging enterprises. The 
fourth section draws conclusions on potential policy outcomes and discusses a 
basis to examine effectiveness of preferential procurement policies. 
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2.2 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOCIAL POLICY 
2.2.1 Background 
Governments can influence the direction and structure of the economy through 
its expenditure on assets and the provision of services, particularly in so far as 
employment and business opportunities are concerned (Bolton, 2004; 
McCrudden, 2004; Arrowsmith, 1995). 
The role of government in economic growth and development is fundamental to 
a country’s stability and prosperity. In a developing country it is generally 
accepted that socio-economic goals need to be a focal point in governmental 
policy framework, especially in countries where the majority of the population 
are excluded from the mainstream economy (Gounden, 2000; Letchmiah, 1998d; 
Watermeyer, Gounden, Letchmiah, 1998; RSA, 1997).  
In a country like South Africa there is a need for mechanisms that the 
government can utilise to address the economic inequities of centuries of 
systematic disempowerment of the majority population. The task of government 
is to develop and implement policies so that improve economic growth thereby 
advancing human development, sustained employment and equity amongst its 
citizens. In commenting on this topic, Dr. Mamphele Ramphele (2001), former 
Managing Director of the Human Development Unit of the World Bank stated 
that: “The essential objective is for African nations to leverage their own destiny 
and build capacity for themselves.”  
The use of public sector procurement as an instrument of government policy to 
achieve specific socio-economic objectives can have significant positive 
outcomes in a variety of areas ranging from the protection and development of 
national industry, to social policy goals such as the promotion of equal 
opportunity (McCrudden, 2004). Likewise, the use of procurement as a 
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regulatory tool to enforce existing legal obligations or to encourage standards of 
behavior beyond those required by law has the potential to be very effective 
(World Bank, 2003). 
A study undertaken for the European Community cites five principle socio-
economic or political functions for which public sector procurement may be used 
to achieve outcomes in addition to obtaining the required goods and services 
(McCrudden, 1995). These are: 
i. to stimulate economic activity; 
ii. to protect national industry against foreign competition;  
iii. to improve the competitiveness of certain industrial sectors;  
iv. to remedy regional disparities; and  
v. to achieve certain more direct social policy functions such as:  
 fostering job creation,  
 promoting fair labour conditions, 
 promoting the use of local labour, 
 prohibiting discrimination against minority groups, 
 improving environmental quality, 
 encouraging equality of opportunity between men and women; and 
 promoting increased employment of the disabled. 
2.2.2 Linking Social Outcomes to Public Procurement 
A common approach used to achieve socio-economic objectives in developing 
countries over the past few decades has been to establish special programmes 
involving construction projects (McCrudden, 2004; Watermeyer, 2000; 
Letchmiah, 1997). For example, since 1970, the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and the World Bank have engaged in employment 
programmes for rural road construction with the objective of substituting labour 
for capital intensive equipment in a cost effective manner (Watermeyer, 
Hauptfleisch, Jacquet and Letchmiah, 2000a). Special programmes such as these, 
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however, have a relatively small impact on the economy as a whole because 
expenditure on them is usually only a small fraction of public sector expenditure 
(Gounden, 2000). 
Many governments have justified the use of procurement as a mechanism for 
promoting socio-economic objectives, and there are many examples of its use as 
an instrument of policy (McCrudden, 1995). Bolton (2004) notes that in South 
Africa procurement is seen as one of the regulatory mechanisms used by 
government to address institutional gender discrimination and inequality. The 
use of preferential policies in public procurement has also extended to include 
the employment and promoting of business opportunities for disabled persons 
(Arrowsmith, 1995). McCrudden (2004) suggests that, although the use of public 
procurement as a tool to achieve socio-economic objectives is being increasingly 
implemented, the use of public procurement for social purposes was still mainly 
being used in the building sector. 
The characteristics of procurement policy to achieve socio-economic objectives 
may include such areas as gender, race, ethnicity, age, disability, religion, and 
caste, as well as meeting participation quotas or conditions for target groups 
(Letchmiah, 1996). 
Certain types of prescriptive instruments that are available to government, e.g. 
legislation, regulations, conditions of contract and set aside schemes (where the 
whole or part of a contract is set aside for a particular target group) are not 
necessarily efficient (Watermeyer, 2003; Letchmiah, 2001a). According to 
Watermeyer (2003), these instruments can constrain the private sector in its 
ability to deliver and are therefore not without controversy, with questions being 
raised regarding their legitimacy and effectiveness. 
Several schemes for using public procurement as a tool to achieve socio-
economic objectives have evolved in different countries and socio-political 
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contexts (McCrudden, 2004; Watermeyer, 2003; Manchidi and Harmond, 2002; 
Gounden, 2000). These include reservations, preferencing, and indirect and 
supply-side interventions. Table 2.1 lists these schemes and outlines the 
methods used to implement them through preferential procurement policies. 
Table 2.1: Types of Public Procurement Interventions 
Scheme 
Type 
Methods Action Associated with the Method 
Reservation 
Set asides 
Allow only enterprises that have prescribed 
characteristics to compete for the contracts or portions 
thereof, which have been reserved for their exclusive 
execution. 
Qualification 
criteria 
Exclude firms that cannot meet a specified requirement, 
or norm, relating to the policy objective from 
participation in contracts other than those provided for 
in the law. 
Contractual 
conditions 
Make policy objectives a contractual condition e.g. a 
fixed percentage of work must be subcontracted out to 
enterprises that have prescribed characteristics, or a 
joint venture must be entered into. 
Offering back 
Offer tenderers that satisfy criteria relating to policy 
objectives an opportunity to undertake the whole or 
part of the contract if that tenderer is prepared to match 
the price and quality of the best tender received. 
Preferencing 
Preferencing at the 
shortlisting stage 
Limit the number of suppliers / service providers who 
are invited to tender on the basis of qualifications and 
give a weighting to policy objectives along with the usual 
commercial criteria, such as quality, at the shortlisting 
stage.  
Award criteria 
(tender evaluation) 
Give a weighting to policy objectives along with the 
usual commercial criteria, such as price and quality, at 
the award stage.  
Indirect 
interventions 
Product/service 
specification 
State requirements in terms of product or service 
specifications, e.g. by specifying the use of labour-based 
construction methods. 
Design of 
specifications, 
contract conditions 
and procurement 
processes to 
benefit particular 
contractors 
Design specifications and/or set contract terms to 
facilitate participation by targeted groups of suppliers. 
Supply side 
interventions 
General assistance 
Provide support for targeted groups to compete for 
business, without giving these parties any favourable 
treatment in the actual procurement. 
Source: Watermeyer (2003)  
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Historically, attempts to link socio-economic objectives with public procurement 
originate mostly in the nineteenth century in England, the United States and 
France (McCrudden, 2004). Many studies indicate that both developed and 
developing countries continue to use public procurement as a mechanism to 
achieve a wide range of socio-economic objectives (Govender and Watermeyer, 
2001; Arrowsmith, 1995). Examples include the United Kingdom, India, Malaysia, 
Canada, the United States, Northern Ireland, Spain, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Namibia, 
Brazil, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Botswana and South Africa (McCrudden, 
2004; Watermeyer, 2003; Gounden, 1998; Arrowsmith, 1995; McCrudden, 1995).  
In countries where affirmative action is a social and political imperative it is not 
uncommon to find public procurement being used as a policy mechanism. For 
example, public procurement has been used to address racial inequality in the 
United States; ethnic inequality in Malaysia; and unfair treatment of aboriginals 
in Canada (McCrudden, 2004). In each of these cases a form of preferential 
procurement policy was utilized.  
McCrudden (2004) contends that the combination of public procurement and 
social policy goes beyond the simple awarding of contracts, and extends to 
include the definition of the contract, the required qualifications of contractors 
and the adjudication criteria for the award of the contract, amongst others. He 
also states that there is relatively little easily accessible information worldwide 
on the current extent and outcomes of procurement as a social policy 
mechanism. 
At the Eighth International Public Procurement Association (IPPA) Conference in 
Malaysia (20 - 22 May, 1997) a resolution was passed to recognize the 
contribution of public procurement towards achieving socio-economic 
development and to highlight the need for multilateral procurement rules to 
take cognizance of this based on the progress of economic development of 
individual nations. 
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A review of the literature indicates that the appropriate orientation of public 
sector procurement can enable governments to use its purchasing power to 
attain specified socio-economic objectives (Bolton, 2004; McCrudden, 2004; 
Arrowsmith, 1995). Within the South African context, public sector procurement 
was identified as a mechanism that could make a critical contribution to the 
transformation and democratization of South African society (RSA, 1997). In 
striving to meet these objectives governments have a responsibility to ensure 
that such procurement policies subscribe to international best practice and 
reinforce the principles of good governance. 
Notwithstanding the use of preferential procurement to promote social policies, 
the concept suffers from a lack of shared understanding (Kajimo-Shakantu, 
2007). Depending on the position of various interest groups there can be 
opposing views based on moral and social grounds (Watermeyer, 2000). 
Despite these differing viewpoints many governments continue to implement 
preferential policies in public procurement to achieve socio-economic goals 
(McCrudden and Gross, 2006). 
2.2.3 Creating Market Access for SME’s 
Preferences in public procurement are primarily aimed at eliminating barriers to 
entry with regard to access to business opportunities and are directed at those 
who have been historically disadvantaged. 
One of the key elements in the South African government’s strategy for social 
equality, employment creation and income generation of historically 
disadvantaged groups was to provide access to markets through government 
contracts. 
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2.3 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON SOCIAL INTERVENTIONS 
THROUGH PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
International experience on the use of public procurement to attain socio-
economic objectives indicates that several models have evolved based largely on 
country specific procurement regimes, socio-economic imperatives and multi-
lateral trade agreements. Many of the models are not necessarily efficient and 
can place constraints on the ability of private sector to deliver optimally 
(Watermeyer, Jacquet and Letchmiah, 2000c). Accordingly, the use of public 
procurement as an instrument of social policy is not without controversy and 
various questions have been raised with regard to its effectiveness, transparency 
and cost effectiveness. 
2.3.1 Historical Background of Preference Policies in Procurement 
A review of the literature on the history and use of government procurement as 
a tool of social regulation indicates that, while its use for achieving social 
objectives is widespread, detailed operational details are often exiguous and 
unavailable (Kajimo-Shakantu, 2007; McCrudden, 2004; Gounden, 2000; 
Watermeyer, 2000; Arrowsmith, 1995). Increasingly, governments are combining 
their regulatory role with their activities in the market as purchasers of supplies, 
services and works in order to advance aspects of social justice. McCrudden 
(2004) has labeled the combining of these two functions as the process of 
linkage. 
An early example of using government procurement to achieve social objectives 
was the Executive Order issued in 1840 by US President Van Buren which 
established a 10 hour working day for workers employed under certain 
government contracts (McCrudden, 2004).  Another example is the Special 
Contracts Arrangements (SCA), a British government scheme aimed at assisting 
employers of severely disabled people in the European economic area to 
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compete for contracts from UK government departments and agencies more 
successfully by requiring procurement authorities to give special consideration to 
buying from eligible suppliers (McCrudden, 2004). The scheme utilises a 
procurement method known as “offer back” under which a registered supplier is 
given an opportunity after tendering to match the best offer received, thereby 
allowing it to revise its tender in order to make it equally competitive 
(McCrudden, 2004; Watermeyer, 2003). Government procurement is used in 
many countries as a tool for reducing unemployment amongst certain categories 
of workers. According to McCrudden (2004), several large municipal 
governments in the Netherlands have used public procurement to increase the 
employment levels of long-term unemployed persons. 
The growth of the movement to end discrimination against black Americans, also 
known as the “civil rights movement”, galvanized the development of anti-
discrimination principles in the United States and other countries. During this 
period successive US Presidents issued Executive Orders requiring non-
discrimination by contractors on federal government contracts. These types of 
“affirmative action” measures by the US government from the mid- to late-
1960’s embodied the various approaches to addressing discrimination that went 
beyond simply prohibiting the action to include a wide spectrum of proactive 
measures intended to promote and achieve greater racial equality.  
These types of actions and their associated anti-discrimination legislation 
significantly influenced similar laws in other countries. For example, the 
American experience appears to have influenced government in the United 
Kingdom where legislation was enacted to address the problem of racial 
discrimination against black and Asian immigrants from Commonwealth 
countries (McCrudden, 2004). In turn, other Commonwealth countries adopted 
anti-discrimination legislation drawing from British and American legislation, 
with the Canadian provinces enacting human rights statutes from the early 
1960’s. In 1986 the Canadian government instituted a Federal Contractors 
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Programme which, according to McCrudden (2004), complimented Canada’s 
Federal Employment Equity Act. It requires that businesses that wish to bid on 
Canadian government contracts of a prescribed value commit to implementing 
employment equity, and demonstrate such commitment by signing a certificate 
in this regard.  
The development of an approach to achieving equality stemming from past 
discrimination also became closely linked with the movement for de-
colonization, which essentially was the movement for independence in countries 
that were formerly under colonial rule (McCrudden, 2004). The approach taken 
by the Indian government in its Constitution included both an anti-discrimination 
principle and the provision of extensive reservations for specific groups. This 
legislation, in turn, influenced other countries such as the British colony of 
Malaya which then comprised present day Malaysia and Singapore (McCrudden, 
2004).  
Following on the enactment of anti-discrimination laws to address racial issues, 
the development of legislation to deal with gender discrimination was another 
important milestone. And as this type of legislation expanded so did the use of 
procurement linkages as an enabling mechanism. Accordingly, by the late 1960’s 
affirmative action requirements were extended to benefit women in US federal 
government contracts to ensure that businesses owned by women would also 
participate in government contracts (McCrudden, 2004). 
2.3.2 Origins of Affirmative Action 
A review of the literature indicates that the term “affirmative action” originated 
in the United States (Weiner, 1993; Kennedy, 1993). According to Weiner (1993), 
affirmative action refers to very specific policies and programmes implemented 
by a government to redress the inequalities that exist within a society based on 
racial, ethnic, gender, caste and other categories. Kennedy (1993) comments 
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that affirmative action refers to policies intended to benefit historically 
disadvantaged racial groups which uses race as a basis for allocating benefits, 
and that the main triumphs of affirmative action in American society have been 
the growth of the Black middle class.  
The case for affirmative action in most countries is straightforward, with the 
intention being to benefit historically disadvantaged (subordinated) groups and 
the nation as a whole (Kennedy, 1993). Affirmative action programmes seek to 
enable members of such groups to attain occupational and economic 
advancement in numbers and at a pace that would otherwise be unattainable. 
Much of the early focus of affirmative action “struggles” centred on educational 
and employment opportunities for Black Americans, before evolving to include 
business opportunity and participation objectives.  
The phase “affirmative action” has its roots in Executive Order 10925 which was 
signed into law by US President Kennedy in March 1961. It stated that 
contractors doing business with the government "will take affirmative action to 
ensure that applicants are employed, and employees are treated during their 
employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin." The 
order did not promote preferential treatment of specific groups but was 
intended rather to eliminate discrimination in the traditional sense. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 solidified the legal status of affirmative action in the 
US (King, 1998; Weiner, 1993). Title VII of the Act offered a similar understanding 
of affirmative action as that established by Executive Order 10925 by stating that 
it was not designed "to grant preferential treatment to any group because of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." The authors of the Act emphasized 
this non-preferential interpretation when they wrote: "There is no requirement 
in Title VII that an employer maintain a racial balance in his workforce. On the 
contrary, any deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever such a 
balance may be, would involve a violation of Title VII, because maintaining such a 
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balance would require an employer to hire or refuse to hire on the basis of race." 
(Affirmative Action Law and Legal Definition, 2012) 
According to Days (1993), the American experience with affirmative action 
initially started with race conscious remedies for education and employment 
opportunities to increase the participation of black Americans and was not 
supposed to be an economic development programme. As such, it was 
implemented to break down the intense social structures that excluded minority 
groups. Over time other countries took the concept of affirmative action as 
defined by the American experience and adapted it to their own socio-political-
cultural context. 
The US programmes that were specifically designed to implement affirmative 
action and address empowerment originated when US federal government 
adopted targeted approaches to ensure that contractors did not discriminate 
against blacks in terms of businesses and employment opportunities (Days, 
1993). These programmes date back to the early 1940’s during the 
administration of US President Roosevelt and are sometimes referred to as the 
“Executive Order Programmes” (Noon, 2009; Days, 1993).  
Although executive orders embodied an anti-discrimination principle, for many 
years they lacked meaningful enforcement mechanisms. Then in 1961 Kennedy’s 
Executive Order 10925 went beyond simply prohibiting discrimination and 
imposed a proactive duty upon contractors to ensure that job applicants from all 
population groups were employed and treated on an equal basis (Noon, 2009; 
McCrudden, 2004; Weiner, 1993). In the early 1970’s, the Equal Opportunity 
Employment Commission (which was created by Order 10925) went further by 
establishing quotas or statistical goals for the employment of certain minority 
groups (Weiner, 1993).  
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According to Days (1993), the 1960’s were considered the decade for 
experimentation and innovation is US affirmative action programmes, while the 
1970’s ushered in a period of legal challenges to such programmes. The outcome 
of these challenges was  that the American courts instructed the US government 
to re-design its affirmative action programmes to address historic discrimination 
for so long as was necessary to achieve programme objectives whilst 
simultaneously minimizing any adverse impact on non-minority groups (Days, 
1993). According to Days (1993), these decisions were made, at least in the initial 
stages, in the absence of reliable data to assess the impact of the programmes. 
The origins of affirmative action in South Africa can be linked to the development 
of the Sullivan Principles which provided a set of non-discrimination and 
affirmative action principles that, although not legally binding, targeted foreign 
corporations operating in South Africa. A particular emphasis was placed on 
American companies.  
These principles are considered to be among the earliest attempts to develop 
norms and standards for human rights in the country (McCrudden, 2004). 
According to McCrudden (2004), one of the techniques adopted to enforce the 
application of the Sullivan Principles (often under political pressure from Non 
Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) operating in South Africa) was the threat by 
the US government that non-conforming companies could be deprived of US 
government contracts. 
South Africa and Malaysia are examples of countries that adopted the concept of 
affirmative action as originated by the American model. Another example is 
Northern Ireland, where the American approach was emulated much more 
closely than in the rest of the United Kingdom in an attempt to tackle the 
discrimination and inequality that persisted between Catholics and Protestants 
(McCrudden, 2004).  
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In Malaysia, affirmative action programmes were introduced during the colonial 
period to favour Malays, and post-independence affirmative action programmes 
were a continuation and intensification of these policies (Emsley, 1996). 
Although some observers might argue that affirmative action programmes are 
only justified when the targeted beneficiaries are disadvantaged minorities, in 
the Malaysian context the aim of affirmative action is to benefit the majority 
group. This is also the case in South Africa. 
Evidence from many countries suggests that a broad range of initiatives designed 
to advance disadvantaged groups (usually minority groups) are often loosely and 
collectively labeled as affirmative action programmes.  However, it is the 
author’s contention that the focus of this discussion should not be on 
terminology but rather on the types of interventions that can best deal with the 
socio-economic inequalities of a particular country. Weiner (1993) contends that 
it is unfortunate that the term “affirmative action” was imported to South Africa 
since it is a purely American term intended to deal with the problems of specific 
disadvantaged minorities. 
2.3.3 The USA Experience 
In the US the construction industry was the first sector targeted by the federal 
government to implement affirmative action procurement strategies for 
government projects (McCrudden, 1995). Since infrastructure projects are 
greatly dependent on public funds, legislation was enacted to provide set-aside 
programmes that required a portion of the contracts to be awarded to minority 
owned businesses (Kajimo-Shakantu, 2007; McCrudden, 2004).  
In the US set-aside programmes were introduced to ensure that a portion of 
Public Works funded construction contracts would be secured by black-owned 
businesses in an attempt to promote the entrepreneurial black middle class 
(Chatterji, Chay and Fairlie, 2010; Days, 1993). According to Chatterji et al (2010) 
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and McCrudden (2004), an early example was the Public Works Employment Act 
of 1997 which provided that at least 10 percent of the budget for local public 
works projects under the Act were to be allocated to minority business 
enterprises.  
According to Kajimo-Shakantu (2007), the set-aside programme allowed only 
targeted groups to tender and was not a system open to everyone. In this regard, 
a waiver of the set-aside requirement could only be obtained if the set-aside 
could not be fulfilled by minority businesses located within a reasonable trading 
area (McCrudden, 2004). Similar programmes were created by federal agencies, 
and by state and local government authorities that implemented public works 
construction projects. 
Under the Act, the targeted beneficiaries are termed Minority Business 
Enterprises (MBE) (also referred to as Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBE)) 
which are defined as businesses with ownership of 50 percent or more by 
minority group members defined to include Black Americans (Marion, 2005; 
McCrudden, 2004). Legislation supporting affirmative action in public 
procurement in the US is linked to the Small Business Act (SBA) of 1953 which 
was enacted to allow government contracts to be set aside for small enterprises. 
Presently, the use of set-aside programmes has been severely curtailed based on 
Supreme Court rulings stemming from legal and constitutional challenges to set-
aside policies (Crosby, Iyer, Clayton and Downing, 2003). 
Despite a lack of empirical studies in the literature, some research has 
contributed to identifying the impact of MBE programmes in the US. A study by 
Myers and Chan (1996) indicated that despite the number of contracts awarded 
during the set-aside programme, the success rate of MBE’s winning tenders did 
not increase when compared with white owned firms. The study suggested that 
MBE programmes did not substantially improve the competitiveness of black 
owned firms. However, it did indicate that the MBE programmes were effective 
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in providing access to markets for minority owned businesses and in enabling 
them to gain a foothold and increase tender opportunities in the construction 
industry. This view is supported by Blanchflower and Wainwright (2005), who 
contend that utilization of minorities and women in public procurement declines 
rapidly where affirmative action programmes are removed and replaced with 
race or gender-neutral programmes. 
Others studies indicate that the US set-aside programmes have resulted in fronts 
and switches (Lanoue, 1992). Switches occur when ownership is transferred from 
husband to wife so that the business can qualify as a women owned enterprise 
or when white males establish front companies with a woman or minority person 
as the owner to benefit from the set-aside programmes, but where such person 
has no effective control in the management and running of the business (Kajimo-
Shakantu, 2007; Blanchflower and Wainwright, 2005; King, 1998; Lanoue, 1992).  
According to Lanoue (1992), a study of the construction industry in Atlanta 
supports the findings of fronting and “pass through” activities, and confirms that 
such abuses were rife in MBE programmes. The abuse of the system was mainly 
attributed to the lack of verification and monitoring of the businesses. The 
fronting problem was further compounded by the absence of penalties or 
sanctions being imposed for non-compliance (Bates & Williams, 1995). However, 
Bates and Williams (1995) also contend that fronting is substantially reduced 
when MBE certification is applied. 
A combination of certification and monitoring effectively required contractors 
with large government contracts to submit implementation plans that included 
analysis of minority utilization in all job categories; targets with timeframes to 
correct the under-representation of minorities; and the development of data 
collection systems and reporting plans to document progress in achieving the 
specified affirmation action goals (Days, 1993). Failure by a contractor to meet 
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the contract goals resulted in financial penalties and sanctions that included de-
barring from future government contracts (Days, 1993).  
Days (1993) contends that the SBA, although intended to help minority 
businesses develop to a point of independence at which they would no longer 
need support, became an entrenched programme in which only a few businesses 
graduated out while many continued to rely on government assistance. Days 
(1993) further contends that an affirmative action policy programme should not 
be limited to creating small businesses, most of which fail after three years, but 
should facilitate further opportunities where small businesses could gain skills, 
resources and networks for sustainable success. The objective is to have an 
enabling environment that creates businesses that can reach a point of take off 
and thereafter continue on a successful trajectory by effectively competing for 
contracts in both the public and private sector (Days, 1993). 
2.3.4 The Malaysian Experience 
The Malaysian experience with preferential procurement over more than 30 
years provides a useful case study that addresses key issues on equality and 
redistribution amongst historically disadvantaged population sectors (Yusof and 
Bhattasali, 2008). The South African Preferential Procurement Policy appears to 
mirror the Malaysian experience in using procurement to address economic and 
social imbalances. Malaysia used a comprehensive system of affirmative action 
policies designed to benefit the politically dominant, but economically weak, 
Malay majority (Emsley, 1996). 
The formation of Malaysia in 1963 resulted in the broadening of the special 
rights provisions to new groups and a new term “bumiputra” was introduced to 
encompass the diverse indigenous groups (Puthucheary, 1993). According to 
McCrudden, this lead to the incorporation into the independent constitution of 
provisions which was modeled on the Indian constitution guaranteeing non-
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discrimination but at the same time providing for the possibility of reservations 
in favour of the Bumiputras. 
The major thrust of Malaysia’s efforts was through the implementation of the 
New Economic Policy (NEP). The NEP, promulgated in 1971, was an ambitious 
programme aimed at redistributing wealth, eradicating poverty, and 
restructuring society with the primary aim of benefiting the majority Malaysian 
Population (Emsley, 1996; Weiner, 1993; Snodgrass, 1980). The NEP was not only 
an economic programme, but was also a social political agenda to ensure 
equitable distribution amongst social groups, to promote national unity and to 
maintain political stability on the basis of sustained economic growth (Simpson, 
2005; Abdullah, 1997; Snodgrass, 1980). The NEP was essentially an affirmative 
action programme necessitated by the pressing problems of economic inequality 
between races, which was a byproduct and legacy of colonialism (Emsley, 1996; 
Puthucheary, 1993). Yusof et al (2008) state that the NEP’s main focus was on a 
major distributional transformation of the Malaysian economy, and that from its 
inception it was able to make remarkable progress. 
The NEP had a two-pronged development programme of which the first was 
aimed at eliminating poverty by increasing employment opportunities and 
raising income levels for all Malaysians, irrespective of race. The second was 
aimed at accelerating the process of restructuring Malaysian society by creating 
business opportunities to correct economic imbalances, in particular for the 
Bumiputras (Emsley, 1996; Hart, 1994). The “restructuring” prong of the NEP was 
comprised of a quota system for Malays in education, employment, and 
government contracts, along with measures to restructure the ownership of 
corporate equity holdings. 
For example the Industrial Co-ordination Act of 1975 stipulated that 30% of the 
equity of firms producing for the domestic market had to be set aside for the 
Malays; employment quotas for Malays in export as well as domestic industries 
Chapter 2: The Role of Public Procurement as a Mechanism to Promote Socio-Economic Objectives 
35 
 
has to be enforced; and firms were required to use Malay distributors for a 
minimum of 30% of turnover (Hart, 1994). Hart (1994) concludes that the NEP 
demonstrates that a highly interventionist state can indeed redefine the 
conditions of access to resources and opportunities along racial or ethnic lines. 
The Malaysian government was both determined and assertive about its targets 
to restructure the economy. Accordingly, it set a timetable that within a period 
of 20 years from the inception of the NEP Malays and other indigenous people 
would manage and own at least 30% of the total commercial and industrial 
activities in all categories (Abdullah, 1997). In order to achieve this, the 
Government played a significant interventionist role in implementing its 
transformation policies. Large companies with capital and employment above 
certain levels were also required by government to restructure their ownership 
to ensure Bumiputra participation and shareholding (Puthucheary, 1993). 
It is important to note that the NEP’s objectives were intended to be achieved in 
the context of an expanding economy. Snodgrass (1980) contends that Malaysia 
undertook its redistribution and restructuring drive in the 1970’s and 1980’s 
within the context of economic growth which offered increasing opportunities 
for all Malaysians and therefore created an environment where no particular 
group experienced any loss or felt any sense of being deprived. Accordingly, 
Malaysia achieved a high growth rate while at the same time achieving most of 
its redistributive affirmative action objectives. 
Abdullah (1997) concludes that at the end of NEP’s 20 year time frame the 
Bumiputra in the 1990’s (especially the Malays) were certainly much better off, 
socially and economically, than they were in the late 1960’s. The number of 
Malay business establishments also increased which reflected the escalating 
purchasing power of the Malays. It appears certain that the affirmative action 
policies implemented under the NEP successfully improved the socio-economic 
positions of the long neglected and economically backward Bumiputra groups. 
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Abdulla (1997) further states that despite the NEP not achieving 100% of it 
targets at the end of its 20 year time frame (1970 – 1990), overall its 
achievements and impact in relative terms can be described as phenomenal and 
hugely successful. 
According to official estimates, Malay ownership of corporate assets was 
between 18% - 19% in the late 1980’s, well short of the NEP target of 30% (Hart, 
1994). At the time of its official conclusion in 1990, spectacular strides had been 
made towards meeting most targets (Simpson, 2005). As noted above, sustained 
economic growth played a pivotal role in the successful restructuring of the 
Malaysian economy and the readdressing of ethnic imbalances (Simpson, 2005). 
The NEP led to an expansion of construction activities with the acceleration of 
public sector development expenditure, mainly in infrastructure projects 
(Madya, Abdullah, Chiet, Anuar and Shen, 2004). The country’s transformation 
from an agriculture based economy to industrialization contributed to the 
development of the construction industry. The construction industry was also 
important in providing the infrastructure required for socio-economic 
development and contributing directly to economic growth in Malaysia. During 
the early stages of independence the Malaysian government directed its 
attention to promoting socio-economic objectives for the target groups by 
implementing rural development projects, amongst others. An important 
element in the Malaysian strategy was the use of procurement contracts that 
were structured in such a way that it would promote an entrepreneurial Malay 
middle class over time. In terms of planning for procurement of works contracts, 
at least thirty percent of the annual value of contracts was set aside for 
Bumiputra contractors (McCrudden, 2004). 
At the same time, Puthucheary (1993) notes that many problems persisted, such 
as conflicts between the dominant Malays and other indigenous groups and 
underlying tension between the Chinese and Malays despite the political alliance 
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successfully promoting high economic growth and greater equity. According to 
Puthucheary (1993), the terms of the constitutional commission that made 
recommendations for a democratic Malaysia required it to make provision to 
safeguard the position of the Malays and, in addition, to protect the legitimate 
interest of other communities so that all citizens of Malaysia would enjoy the 
fundamental rights of equality. In its recommendations the commission 
proposed that these special privileges be subjected to review after fifteen years 
in order to determine whether quota systems should be retained, reduced or 
discontinued in its entirety (Puthucheary, 1993). 
Affirmative action programmes were introduced where wealth was measured in 
terms of equity ownership and statistical targets were set for economic 
transformation. The aim was that within a 20 year period Malay ownership of 
share capital would increase from less than two percent in 1969 to about 30 
percent by 1990 (Puthucheary, 1993). The affirmative action programmes 
accordingly contributed to the establishment of a Malay business community 
which was one of the stated objectives of the NEP.  
One of the strategies employed by the non-Malay business community was to 
establish joint venture companies with Malay ownership. According to 
Puthucheary (1993), the willingness and co-operation of the non-targeted groups 
to give the affirmative action programmes a chance to succeed was a major 
factor contributing to their success. Puthucheary (1993) goes on to state that 
because there is a tendency for the benefits of affirmative action programmes to 
benefit disproportionately those at the upper end of the social spectrum, to 
avoid this anomaly policy objectives should seek to create a sustainable middle 
class.  
According to Puthucheary (1993), the Malaysian experience showed that 
disadvantaged groups could not take advantage of those opportunities because 
they had not attained the skills level or had little experience in an open capitalist 
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system to make proper use of market opportunities offered by government. This 
presents an important lesson for South Africa in that it is necessary to identify 
whether the preferential procurement programmes and supportive policies have 
been implemented in a way that may have promoted the interest of the more 
economically developed sectors of the target groups at the expense of 
economically disadvantaged persons in South Africa. 
The Malaysian experience also shows that there is a need to continuously 
respond to outcomes and results, and to initiate adjustments to policies. 
According to Yusof et al (2008), the affirmative action policies in the NEP were 
implemented during a new and uncertain era and that their impact and 
experiential learning lay in the actual outcomes of the policies. Built into the 
implementation of the NEP were the mechanisms to monitor, evaluate and, 
where possible, adjust the linkages between economic growth and distribution 
(Yusof et al, 2008). 
Malaysia provided South Africa with an interesting comparative case for 
affirmative action since the target group in Malaysia, like in South Africa, was the 
majority population group. According to Hart (1994), a very different 
configuration of social forces were applicable in Malaysia during the NEP 
compared to that confronted by South Africa in that South Africa had a highly 
organized and mobile working class. It was also very differently situated in an 
increasing integrated global economy. Hart (1994) argues further that rather 
than a model, Malaysia serves as a set of lenses which can help to clarify the 
possibility and limits of transformation in South Africa. 
2.3.5 Experiences of Other Countries 
India - According to Beteille (1993), the Indian example illustrates a particular 
form of affirmative action in which reservations are used as the predominant 
form for achieving equity among social groups. The Indian experience is referred 
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to as a programme of positive discrimination or a policy of reservations   and 
dates back to colonial times. The constitution of India makes reference to the 
schedule Tribes and the schedule Castes in the context of positive discrimination 
(Beteille, 1993). These categories are reasonably well defined and there is a fair 
amount of consensus about the need for special provisions for these groups. The 
early positive discrimination (reservations) applied primarily to jobs in 
government and to access to education opportunities. Procurement regulations 
in India stipulate that certain products must be purchased exclusively from the 
small business sector provided that prices are within fifteen percent of that 
offered by the closest competitors which are intended to promote artisans and 
small scale firms (Kajimo-Shakantu, 2007; Srivastava, 2003). According to 
Agarwal (2012), the government of India recently approved a Public 
Procurement Policy that would require all central ministries and public sector 
units to procure at least 20 percent of their total annual purchases from the 
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME). This brings India in line with 
global practices and follows the examples of the European Union, Australia, 
Brazil and China where similar policies are already put in place (Agarwal, 2012). 
 
Sri Lanka - The Sri Lankan experience according to Weiner (1993) raises a 
fundamental question as to whether affirmative action programmes intended to 
achieve greater equality amongst ethnic groups results in the unintended 
consequence of increasing ethnic conflict. The special affirmative action policies 
to benefit the Sinhalese community in Sri Lanka intensified the political divisions 
that led to the civil war that was destructive for the entire country (Weiner, 
1993). According to Samarasinghe (1993), Sri Lanka’s affirmative action 
programme and policies originated primarily to help the Sinhalese majority to 
gain what they considered to be a fair share of the national economy.  
Affirmative action in Sri Lanka is defined as any public programme or policy that 
is implemented by either the state or by the private sector in a way that is 
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designed to help a particular designated group in society to obtain a share of 
resources that it would not be able to obtain otherwise (Samarasinghe, 1993). 
Canada - Procurement measures in Canada were put in place in March 1996 to 
increase the participation of Aboriginal business in tendering for federal 
government contracts (McCrudden, 2004). This initiative, according to 
McCrudden (2004) consisted of the following different elements: 
1. Emphasis on Aboriginal economic development in public procurement 
policy; 
2. Mandatory set-asides intended for Aboriginal population groups for 
contracts above a certain threshold which were; and 
3. Selective set-asides on specific contracts to provide sub-contracting 
opportunities for Aboriginal firms.  
These mandatory and selective development activities were aimed to achieve to 
increased representation of Aboriginal business in contracts awarded by the 
public sector. In addition, the participation of Aboriginal business through sub-
contracting was also encouraged in the procurement review process. 
South African Development Community (SADC) countries – Namibia has similar 
challenges to the South African situation in having to integrate racially 
disadvantaged persons into the mainstream economy after independence. The 
Namibian government has recognised the benefits of using some of the 
preferential procurement strategies that were developed in South Africa to 
realize socio-economic objectives in its labour-based programmes and in 
promoting the participation of small scale enterprises in construction projects 
(Govender et al, 2001). Botswana conducted an overall review of the central 
government’s procurement policies, practices and procedures. (Govender et al, 
2001). According to Govender et al (2001), Botswana provides a margin of 
preference in the adjudication of construction tenders where the tenderer is a 
citizen (indigenous) contractor, a joint venture with citizen contractors or a 
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foreign contractor that is in association with citizen contractors and/or 
maximizes sub-contracting opportunities to citizen contractors. In joint ventures, 
citizen contractors are required to undertake a minimum of 25% of the contract 
amount in order for the tendering entity to qualify for preferences (Govender et 
al, 2001). 
2.4 THE EVOLUTION OF PREFERENTIAL PROCUREMENT IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
2.4.1 The Reconstruction and Development Programme 
In 1994, following the first democratic election in the Republic of South Africa, 
the South African government adopted the Reconstruction and Development 
Program (RDP), a comprehensive socio-economic policy instrument aimed at 
eradicating the legacy of apartheid, which had left South Africa with an economy 
which was inward focused, distorted by growth inequities, inefficiencies and 
underdeveloped resources and markets. 
The RDP can be equated to the Roosevelt New Deal which was designed to pull 
the US out of the Great Depression, and to the Marshall plan which was aimed at 
rebuilding the war ravaged economies of Europe after the Second World War 
(Gounden, 2000).   
The RDP provided the ideological backdrop to discussions about ways of 
transforming the country’s public procurement process. It recognized the 
challenge of stimulating economic growth by economically empowering the 
previously marginalized sectors of the South African society. A central objective 
of the RDP was the de-racialisation of business ownership and control through 
focused socio-economic interventions. This vision of an equitable economy, 
which had its roots in the Freedom Charter of 1955, was refined and developed 
in the contemporary context of the RDP (RSA, 2003a). 
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The African National Congress (ANC) realised the importance of small, medium 
and micro enterprises (SMME’s) in the macro economic development of South 
Africa, and understood that they were had been largely ignored in the past (RSA, 
1997). It also recognized that historically the tendering system favoured larger 
and more established businesses, and that it was very difficult for new and 
emerging enterprises to compete successfully in the existing public sector 
procurement system (Gounden, 2000; Watermeyer et al, 1998). As a result, 
policy makers decided to use the public sector procurement system to help 
eliminate past injustices by making the procurement process easily accessible to 
new and emerging businesses.  
2.4.2 The Public Sector Procurement Reform Task Team 
After an initial review of the regulatory environment that impacted upon public 
sector procurement, the government concluded that procurement reform could 
not be undertaken on a sector by sector basis, but rather that a fundamental 
review of the entire public sector procurement system was required (Manchidi 
and Harmond, 2002; Gounden, 2000; Letchmiah, 1998c). This resulted in the 
Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Finance embarking on a joint 
initiative in February 1995 to transform public sector procurement policy and 
systems in South Africa (Letchmiah, 2001b). 
A Procurement Reform Task Team consisting of government officials and private 
sector consultants was appointed to research and draft new policy proposals. 
The author was appointed Leader of this team. From the outset the 
transformation of the public sector procurement system had two primary 
objectives: 
(1) The promotion of good governance within the sphere of public sector 
procurement; and 
(2) To utilize public sector procurement as a vehicle to achieve specific socio-
economic objectives such as the promotion of targeted small and 
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medium enterprises, enhanced job creation, business opportunities, skills 
and technology transfer and other related goals. 
Soon after the first democratic elections in April 1994 the new government 
began investigating international models which could be emulated in post-
apartheid South Africa. Malaysia became the leading example because of the 
many similarities in its history, and political and economic development. At the 
time, few societies in the world had undertaken as massive an economic 
redistribution based on racial or ethnic criteria as Malaysia (Puthucheary, 1993; 
McCrudden, 2004). Because its New Economic Policy (NEP) had successfully 
achieved many of its goals, South Africans were encouraged to look to Malaysia 
for solutions (Hart, 1994). As Hart (1994) contends, however, the invocation of 
“comparative models” and “international experience” is often a means by which 
allegedly superior knowledge is used to preclude debate. 
A preliminary review of South Africa’s existing procurement policies and systems 
identified a tendency for the awarding of public sector contracts to be skewed 
towards large established companies (Letchmiah, 2001a; Gounden, 2000; 
Watermeyer et al, 1998). Further, the participation of SMMEs in public sector 
procurement, particularly enterprises owned and controlled by previously 
disadvantaged individuals (i.e., persons who did not have political franchise prior 
to the 1994 elections), was negligible (Manchidi and Harmond, 2002; Gounden, 
2000). Accordingly, a decision was made to base the transformation of public 
sector procurement on two strategies to be implemented concurrently. The first 
strategy was to develop a substantially new procurement policy for South Africa 
linked to legislative reform. The outcome of this strategy was the Green Paper on 
Public Sector Procurement. This strategy was implemented concurrently with a 
series of interim strategies that were labeled the Interim Strategies: A Ten Point 
Plan. These were developed to be implemented over the immediate short term, 
albeit within the ambit of the extant flawed legislation. 
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The Procurement Reform Task Team undertook various study trips and consulted 
with many international experts before making recommendations on 
procurement reform. The experiences of the US and Malaysia in particular 
provided valuable insight and served as a guide to formulating preferential 
procurement policies in South Africa (Letchmiah and Manchidi, 2001; Letchmiah, 
1997). The work of the Procurement Task Team concluded with the release of 
the Green Paper on Public Procurement Reform.  
2.4.3 Ten Point Plan 
One of the urgent outputs of the Procurement Task Team was to develop a set of 
interim strategies that would make the public sector tendering system 
immediately accessible to historically disadvantaged target groups within the 
context of good governance. The outcome of this was termed the “Interim Ten 
Point Plan on Procurement” which was a series of interim interventions primarily 
aimed at impacting positively on the participation of small and medium 
enterprises, in particular those owned by previously disadvantaged persons 
(Letchmiah, 1999b). 
The Ten Point Plan was adopted by the then National Cabinet of Unity in 
November 1995 as its interim procurement policy. The two key thrusts were the 
price preference policy and the strategy for breakout procurement (i.e. 
unbundling of large contracts). The 10 Point Plan provided for an 88/12 points 
formulation for goods and services and an 85/15 for building and construction 
works. 
The ten interim interventions contained in the plan are listed in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2:  10 Point Plan – Interim Strategies 
1. Improving access to tendering information 
2. The development of tender advice centres 
3. Broadening the participation base for contracts less than R7 500 
4. The waiving of security /sureties on construction contracts having a value of less 
than R100 000 
5. The unbundling of large projects into smaller contracts 
6. The promotion of early payment cycles by government 
7. The development of a preferencing system for small and medium enterprises 
owned by historically disadvantaged individuals 
8. The simplification of tender submission requirements 
9. The appointment of a procurement ombudsman 
10. The classification of building and engineering contracts 
Source: RSA (1995) 
2.4.4 Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform in South Africa 
The Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement in South Africa was released with 
the full endorsement of the National Cabinet in April 1997. In his message 
contained in the forward to the Green Paper, then Minister of Finance, Trevor 
Manuel, stated: “In the past, the tendering system favoured larger, established 
companies, and it was very difficult (if not impossible) for newly established 
businesses to enter the public tendering system.” (RSA, 1997, p. 7). All the 
principles contained in the Ten Point Plan on Procurement were incorporated 
into the Green Paper. 
The Green Paper recognized that government, as the largest purchaser of goods 
and services in the economy, could leverage its purchasing power in support of 
its socio-economic policy objectives (RSA, 2003a). This view formed the 
foundation of the procurement reform process and the subsequent development 
of policies and procedures. The perspective articulated by the Green Paper was 
that an effective and efficient procurement system would permit Organs of State 
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to deliver the quality and quantity of services required by its new constituency in 
accordance with its policies, which were articulated in the RDP. 
The Green Paper contained the following two basic themes, viz.: 
 Achieving good governance in procurement; and 
 Achieving socio-economic objectives through procurement 
The pillars upon which socio-economic issues were formulated are set out in 
Table 2.3.  
 
Table 2.3: Pillars of procurement reform in respect of socio-economic issues 
(i) Public sector procurement should be structured in a manner that promotes economic 
reconciliation and competitiveness. 
(ii) The structuring of contracts should be such that small, medium and micro enterprise 
participation is maximized without compromising time, cost and quality. 
(iii) Value for money should not be based on least cost alone; it can include well defined 
socio-economic criteria which can be evaluated in a transparent and measurable 
manner. 
(iv) Targets should be set and delivery systems designed to facilitate one or more of the 
following subject to such targets being readily definable, quantifiable, measurable, 
auditable and verifiable: 
 the development of small, medium and micro enterprises particularly those 
owned and operated by previously disadvantaged persons; 
 increasing of the volume of work available to the poor and the income 
generation of marginalized sectors of society; and affirmative action to address 
the deliberate marginalization from economic, political and social power of 
black people, women and rural communities and to empower communities 
and individuals from previously disadvantaged sectors of society. 
(v) The procurement process should be made accessible to the target groups and 
structured in a simplified and user friendly manner. 
(vi) The third tier of government should identify area bound targets and select associated 
delivery mechanisms. 
(vii) Organs of State should take cognisance of regional and local dynamics when 
implementing procurement policy and associated practices. 
Source: RSA (1997) 
 
The Green Paper (RSA, 1997), inter alia, addressed and provided principles and 
proposals in respect of: 
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 Access to tendering information and simplification of tender 
documents 
 Break-out procurement (unbundling) 
 Awarding of tenders in terms of a development objective/price 
mechanism 
 An affirmative small, medium and micro enterprise participation 
programme 
 Promoting employment-intensive practices 
 Affirming marginalized sectors of society in construction projects; and 
 The development of an affirmative procurement policy. 
It also set out an affirmative SMME programme which was aimed at: 
 reducing disparities in business ownership 
 directing some of the flow of commerce to and through those 
population segments which historically were underutilized and 
excluded from participation 
 engaging SMMEs in public sector procurement activities through 
prime (main) contractors on medium to large public sector contracts 
 providing accessible markets; and 
 forging linkages with large scale enterprises (RSA, 1997). 
The Green Paper advocated an affirmative small, medium and micro enterprise 
participation programme that “should be integrated with development initiatives 
aimed at enhancing the business capacity and skills of established small, medium 
and micro enterprises, and would provide work opportunities for those 
enterprises which had graduated from initiatives aimed at developing new small, 
medium and micro enterprise capacity” (RSA, 1997, p70). 
It also outlined an Affirmative Procurement Policy needed to enact the vision of 
the Procurement Reform Process and to facilitate the engagement of previously 
disadvantaged enterprises and communities. The paper envisaged that the policy 
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would promote: programmes aimed at the engagement of SMMEs owned by 
previously disadvantaged persons; an increase in the volume of work available to 
the poor; and income generation for marginalized sectors of society. 
The Green Paper policy proposals attempted to address these issues and 
proposed strategies that integrated international best practice with South 
African specificities. The presentation of new concepts such as a targeted 
procurement policy, life cycle costing, value for money, and appropriate risk 
management strategies indicated government's commitment to the 
development of a procurement system that would respond to the needs of South 
African society (RSA , 1997). The new proposals provided wide ranging and far 
reaching implications for all stakeholders engaging in the public sector 
procurement process. 
A White Paper represents government’s official position on new policy proposals 
which follows from a process of consultations with various stakeholders. In the 
absence of a White Paper on South African Public Sector Procurement, several 
pieces of legislation which either dealt specifically with aspects of procurement 
or made reference to procurement were promulgated directly from the Green 
Paper proposals.  
 According to the World Bank’s Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR) 
for South Africa, the non-formalization of the Green Paper created numerous 
challenges from the outset for implementing policy in a comprehensive and 
coherent manner. This was due to new legislation and regulations being passed 
without addressing the significant blockages and problems inherent in the legal 
and institutional framework (World Bank, 2003). 
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2.4.5 The Constitutional and Legislative Framework pertaining to Public 
Procurement 
The public procurement system in South Africa is unique in that the principles 
governing procurement are contained in the South African Constitution (Bolton, 
2008). According to McCrudden (2004), due to economic disparities, it was not 
unexpected that public procurement became one of the regulatory mechanisms 
used to redress the effects of institutional discrimination and inequality in South 
Africa after the dismantling of apartheid. 
Over time, and in particular from 1994, the South African public sector 
procurement environment has been influenced by key policies and legislative 
acts as shown in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4:  Chronological development of key procurement policies and 
legislation 
Date Policy or legislation Impact on preferential procurement 
1968 State Tender Board 
Act of 1968, (Act 
No. 66 of 1968, as 
amended) 
The Act formulated a procurement regime to 
allow the procurement process at the national 
level to be regulated through the 
establishment of the State Tender Board. 
1994 Provincial Tender 
Board Acts, e.g. 
Gauteng Provincial 
Tender Board (Act 
No.2 of 1994) 
The interim and current Constitution 
established nine provinces. The Act formulated 
a procurement regime that allowed for a 
procurement process in the provinces and was 
formulated in line with the State Tender Board 
Act of 1994 (Act No. 86 of 1968, as amended). 
November 
1995 
Public Sector 
Procurement 
Reform in South 
Africa, Interim 
Strategies (a 10-Point 
Plan) 
Interim strategies aimed at increasing the 
participation of previously disadvantaged 
enterprises. It was only 
applicable for use within the state 
procurement legislation, i.e., applicable within 
the ambits of the State Tender Board Act (Act 
No. 86 of 1968, as amended), and as a guiding 
framework for the provinces (i.e. not 
enforceable). 
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Table 2.4:  Chronological development of key procurement policies and 
legislation 
Date Policy or legislation Impact on preferential procurement 
February 
1996 
Constitution of the 
Republic of South 
Africa (Act No. 108 
of 1996) 
The Constitution requires the procurement 
process to be fair, equitable, transparent, 
competitive and cost effective and that, in 
addition, national legislation must prescribe a 
preferential policy framework. The Interim 
Constitution of RSA (Act No. 200 of 1993) did 
not cater for preferencing. The final 
Constitution was therefore influenced by the 
10-Point Plan. 
February 
1999 
Public Finance 
Management Act 
(Act NO.1 of 1999, as 
amended by Act 
No. 29 of 1999) 
The Act promotes good financial management 
at national and provincial levels. It requires 
accounting officers to have a procurement 
system that is fair, equitable, transparent, 
competitive and cost-effective, as required by 
the Constitution. It also authorizes the 
National Treasury to issue procurement 
regulations as and when necessary. The 
Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) 
applies to local government. 
February 
2000 
Preferential 
Procurement 
Framework Act (Act 
No.5 of 2000) 
The Act is intended to give effect to Section 
217(2) of the Constitution to provide a 
framework for preferencing. Regulations to 
this effect were issued in August 2001 and 
subsequently changed in December 2011. 
January 
2004 
Broad-based Black 
Economic 
Empowerment Act 
(Act No. 53 of 2003) 
The Act provides a legislative framework for 
the promotion of black economic 
empowerment. It also enables the Minister of 
Trade and Industry  to issue codes of good 
practice and to publish transformation 
charters and, in addition, to establish the Black 
Economic Empowerment Advisory Council  
Source: RSA (2003a); Manchidi and Harmond (2002) 
The 1994 Interim Constitution made aspects of procurement a subject of the 
Constitution. This led to the reform of public sector procurement in South Africa. 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108) was subsequently 
legislated in 1996 and included Section 217 which forms the basis for public 
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sector procurement legislation. The relevant provisions contained in Section 217 
are listed in Table 2.5.  
Table 2.5: Constitutional Provisions Pertaining to Procurement 
1. Good Governance 
When an organ of state in the national provincial or local sphere of government; 
or any other institution identified in national legislation, contracts for goods or 
services, it must do so in accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, 
transparent, competitive and cost-effective. 
2. Socio-Economic  
Provision (1) above does not prevent the organs of state or institutions referred to 
in that subsection from implementing a procurement policy that provides for: 
a.  categories of preference in the allocation of contracts; and 
b. the protection or advancement of persons, or categories of persons,   
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. 
3. Framework for Implementation 
National legislation must prescribe a framework within which the policy referred 
to in subsection (2) may be implemented. 
Source: RSA (1996b) 
The Constitution therefore establishes the primary and secondary procurement 
objectives. The policy for the "good governance" aspects of procurement which 
is captured in sub-section (1) of Table 2.5 establishes a framework for 
procurement that is consistent with international norms and standards. South 
Africa's preferential procurement policy is derived from sub-section (2) of Table 
2.5 in that it proposes a preferencing scheme to protect or advance persons 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. Furthermore, the requirement that 
national legislation must prescribe a framework within which the preferential 
procurement policy must be implemented is identified in sub-section (3) in Table 
2.5. 
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Procurement reform commenced in 1995 with the appointment of a Task Team 
by the Ministries of Finance and Public Works and concluded with the release of 
the Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform in 1997. Procurement 
reform focused on the two constitutional requirements, that being (i) good 
governance in procurement and (ii) the attainment of socio-economic objectives 
through procurement which resulted in subsequent legislation as summarized in 
Figure 2.1. 
In summary, the constitutional and legislative framework facilitates a cost 
effective procurement system which provides, encourages and promotes the  
government's socio-economic objectives in a definable, quantifiable, 
measurable, verifiable and auditable manner, within a fair, equitable, 
competitive, cost effective and transparent environment, without (RSA, 1997):  
 over-taxing the administrative capacity of government; 
 creating unfair competition within sectors of the economy; 
 abusing or lowering labour standards; 
 
Figure 2.1: Legislative Framework of Procurement 
Source: RSA (2003b), RSA (2000a), RSA (1999), RSA (1996b) 
SA Constitution 
(1996) 
Good governance 
in procurement 
Attaining socio-
economic 
objectives through 
procurement 
Public Finance Management Act (1999) 
(for National and Provincial Government) 
+ 
Municipal Finance Management Act (1999) 
(for Local Government) 
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework 
Act (2000) 
+ 
Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment 
Act (2003) 
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 exposing government to unacceptable risks; 
 compromising value for money; or 
 compromising the efficiency and effectiveness of the private sector to 
deliver. 
According to Watermeyer (2003), the constitutional requirements for 
procurement is consistent with the objectives of The United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model laws and as such follows 
international best practice. 
2.4.6 The Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act  
The Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (PPPFA) (Act 5 of 2000) was 
intended to give effect to Section 217(2) of the Constitution and to provide a 
framework within which procurement policies referred to therein must be 
implemented. The preferential procurement policy was defined as a 
procurement policy contemplated in Section 217(2) of the Constitution (RSA, 
2000a) 
The Act requires Organs of State (through Accounting Officers) to determine 
their preferential procurement policy and to implement it within a framework. 
The Framework provided by the Act required a preference points system to be 
developed as indicated in Table 2.6. 
No preferencing outside of the points system provided for in the Act was 
permitted. This meant in practice that tenderers who obtained the highest 
number of points could only have their tenders rejected should they: 
 had insufficient capacity or capability to deliver; or 
 were under suspension from participating in public procurement for 
prior actions.  
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Table 2.6:  Framework for the Implementation of the Preferential 
Procurement Policy 
1. For contracts with a Rand value above a prescribed amount, a maximum of 10 
points may be allocated for specific goals provided that the lowest acceptable 
tender scores 90 points for price. 
2. For contracts with a Rand value equal to or below a prescribed amount, a 
maximum of 20 points may be allocated for specific goals provided that the 
lowest acceptable tender scores 80 points for price.  
3. Any other acceptable tenders which are higher in price must score fewer points 
on a pro rata basis, calculated on their tender prices in relation to the lowest 
acceptable tender in accordance with a prescribed formula. 
4. The specific goals may include: 
(i) contracting with persons, or categories of persons, historically 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the basis of race, gender or 
disability and referred to as historically disadvantaged individuals (HDI) 
(ii) implementing the programmes of the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme  
5. Any specific goal for which a point may be awarded must be clearly specified in 
the invitation to submit a tender. 
6. The contract must be awarded to the tenderer who scores the highest points 
unless objective criteria in addition to that pertaining to specific goals justify the 
award to another tenderer.  
7. Any contract awarded on account of false information furnished by a tenderer to 
secure preference points may be cancelled at the sole discretion of the organ of 
state. 
8. Any goals for which preference points may be awarded must be measurable, 
quantifiable and monitored for compliance. 
Source: RSA (2000a) 
 
An historically disadvantaged individual (HDI) was defined as a South African 
citizen who, due to the apartheid policy before 1994, had no franchise in national 
elections; or is female; or has a disability (RSA, 2001). Specific goals for which 
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preference points could be awarded included, inter-alia, the promotion of South 
African owned enterprises; the creation of new jobs; the promotion of 
enterprises in a specific region, municipality, or rural area; and the improvement 
of communities (Bolton, 2008; RSA, 2001). 
According to the Preferential Procurement Regulations (RSA, 2001), the following 
activities as set out in Table 2.7 were permitted to be regarded as a contribution 
towards achieving the goals of the RDP as envisaged in the preferential 
procurement policy. 
Table 2.7: Socio-economic goals of the RDP 
Item Description 
1.  The promotion of South African owned enterprises 
2.  The promotion of export orientated production to create jobs 
3.  The promotion of SMMEs 
4.  The creation of new jobs or the intensification of labour absorption 
5.  The promotion of enterprises located in a specific province for work to be done 
or services to be rendered in that province 
6.  The promotion of enterprises located in a specific region for work to be done 
or services to be rendered in that region 
7.  The promotion of enterprises located in a specific municipal area for work to 
be done or services to be rendered in that municipal area 
8.  The promotion of enterprises located in rural areas 
9.  The empowerment of the work force by standardising the level of skill and 
knowledge of workers 
10. The development of human resources, including by assisting in tertiary and 
other advanced training programmes, in line with key indicators such as 
percentage of wage bill spent on  education and training and improvement of 
management skills 
11. The upliftment of communities through, but not limited to, housing, transport, 
schools, infrastructure  donations, and charity organizations 
Source: RSA (2001, pp. 13-14) 
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The PPPFA provided for regulations to be used as necessary to advise the 
objectives of the policy. These regulations in some instances converted the 
general framework provided for in the Act into a series of prescriptions (Bolton, 
2004; Watermeyer, 2003).   
The principles that underpinned the Regulations of the PPPFA stipulated, inter 
alia, the following: 
 Tender adjudication criteria must include preference points for equity 
ownership by HDI’s. 
 The equity ownership must be equated to the percentage of an 
enterprise owned by HDI’s, or in respect of a company, the 
percentage of a company’s shares that are owned by HDI’s 
 HDI’s claiming preference points for ownership must be actively 
involved in the management of the enterprise and exercise control 
over the business in a way that is commensurate with their degree of 
ownership as applicable at the tender closing date 
 In the event that the percentage of ownership changes during the 
tender adjudication stage and prior to tender award, the tenderer 
must notify the relevant organ of state and such tenderer will not be 
eligible for any preference points 
 Preference points may not be awarded to public companies and 
tertiary institutions 
 A declaration and supporting documentation to substantiate HDI 
ownership must be submitted as specified in the tender 
 A 25% maximum restriction on the value of the value that could be 
sub-contracted to non-HDI’s by those HDI’s awarded contracts as a 
result of preference points (RSA, 2001). 
The PPPFA and its regulations also provided for penalties. These included that 
the use of false information by a tenderer to obtain preference points may result 
in the termination of the awarded contract; the recovery of all costs, losses and 
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damages incurred by the organ of state; and debarment from future contract 
awards (RSA, 2001). 
2.4.7 Public Finance Management Act  
The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) (Act 1 of 1999) regulates financial 
management and provides the framework for good governance in procurement 
at national and provincial government levels. The PFMA is intended to support 
the principles of good governance as stipulated in Section 217 (1) of the 
Constitution which is to give effect to a procurement system that is fair, 
equitable, transparent, competitive and cost effective (RSA, 1996b). 
The PFMA applies to all organs of state other than municipalities and municipal 
entities (municipalities and municipal entities are regulated by the Municipal 
Finance Management Act (MFMA), Act 56 of 2003). The PFMA requires 
accounting officers (head of departments / chief executive officers of 
constitutional institutions) and accounting authorities (board / controlling body / 
chief executive officer in an entity which has no board or controlling authority) to 
have an appropriate procurement and provisioning system in place which is fair, 
equitable, transparent, competitive and cost effective, together with an 
effective, efficient and transparent systems of financial and risk management 
and internal control for procurement, and a system for properly evaluating all 
major capital projects prior to a final decision on the project (RSA, 1999).  
Section 76(4) of the PFMA (RSA, 1999) permits the National Treasury to make 
regulations or issue instructions applicable to all institutions to which the Act 
applies with regard to the determination of a framework for an appropriate 
procurement system which is fair, equitable. transparent; competitive and cost 
effective as required by the Constitution (RSA, 1996). 
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Policy guidelines for the issuance of a Supply Chain Management Framework in 
terms of the PMFA introduce uniform norms and standards within government 
to ensure transparency and expenditure control measures as required in sections 
215 to 219 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996). In essence, these guidelines 
determine the underlying support structure that sets the parameters for 
procurement management within government, and consolidates supply chain 
policy in all spheres of government and for all organs of state.  
2.4.8 Promotion of Equality and Unfair Discrimination Act  
The Promotion of Equality and the Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (Act 4 
of 2000) expressly prohibits the state from discriminating unfairly against any 
person on the grounds of race through the denial of access to contractual 
opportunities for rendering services or by failing to take steps to reasonably 
accommodate the needs of such persons. A schedule attached to the Act 
provides an illustrative list of unfair practices in certain sectors. This list includes, 
inter alia, the unfair restriction of contracts opportunities for the supply of goods 
and services (RSA, 2000c). 
It is important to note that a preference system using a points scoring system, 
strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Preferential Procurement Policy 
Framework Act, is not considered to be unfair discrimination as no person is 
denied an opportunity to tender. According to Gounden (2000), any preferential 
procurement policy that uses exclusionary mechanisms may be considered as 
unfair discrimination. The following are examples of such mechanisms: 
 set asides, i.e. allowing only enterprises that have prescribed 
characteristics to compete for the contracts or portions thereof and 
which accordingly are reserved for their exclusive execution; 
 contractual conditions, i.e. making policy objectives an unfair 
contractual condition e.g. specifying a fixed percentage of work to 
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be subcontracted to enterprises or joint ventures that have 
prescribed ownership profiles; 
 qualification criteria, i.e. excluding firms that cannot meet a 
specified requirement relating to the policy objective from 
participating in contracts, other than those objectives provided for in 
other forms of legislation, and; 
 offering back, i.e. offering tenderers that satisfy criteria relating to 
policy objectives an opportunity to undertake the whole or part of 
the contract if that tenderer is prepared to match the price and 
quality offered by the most responsive tenderer. 
2.4.9 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment  
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is defined as “an integrated and coherent 
socio-economic process that directly contributes to the economic transformation 
of South Africa and brings about significant increases in the number of black 
people who manage, own and control the country’s economy, as well as 
significant decreases in income inequalities” (RSA, 2003a, p. 12).  
The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) Act (Act 53 of 2003) 
was introduced when government realized that the extent to which black 
people, a generic term for “Africans, Coloureds and Indians” who are South 
African citizens, participated meaningfully in the economy had remained limited 
since 1994, despite some progress being made (Bolton, 2008). The Act addressed 
the lack of a comprehensive BEE strategy and drew together the various 
elements of the government’s transformation programme in a more coherent 
and focused way. Most importantly, it attempted to provide a more common 
definition and understanding of what is meant by black economic 
empowerment. Critically, it was a shift from a narrow-based BEE policy that 
focused primarily on ownership by HDI’s to a broad-based BEE policy that 
measures the status of an enterprise using a “balanced scorecard” that takes into 
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account seven related empowerment elements in evaluating a business 
enterprise (Letchmiah, 2011). An enterprise’s scorecard now forms the basis of 
awarding preference points during tender adjudication. 
The objectives of the Act are, inter alia, to facilitate broad-based black economic 
empowerment by promoting economic transformation; to enable meaningful 
participation by black people; achieving a substantial change in the racial 
composition of ownership and management structures of existing and new 
enterprises; increasing access to economic activities for disadvantaged sectors of 
society; and promoting investment programmes and access to finance for black 
economic empowerment in order to achieve sustainable development and 
investment in general property (RSA, 2003b). 
To promote such objectives the BBBEE Act expands the framework provided in 
the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act and enables the Minister of 
Trade and Industry to issue codes of good practice on black economic 
empowerment that may include adjudication criteria for preferential purposes in 
procurement; indicators to measure broad-based black economic 
empowerment; and the weighting attached to such indicators (RSA, 2003b). The 
Act also provides for Codes of Good Practice to specify targets that are consistent 
with the objectives, and to provide sunset clauses that indicate the period within 
which such targets must be achieved. It furthermore provides for the use of 
qualification criteria for the issuing of licenses, the sale of state owned assets and 
the entering into of public private partnerships. 
In addition, every organ of state is required to take into account and, as far as is 
reasonably possible, apply any relevant code of good practice issued in terms of 
the Act in developing and implementing a preferential procurement policy. 
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In order to bring its application more in line with the BBBEE Act, 2003 (BBBEEA), 
the PPPFA regulations were re-drafted to establish a legislative framework for 
the promotion of black economic empowerment (Bolton, 2008). 
2.4.10 Construction Sector Charter 
The BBBEE Act requires the Minister of Trade and Industry to publish and 
promote transformation charters together with codes of good practice for 
particular sectors of the economy in order to address inequalities specific to a 
sector, and to thereby unlock that sector’s potential and enhance its growth 
(RSA, 2003b). 
The Construction Sector Charter (RSA, 2006) was published under the direction 
of the National Department of Public Works and provided the basis for the 
development of a Construction Code of Good Practice as published in the 
Government Gazette No. 32305 on 05 June 2009. The Code provides a 
framework for the construction sector to address and implement broad-based 
transformation, enhance capacity and increase the productivity of the sector. In 
general, the Construction Code of Good Practice supports all the objectives of 
the Construction Sector Transformation Charter and in particular sets out to 
achieve the following objectives as illustrated in Table 2.8. 
The Construction Charter applies to all enterprises that are involved in the 
creation, expansion and/or maintenance of fixed assets related to residential or 
non-residential buildings, infrastructure or any other form of construction works 
in South Africa (RSA, 2006). 
The scorecard for contractors engaging in the construction sector comprises 
seven elements which are each measured and weighted to equal a total score of 
100 as set out in Table 2.9. This scorecard, with effect from 07 December 2011, 
forms the basis on which preference points are awarded to tenderers in terms of 
Chapter 2: The Role of Public Procurement as a Mechanism to Promote Socio-Economic Objectives 
62 
 
the PPPFA. The Built Environment Professionals (BEP’s) practising in the 
construction industry are subject to a scorecard which have differences in the 
weighting score of two of the elements, i.e. skills development and enterprise 
development. 
Table 2.8: Objectives of the Construction Sector Charter 
Item Description 
1. Achieve a substantial change in the racial and gender composition of  
ownership, control, and management in the sector 
2. Promote the effective advancement of employment equity in the sector 
and adherence to principles of non-racialism and non-sexism 
3. Provide to the construction sector the first quantitative method for 
monitoring and evaluating the progress of an enterprise towards BBBEE 
and thereby contribute to ending the malpractice of fronting 
4. Expand the employment potential and absorption capacity of the sector  
using labour-intensive approaches where economically feasible and  
possible 
5. Address skills development in a manner that accelerates the 
advancement of black people, black women and designated groups with a 
particular emphasis on learnerships, technical and management training 
6. Increase the procurement of goods and services from BBBEE enterprises  
and standardise preferential procurement methodology 
7. Enhance entrepreneurial development and promote the sustainable 
growth of micro, medium and small BBBEE enterprises 
Source RSA (2009, p 7) 
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Table 2.9: Construction Sector Scorecard for Contractors 
Element Weighting 
Ownership 25% 
Control 10% 
Employment Equity 10% 
Skills Development 15% 
Procurement 20% 
Enterprise Development 15% 
Socio-economic development initiatives (Corporate social investment) 5% 
Total 100% 
Source: RSA (2009) 
The BBBEE status of a construction sector enterprise, after calculating its score in 
terms of the scorecard, is then classified in terms of the following “contributor” 
levels as per Table 2.10. 
Table 2.10: BBBEE Status of a Construction Sector Enterprise 
BBBEE Level Required Score 
 Level 1 Contributor Total score of 100% and above 
 Level 2  Contributor Total score of ≥ 85% < 100% 
 Level 3  Contributor Total score of ≥ 75% < 85% 
 Level 4  Contributor Total score of ≥ 65% < 75% 
 Level 5  Contributor Total score of ≥ 55% < 65% 
 Level 6  Contributor Total score of ≥ 45% < 55% 
 Level 7  Contributor Total score of ≥ 40% < 45% 
 Level 8  Contributor Total score of ≥ 30% < 40% 
 Level 9  Contributor Total score of less than 30% 
Source (RSA, 2006) 
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2.4.11 Preferential Procurement Regulations, 2011 
The PPPFA enables the Minister of Finance to make regulations as may be 
necessary to achieve the objectives of the Act (RSA, 2000a). New Preferential 
Procurement Regulations pertaining to the PPPFA were gazetted on 08 June 
2011 and became effective from 07 December 2011, and accordingly replaced 
the Preferential Procurement Regulations of 2001. These new Regulations 
became effective after the end of the five year period, i.e. from April 2006 to 
March 2011, which is the focus of this study. This period was used primarily 
because it covers the years for which National Treasury data on procurement 
were made available to this researcher.  
The new PPPFA regulations stipulate that preference points must be awarded to 
a tenderer on the basis of its BBBEE scorecard level and no longer on its HDI 
ownership status, as was previously applicable. In addition, the threshold value 
for the 80/20 and 90/10 preference points system was increased from R0.5 
million to R1 million. 
Currently, preference points are awarded to tenderers on the basis of the BBBEE 
scorecard as prescribed in the 2011 Regulations as shown in Table 2.11. 
Table 2.11: Awarding of Preference Points based on the BBBEE Scorecard 
BBBEE Status Level of 
Contributor 
Tenders ≤R1m using the 
80/20 points system 
(maximum = 20 points) 
Tenders >R1m using the 
90/10 points system 
(maximum = 10 points) 
Level 1 20 10 
Level 2 18 9 
Level 3 16 8 
Level 4 12 5 
Level 5 8 4 
Level 6 6 3 
Level 7 4 2 
Level 8 2 1 
Non-compliant contributor 0 0 
Source: RSA (2011) 
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Construction based enterprises with annual turnover exceeding R35 million are 
required to comply with all seven elements of the scorecard, while Qualifying 
Small Enterprises (QSE) with turnover between R5 million and R35 million may 
select any four of the seven elements of the scorecard. Those enterprises with an 
annual turnover less than R5 million are classified as Exempted Micro Enterprises 
(EME) and such businesses are automatically considered as Level 4 Contributors 
(RSA, 2009).  
Tenderers applying for preference points must submit a valid BBBEE scorecard 
certificate issued by an approved verification agency that is registered with the 
South African National Accreditation System (SANAS) to conduct such verification 
(RSA, 2003b). 
Tenderers awarded contracts on the basis of preference points may not, in 
general, sub-contract more than 25% of the value of the contract to any other 
enterprise that does not have an equal or higher BBBEE status level (RSA, 2011). 
2.4.12 International Trade Considerations 
A policy of using public procurement to achieve socio-economic objectives must 
also take into account the impact of international trade considerations. Most 
South African industries are not yet in a position to compete on a par with their 
international counter-parts (RSA , 1997). There are a number of reasons for this, 
including the fact that they have not gone through the full development cycle 
experienced by other developed economies. Accordingly, many South African 
industries would find it very difficult to compete both locally and abroad if all 
forms of preference and support for locally manufactured products were 
abolished (RSA , 1997).  
Whilst State regulatory policy should aim to achieve its goals in an international 
context, it has to take into consideration the support required for the 
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development of South African industry, and the creation of local job 
opportunities. The public procurement policy therefore must respond to key 
issues of national priority such as the upliftment of previously disadvantaged 
sections of the community, whilst also reflecting on issues pertinent to 
international trading, and how these issues will be managed. It is necessary for 
South African enterprises to become competitive both on the local and 
international markets. 
From an international perspective, the continuation of a procurement 
preference system should not exclude broader international policies which can 
yield increased future benefits (RSA , 1997).  
According to McCrudden (2004), where public procurement is subject to one of 
the international trade agreements, the application or specific requirement to 
incorporate socio-economic objectives may be regarded as inconsistent with 
those trade agreements. Watchwords such as “governance” and 
“implementation culture” have come to be associated with concern over the 
standard of public administration and with efforts to combat corruption 
(Letchmiah, 1999b). 
2.5 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PREFERENTIAL PROCUREMENT IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
According to Yusof et al (2008), implementation matters a great deal in the 
successful execution of economic policies. Even the best policy can be ineffective 
if it is poorly implemented. Policies must be turned into actions to deliver results 
that are tangible. The successful implementation of policies requires effective 
institutions; leadership; and clarity of purpose, processes and mechanisms. 
Policies must be coordinated and consistent. A good delivery system is therefore 
essential for the implementation of economic policies. A system of oversight on 
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implementation is essential and must be developed and maintained at all levels 
of government.  
2.5.1 The Concept of Preferential Procurement 
Public sector procurement in South Africa, as in most countries, has a major 
impact on the macro economy, both in terms of consumption and investment 
spending (Gounden, 2000). At the same time, an effective and efficient 
procurement system is necessary for the South African government to deliver 
the quality and quantity of services demanded by its new constituency 
(Letchmiah, 2001b). A fundamental requirement for any new procurement policy 
in a developing country is that it be in line with the national economic growth 
strategy and relate to both the local and international environment (Emsley, 
1996).  
Preferential procurement policy is defined by Watermeyer (2003:11) as a 
“procurement policy that provides objectives additional to those associated with 
the immediate objective of procurement itself.” In the South African context, a 
preferential procurement policy is defined by Kajimo-Shakantu (2007:30) as “a 
policy which favours preference in the award of contracts either directly or 
indirectly to certain categories of people or groups, based on prescribed 
characteristics, in order to achieve specific secondary objectives of procurement.” 
The South African Government has to also ensure that public funds are expended 
in a way that all segments of the population benefit the expenditure through job 
creation and commercial opportunities. It must also purposefully direct the flow 
of commerce to and through those population groups which were historically 
disadvantaged and excluded from participation. An effective way of doing this is 
to ensure that participation in procurement activities is achieved through: 
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 making the tendering process accessible to the target group (without, 
however, guaranteeing work); and 
 linking opportunities to target business enterprises with a 
concomitant flow of responsibility. 
Public procurement interventions are comprised of mechanisms aimed at the 
engagement of SMMEs owned by previously disadvantaged persons in all types 
of government contracts and at maximizing job creation. Notwithstanding this, 
Bolton (2008) argues that sunset provisions should be built into the system to 
ensure programmes do not continue to protect and advance targeted persons 
and sectors of society beyond a justifiable period of time. 
In the implementation of policies to achieve socio-economic objectives 
preferential procurement must take into account the elements of good 
governance. Some of the essential elements that characterize good governance 
in this context are listed in Table 2.12. 
Public procurement policies should in the long term: 
 facilitate growth in the numbers and sizes of business enterprises 
owned and controlled by the target groups, as well as in terms of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of delivery; 
 businesses should compete for the award of contracts; and 
 measures which are adopted to secure participation by target group 
enterprises should fall away once such enterprises reach 
predetermined turnover milestones (i.e. they should have sunset 
clauses). 
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Table 2.12:  The Essential Elements of Good Governance and Socio-economic 
Objectives 
1. To promote effective and efficient procurement practices and systems to 
enable government to timeously deliver the quantity and quality of services 
demanded by its constituents 
2. To achieve continuing improvement in value for money based on whole life 
cost and quality 
3. To enhance the competitiveness of suppliers through the development of 
world class procurement systems and practices 
4. To ensure that control and accountability is maintained through 
comprehensive auditing 
5. To achieve a uniform procurement system with standardized tendering 
procedures, policies and contract documentation for implementation at 
national and regional levels 
6. To ensure that public sector procurement complies with the provisions of the 
Constitution 
7. To ensure consensus within government on the reform of the public 
procurement process, and to encourage the adoption of the reformed 
process by all public sector procurement agencies 
8. To seek value for money on behalf of all taxpayers 
9. To eliminate corruption in the procurement process 
10. To make the public procurement process accessible to all by simplifying the 
process, and by encouraging fairness and transparency 
11. To encourage greater competition in the public procurement process through 
the creation of an enabling environment for small, medium and micro-
enterprises while retaining quality and standards 
Source: RSA (1997) 
 
2.5.2 Adjudication of Tenders on a Points System 
In order for a tender to be adjudicated it must first be responsive. A responsive 
tender is one which conforms to all the terms, conditions and specifications of 
the contract without material deviation or qualification (Letchmiah, 1999a). 
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Traditional South African practice provided for a government tender to be 
awarded to the lowest tenderer, as this was considered to represent value for 
money. In terms of preferential procurement, it is apparent that value for money 
is no longer measured by the monetary cost alone, i.e. the lowest price tender 
does not automatically ensure the best value for money. Depending on tender 
requirements, value for money could be interpreted to include HDI shareholding 
of the tendering entity and/or the re-structuring of the contract to provide the 
most employment opportunities per unit of expenditure, or providing an 
acceptable technical offer and an exceptional human resource development 
offer (Watermeyer et al, 2000a). 
A point scoring system implies that tenders are awarded in the first instance, for 
points relating to the financial offer, and in the second instance, for the offer to 
meet the specified socio-economic objectives or their current enterprises status. 
This type of system permits human resource / socio-economic objective offers to 
be considered together with the financial offer. 
Tender adjudication points for specific goals in terms of the PPPFA Regulations 
(RSA, 2001) could be awarded for meeting and/or exceeding targets specified, 
inter alia, in respect of: 
 the use of local resources 
 the use of labour intensive methods  
 the use of small, medium and micro enterprises  
 job creation 
 equity shareholders 
 affirmative action principles 
 promotion of local enterprises 
 skills training and development; and 
 community and social investment. 
The above is in addition to awarding points for HDI shareholding in an enterprise. 
Chapter 2: The Role of Public Procurement as a Mechanism to Promote Socio-Economic Objectives 
71 
 
Tenderers are awarded points out of 100 based on price and preference. 
According to Bolton (2008), the points system is dual scale in that more 
preference points are awarded for lower value contracts and less preference 
points for higher value contracts. 
In terms of the 2001 Regulations (RSA, 2001), the 80/20 points system applied 
for contracts between R30 000 and R500 000 whereby 80 points were awarded 
for the lowest responsive price and a maximum of 20 points for shareholding by 
historically disadvantaged individuals; for sub-contracting with HDI owned 
enterprises; or attaining other specified goals. For contracts exceeding R500 000, 
the 90/10 points system applied, whereby 90 points were awarded for the 
lowest responsive price and a maximum of 10 points for shareholding by an HDI; 
for sub-contracting with HDI owned enterprises; or attaining other specified 
goals. 
According to the PPPFA Regulations (RSA, 2001), the recommended formula for 
the awarding of points in respect of the financial offer is: 
Ps = M [ 1 – (


)] 
Where  
Ps = number of adjudication points scored for price of tender under 
consideration 
Pmin = the price of the lowest responsive tender  
Pt = the price of the tender under consideration  
M = maximum number of points allocated for price. 
According to Watermeyer et al (1998), the use of this tender adjudication 
mechanism: 
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 enables tenderers to use their skill, knowledge and creativity in 
arriving at a favourable mix between economic and development 
objectives 
 penalises those persons who fall outside the targeted groups, or who 
offer to meet certain socio-economic objectives to only a limited 
degree, but does not preclude them from tendering; and 
 prevents those who fall within a targeted group from presenting 
grossly uncompetitive tender prices, as the reward for compliance 
with socio-economic objectives will be outweighed by the loss off 
points incurred through uncompetitive tender prices since the 
maximum number of points which can be scored is 100. 
2.5.3 Monitoring and Evaluation 
The PPPFA (RSA, 2000a) stipulates all socio-economic goals to be measurable, 
quantifiable and monitored for compliance. 
A prerequisite to the proper application of monitoring systems is an effective 
control process aimed at ensuring due compliance through all stages of the 
contract (Letchmiah, 1998a). Such control process must generate adequate 
records to reflect the current status and performance of all beneficiaries. 
Socio-economic undertakings should be set out in a manner which can be readily 
incorporated as contractual requirements in a contract. According to 
Watermeyer et al (2000a) this process should, inter alia: 
 Define the deliverables; 
 Set out the method by which the attainment of the deliverables may 
be met; 
 Set out the means by which progress towards the attainment of the 
deliverables may be quantified at various intervals; 
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 Set out the method by which the attainment of the deliverables may 
be audited and verified; and 
 Provide for financial penalties to be applied in the event that interim 
and final deliverables are not achieved. 
In the absence of well structured monitoring and evaluation systems, any 
undertaking to promote socio-economic objectives merely becomes a promise 
that is dependent on the goodwill of the supplier. Furthermore, a system without 
checks and balances is prone to abuse and eventual corruption wherein the 
credibility of the procurement agency comes into question. Gounden (2000) 
suggests that procurement related failures relating to the promotion of social 
policies occur when principles of good governance are ignored and where 
institutional mechanisms are lacking.  
A 2000 study in South Africa identified a lack of monitoring procedures and 
reporting processes at both national and provincial levels which limited an 
accurate assessment of the effectiveness of preferential procurement in 
benefitting those for whom it was intended (Aus Aid, 2000). The World Bank 
arrived at a similar conclusion in their Country Procurement Assessment Report 
(CPAR) on the South African procurement arrangements and implementation 
systems (World Bank, 2003). 
2.5.4 Anti-Corruption Measures and Contract Compliance   
There continues to be widespread criticism of fraud and corruption in the form 
of fronting by businesses and the manipulation of the tender processes by 
government officials (Nkuna, 2011; Mokone, 2010). This undermines the 
objectives of promoting socio-economic development and the process of  
preferential procurement as envisaged in the PPPFA. In 2005, the National 
Department of Public works announced its findings of a probe into “fronting” in 
the construction industry and the consequent blacklisting of companies by the 
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National Treasury and the Construction Industry development Board (Ancer, 
2005). According to Rampedi (2012), another concern is the growing trend of 
paying “kickbacks” to corrupt politicians and government officials to win 
contracts even when the most competitive tenders are submitted. According to 
the World Bank, the lack of institutional mechanisms and proper monitoring is 
likely to result in the abuse of the preferential procurement policy (World Bank, 
2003).  
The government’s plan to move from a narrow based black economic 
empowerment policy based primarily on HDI ownership in an enterprise to a 
broad based black economic empowerment policy based on the balanced 
scorecard is an attempt to address the issue of fronting. Another effective 
preventative measure to minimize fraud and corruption in public procurement is 
to enforce contract compliance by monitoring, verifying and auditing socio-
economic deliverables and, where applicable, applying strict sanctions for non-
compliance.  Transparency regarding the potential and actual distributional 
consequences of preferential procurement policies can also be an effective anti-
corruption measure. 
Minority Business Enterprise programmes in the Atlanta (USA) construction 
industry also experienced the problem of fronting where non-minority owned 
businesses secured contracts by using minority business enterprises as fronts 
(Kajimo-Shakantu, 2007). According to Bates and Williams (1995), businesses 
flourish in the absence of sanctions for fraudulent activities but benefit in an 
environment in which certification and contract compliance measures are 
comprehensive. An example of effective monitoring and enforcement, according 
to McCrudden (2004), was in Northern Ireland where compulsory monitoring 
and self assessment was introduced. One of the enforcement techniques 
involved the possibility of barring tenderers from future government contract 
opportunities if there was consistent failure to comply. Businesses who were in 
default of the legislation by not submitting monitoring returns faced penalties as 
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well as economic sanctions such as being excluded from public procurement 
contracts (McCrudden, 2004). 
In South Africa, The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004 
(Act No. 12 of 2004) makes corruption and related activities a criminal offence, 
establishes a Register to identify these persons and enterprises convicted of 
corrupt tender related activities and also places a duty on organs of state to 
report corrupt transactions (Watermeyer, 2011). 
2.5.5 Financial Premiums and Redefining Value for Money 
Historically, South African government tenders were awarded to the lowest 
priced tender which was reversed only when there was clear evidence that the 
tenderer did not have the necessary experience or capacity to undertake the 
work, or was financially unsound (Manchidi et al, 2002; Gounden, 2000). In other 
words, traditional practice considered the lowest tendered offer to represent 
best value for money. 
In the changed environment within South Africa, the definition of value for 
money in the public procurement sector cannot be measured by monetary cost 
alone. It must also take into account the extent to which the offer provides 
increased business opportunities to targeted groups and/or makes an 
exceptional commitment to human resource development. If, however, the state 
moves away from awarding contracts to the lowest priced tenders in order to 
reward tenderers for the socio-economic components of their tenders, tender 
evaluation criteria must be clearly defined and communicated in the tender 
documents to enable tenderers to compete on an equitable basis and in a 
transparent manner. 
A successful tender would, normally, be the one that is awarded the most points, 
subject to performance capability and financial references being acceptable. The 
financial premium, if any, which an organ of the state is prepared to pay to meet 
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the specific socio-economic objectives can be managed in the formulation of the 
points mechanism. 
In competitive tendering, the premium payable for incorporating socio-economic 
objectives into projects can be minimized, as tenderers would compete on the 
basis of both price and socio-economic objectives. Market forces will dictate the 
degree to which contractors can meet socio-economic objectives in the most 
cost-effective manner. 
Even though preference is afforded to tenderers during the adjudication stage, 
the attainment of value for money still remains the single most important criteria 
when evaluating tenders. The maximum number of preference points, either 10 
or 20, are specified, therefore organs of state have no discretion to award more 
than that under normal circumstances (Bolton, 2008). 
According to Watermeyer et al (2000c), any Preferential Procurement Policy 
which sets out to achieve socio-economic objectives in South Africa would need 
to set out clear statements of intent and address issues such as: 
 How can historically disadvantaged enterprises and/or other 
development objectives be given preferential consideration for award of 
contracts? 
 What cost premium is government prepared to bear on contracts in order 
to correct skewed apartheid influences? 
PPPFA provides clear parameters and encourages groups to engage SMMEs, 
particularly those owned and operated by historically disadvantaged individuals, 
in order to increase business opportunities and the volume of work available to 
these groups. The development objective price mechanism (a weighting system) 
which is provided ensures that price alone is not the only determinant for 
adjudicating contracts. The system tips the scale in favour of the targeted group 
in a manner that pre-determines the maximum cost premiums for government. 
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The direct financial premium associated with the development objective / price 
mechanism is the difference between the awarded tender price (i.e. tender with 
the highest number of adjudication points) and the price of the lowest 
responsive tender and can be expressed as a percentage of the value of the 
contracts awarded. 
The price preferencing formula restricts the theoretical cost premium to a 
maximum value depending on which formula is used. In terms of the 80/20 
formulation, the premium percentage or price advantage cannot be more than 
25% (20/80) higher than the comparative lowest responsive tenderer while the 
maximum premium using the 90/10 formulation is restricted to not more than 
11.1% (10/90) higher than the comparative lowest responsive tenderer 
(Manchidi et al, 2002; Gounden S. , 2000). 
2.6 DEVELOPMENT OF PROCUREMENT STRATEGIES FOR THE 
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.6.1 Defining and Quantifying Socio-Economic Deliverables 
Any programme used to facilitate the implementation of procurement to achieve 
socio-economic objectives requires a measurable component to enable the 
amount of participation by the target group to be quantified. This requires the 
development of a specific formula that can be used to calculate the value of the 
contribution in monetary terms, which can then be expressed as a percentage of 
the total value of goods provided or services performed.  
In order to provide a level playing field for all tenderers, socio-economic 
deliverables and related specifications must be clearly and precisely defined. 
According to Watermeyer (1998) and Gounden (2000), the key elements 
associated with socio-economic objects must accordingly: 
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 Define what constitutes each target group; 
 Set goals (targets), measurable in monetary terms, which can be 
met by engaging the target groups in the pursuit of 
predetermined socio-economic / development objectives; 
 Provide for the measurement of key indicators to ensure that 
goals may be quantified and audited during the performance of 
the contract; and 
 Set out of the manner in which goals can be achieved, as well as 
what and how penalties will be applied in the event that a 
contractor fails to meet his contractual obligations. 
As an example, SMMEs can be targeted on either a generic or area bound 
(localized) basis. In turn, generic targeting can target either all SMMEs within a 
country, or province, or within demarcated geographic boundaries. Such 
enterprises can be defined as being owned and controlled by disadvantaged 
individuals. Disadvantaged individuals can be defined on the basis of race, 
gender, ethnicity, disability, etc. Labour can be targeted on the basis of gender, 
race, ethnicity, locality, age, disabilities, period of unemployment, etc. Unskilled I 
semiskilled labour can be targeted on the basis of wage levels. The increase in 
employment opportunities per unit of expenditure can be readily measured 
should targeted labour be defined on this latter basis. 
2.6.2 Unbundling Strategies 
SMME’s can participate in public sector procurement in one of two ways. They 
can either contract directly with a public body as the prime contractor, or 
participate as a subcontractor, supplier, manufacturer or service provider to a 
prime contractor, or at some point in the delivery chain.  
A procurement mechanism that can be used to facilitate and increase 
participation by SMMEs is called unbundling. Unbundling involves breaking down 
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the tender into work components that are small enough for an SMME to 
compete as a main contractor, or which are suitable for subcontracting to an 
SMME by a large business as part of its main contract. Unbundling strategies 
afford participation opportunities to the full spectrum of SMMEs, from those 
operating as labour only contractors to those operating as prime contractors. 
Based on the unbundling strategy in the 10 Point Plan, Targeted Procurement 
specifications were developed to provide a range of options to address the 
different socio-economic policy imperatives (Letchmiah, 1999a) 
According to Ofori (1995), the lessons learnt from past contractor development 
programs in developing countries include the following: 
 Large companies can be used to develop smaller enterprises, which 
makes for stronger intra-industry linkages; 
 Management contracting or the development team approach can be 
used to facilitate skills transfer to emerging contractors;  
 Contractor associations can play a key role and contribute to small 
contractor development; 
 Skills training, in particular for technical and managerial skills, can 
significantly improve the ability of small contractors to function 
effectively; and 
 Programmes should include measures to wean contractors off 
supporting schemes. 
Unfortunately, unbundling is not always justifiable because the nature of some 
projects and activities often involve complex relationships related to the division 
of responsibilities, interdependence of activities, programming, duplication of 
establishment charges and under-utilization of resources. Furthermore, for 
public bodies and their agents the administration of many small, unbundled 
contracts adds additional layers of management responsibilities and costs as 
compared with fewer, but larger contracts. 
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2.6.3 Targeted Procurement System 
According to McCrudden (2004), a system of “targeted procurement” was 
established in South Africa that was similar to the Malaysian model for the 
Bumiputras. The similarity was more on intent rather than on implementation 
since the Malaysian model provided set-asides exclusively for the Bumiputras 
whereas the South African model promoted the participation of target groups 
without excluding any enterprise from tendering (Letchmiah, 1999a). 
Targeted Procurement, or Affirmative Procurement as it is sometimes called, is 
an innovative form of public sector procurement which was developed in South 
Africa by the Procurement Reform Task Team to provide employment and 
business opportunities for historically disadvantaged businesses, marginalized 
individuals and poor communities. The system was developed to enable the 10 
Point Plan to be implemented and satisfies the framework set out in the PPPFA 
(Letchmiah, 2000b). Targeted Procurement as such allows preferential 
procurement policies to be implemented and enables social objectives to be 
linked to procurement in a fair, transparent, equitable, competitive and cost 
effective manner. It also permits these objectives to be quantified, measured, 
verified and audited. 
The use of Targeted Procurement enables contracts to be unbundled in a 
number of ways, viz.: 
 by procuring works in the smallest practicable quantities 
 by obligating prime contractors to engage SMMEs in the performance 
of their contracts in terms of resource specifications 
 by requiring joint venture formation between large businesses and 
SMMEs (known as Structured Joint Venture); and 
 by providing third party management support to enterprises which 
are not capable of operating as prime contractors (known as 
Development Contracts). 
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Targeted Procurement, through a variety of techniques, can provide 
opportunities for participation by targeted enterprises, even to those who may 
not have all the necessary resources, capacity or expertise in their own right to 
perform contracts. However, this is done in a manner which does not guarantee 
contracts to these enterprises. On small contracts having a value below a 
predetermined financial threshold, direct preferences are accorded to targeted 
enterprises to tip the scales in their favour. On contracts above a financial 
threshold, tenderers are required to compete on the basis of both the product 
and the process.  
Technical specifications are used to define the product and establish compliance 
criteria. Standardized resource specifications are used to define social objectives 
and establish compliance criteria. These specifications accordingly define the 
social deliverables which must be realized through the delivery process, and set 
out the manner in which they can be achieved, measured and monitored.  
Contracts are awarded to the most advantageous offer, based on a balance 
between the tendered price and the tendered deliverables in respect of targeted 
groups. Targeted enterprises, depending upon the contracting strategy which is 
adopted, may participate in contracts as prime contractors, joint venture 
partners, subcontractors, service providers, manufacturers or suppliers. The 
preference system for Targeted Procurement is implemented via tender 
adjudication criteria that complies with the legislative framework of awarding 
tenders, whereby tenderers are required to meet both price and development 
goals. 
The Targeted Procurement specifications are presently available as South African 
National Standards (SANS) documents (www.sans.org.za) and provide a 
structured mechanism to achieve various socio-economic objectives in a manner 
that is measurable, quantifiable and can be monitored for compliance. These 
specifications are briefly described in Table 2.13. 
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Table 2.13: Types of Resource Specifications 
Resource 
Specifications 
Document 
Reference 
Socio-Economic Objectives 
Targeting of 
Affirmable 
Business 
Enterprises 
(ABE’s) 
TP1 
(APP1) 
Development of sectors of an industry, e.g. 
SMME’s, HDI owned business, women owned 
business and local industry development. The 
specification provides for affirmative participation 
targets to be set by the Client which a contractor 
is required to meet in order for the tender to be 
responsive. 
Structured Joint 
Ventures 
(Affirmable 
Partners) 
TP2 
(APP2) 
Development of sub-contractors to prime (main) 
contractors and development of management 
capacity of emerging contractors. 
Structured Joint 
Ventures 
(Targeted 
Partners) 
TP3 
(APP3) 
The specifications provide for the setting of joint 
venture participation targets by the Client which 
promotes participation of target enterprises in a 
structured manner. 
Targeting of 
Local Resources 
TP4 
(APP4) 
Local economic development; job creation; 
poverty alleviation; and community based 
developments. The specification provides for the 
setting of participation targets for the 
procurement of local resources in contracts. 
Engagement of 
Targeted 
Labour 
TP5 
(APP5) 
Job creation for targeted sectors of the population 
(based on race, gender, disability, age, period of 
unemployment, etc.) and poverty alleviation. The 
specification provides for the setting of targeted 
labour participation and requires contractors to 
engage labour in accordance with the specified 
conditions. 
Targeting of 
Affirmable 
Professional 
Service 
Providers 
TP6 
(APP6) 
Development of sectors of the built environment 
professions to facilitate skills development and 
capacity building. The specification is used for the 
appointment of Affirmable Professional Service 
Providers. 
Source: Manchidi and Harmond (2002); Watermeyer (2000); Letchmiah (1998c) 
 
The classification of contracts based on size, value and complexity enables 
appropriate targeting strategies to be developed and procurement processes to 
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be implemented in a systematic and uniform manner (Letchmiah, 1998c; 
Watermeyer, 2000).  This provides a useful means to link together the elements 
of the Targeted Procurement system in a single descriptor. 
Contracts classified as “major” can be used to engage targeted enterprises 
and/or targeted labour through the use of resource specifications in the 
performance of the contract with the successful tenderer being selected on the 
basis of a development objective/price mechanism in terms of a tendered price 
and tendered resource goal. Alternatively, a “minor” contract can be used to 
target enterprises with a particular status in terms of a direct price preference 
system 
2.6.4 Affirmative Procurement Policy 
At the beginning of the procurement reform process in South Africa in 1995, the 
National Department of Public Works (NDPW) became actively involved in the 
conceptualization and development of procurement strategies to achieve socio-
economic objectives. One of these is the Affirmable Procurement Policy (APP) 
which uses the concept of Targeted Procurement to redress the skewed business 
ownership patterns amongst South Africans. NDPW used this policy to provide 
access to work opportunities and create a demand for the goods and services of 
black owned businesses. It also targeted women equity ownership in contracts. 
The objective was to set out targeting policies in order to create opportunities 
for the broadest possible participation of historically disadvantaged persons in 
the public procurement process. 
The APP was implemented through the use of resource specifications that 
targeted prime contractors, joint venture partners, subcontractors, suppliers, 
manufacturers and service providers, targeted labour, Affirmable Joint Venture 
Partners together with businesses owned, managed and controlled by previously 
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disadvantaged persons referred to as Previously Disadvantaged Enterprises in 
concessionary contracts (private public partnerships). 
A resource specification defines the essential characteristics of a deliverable in a 
comprehensive, precise and verifiable manner. In respect of socio-economic 
objectives, points were awarded in accordance with the following formula:  
 = 		
	( − )
 − 
 
 
Where, 
 
Nc = number of adjudication points scored by the tenderer under 
consideration 
D = the tendered goal percentage in the tender under 
consideration in respect of socio-economic deliverables 
Ds = the specified minimum goal percentage in respect of 
socio-economic deliverables 
X = maximum number of adjudication points assigned for 
the socio-economic criteria specified in the tender 
Y = contract participation goal percentage above which no 
further tender adjudication points are awarded 
 
Each Affirmative Procurement resource specification had a measurable 
component which enabled the amount of participation by the target group to be 
quantified and monitored. In each case, the value of the contribution could be 
computed, in terms of a prescribed formula, as a monetary value (goal credits) 
and was expressed as a percentage of the total value of the goods and services 
provided, or works performed, in terms of the contract. 
The goals associated with each specification could be readily audited and verified 
during the performance of a contract. They included indicators of economic 
empowerment expressed in terms of employment and/or business 
opportunities, which permitted the NDPW to report on these key indicators.  
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The Gounden (2000) study evaluates the application of the APP, via the 
development of appropriate indices and a diagnostic quadrant comparator, and 
concludes that the policy has a positive impact on ABE participation. The study 
also identified that financial premiums, less than 1% across construction sub-
sectors, were nominal when compared with the initial projected estimates and 
the overall benefits achieved (Gounden, 2000). 
According to Govender and Watermeyer (2001), the market share of small 
businesses owned, managed and controlled by black South Africans was found to 
be less than 0.5% in 1993 and a mere 2.5% in 1995 prior to the introduction of 
the APP in August 1996. The participation and financial premium indices 
recorded since the introduction of the APP as per the study by Gounden (2000) 
are set out in Table 2.14. The APP not only resulted in increased participation by 
the target groups but also contributed to the formalization of this sector, more 
structured relationships within the construction industry and an increase in the 
tax base of the country (Gounden, 2000).  
Table 2.14:  Outcomes of the Affirmative Procurement Policy obtained on 
contracts awarded by National Department of Public Works in 
South Africa 
TIME PERIOD 
AFFIRMABLE 
BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE INDEX* 
DIRECT 
FINANCIAL 
PREMIUM** 
August 1996 to June 1997 22.29% 0.32% 
July 1997 to December 1997 25.67% 0.40% 
January 1998 to July 1998 28.39% 0.12% 
Study period (August 1996 to July 1998) 26.84% 0.32% 
*   The Affirmable Business Enterprise Index is defined as the estimated total value of work undertaken 
by ABE’s expressed as a percentage of the total value of contracts awarded, where ABE’s are targeted 
**  The direct financial premium measures the difference in price between the bid with the highest 
number of adjudication points (successful bid) and the most favourable offer (lowest acceptable bid) 
Source: Gounden (2000); Watermeyer (2000); Letchmiah (2000a) 
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The APP was first used on the Malmesbury prison project in the Western Cape. 
This resulted in 30% of the total contract value being channeled into the local 
community of Malmesbury, which is a small rural town approximately 70km from 
Cape Town. According to the Soderlund and Shuttle (1998) report, this project 
proved to be more effective in channeling business and labour opportunities into 
local communities than some focused poverty alleviation programmes involving 
the construction of community buildings. 
2.7 LINKING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT TO CONTRACTOR 
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA  
2.7.1 Introduction 
Marginalized (disadvantaged) people are found in most societies. Marginalisation 
is often a result of the denial of access to employment and business 
opportunities based on discriminatory factors such as gender, race, religion, 
ethnicity, age and disability. Marginalization inevitably results in disparities in 
employment rates and a skewed distribution of wealth. At the dawn of the 
democratic South Africa, disparities in income levels and business activity were 
starkly evident across all sectors of society (RSA, 1994). Studies suggested that 
this was caused by the direct or indirect denial of access to both employment 
and business opportunities stemming from discriminatory practices 
(Watermeyer et al, 2000a). 
Economic activity is the primary provider of employment and business 
opportunities. Such activity may be initiated by either the private or public 
sector, or by local communities. The private sector may, in response to social 
concerns, use its funds to pursue social objectives on its capital projects. 
Governments may offer incentives such as tax breaks as an indirect incentive for 
the private sector to pursue similar objectives.  Alternatively, governments may 
target social objectives directly by using preferences in public procurement as an 
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instrument of policy to link the objectives with access to publicly funded 
contracts.  
One of the main approaches to achieving socio-economic objectives in 
developing countries over the past few decades has been to establish special 
programmes involving construction projects (Watermeyer et al, 2000a). For 
example, since 1970 the International Labour Organisation and the World Bank 
have promoted and funded employment programmes for rural road construction 
which seek to substitute labour for capital intensive equipment (Watermeyer, 
2003). 
It is common practice in most countries to regulate public sector procurement, 
usually within a legal framework, through a system that prescribes the manner in 
which such procurement must or should be undertaken. The framework 
generally controls the “how” of procuring goods, services and works but does not 
commonly define the “who”. Stipulating who ought to benefit from public sector 
procurement is only addressed in a preferential or targeted procurement system 
(Watermeyer et al, 2000a).  
Because of its size, public sector procurement that is used as an instrument of 
policy can have a significant impact on the economy as a whole. An indication of 
this impact can be seen from 1996 data which show that public sector 
procurement (national and provincial departments and local authorities only) for 
that year constituted 13% of South Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (RSA, 1997). 
2.7.2 Defining Procurement 
According to Watermeyer (2010), ISO 10845-1 defines procurement as the 
process which creates, manages and fulfills contracts. Procurement is therefore 
concerned with activities which both precede and continue after the signing of a 
contract (Watermeyer et al, 2000).  
Chapter 2: The Role of Public Procurement as a Mechanism to Promote Socio-Economic Objectives 
88 
 
Public sector procurement is concerned with establishing and documenting what 
is required; inviting the private sector to bid to provide goods or services to 
construct or maintain infrastructure; awarding contracts to successful bidders; 
monitoring to ensure that what was contracted is actually provided; and paying 
contractors for executing their contracts. According to Bolton (2008) in the South 
African context the word procurement (which heads the procurement clause in 
the Constitution) has a broader meaning than usual because it refers to both the 
acquisition and the selling or lending of assets. 
Most public sector procurement activities focus on the provision of goods, 
services and construction works as defined in Table 2.15.  
Table 2.15: Definitions of Procurement Categories 
Item Definition 
Goods The supply of raw materials or commodities made available for 
general sale 
Services The provision of labor and/or knowledge based expertise 
Construction 
Works 
The provision of a combination of goods and services including 
building and engineering infrastructure, arranged for the 
development and provision of an asset or refurbishment of an 
existing asset 
Other The disposal of moveable property 
The hiring or letting of anything 
The acquisition or granting of any rights 
Source: Watermeyer et al (2000a) 
Although the details may vary, the principles of procurement are applicable to all 
three of the main types of procurement activity.  
Because the role of the construction industry in South African public sector 
procurement is significant this research examines specific aspects of public 
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procurement in terms of their contribution to the development of the 
construction industry. Procurement of construction works tends to be more 
complex than that for goods and services because a construction project usually 
requires elements of both goods and services to be combined and arranged 
during the performance of the contract. Construction contracts require assets to 
be constructed in a specific location and have other requirements which are 
industry specific. 
2.7.3 Using Public Procurement to Develop Sectors of the Construction 
Industry 
According to Watermeyer (2011), construction procurement includes, in addition 
to engineering and construction works contracts, supply contracts for the 
purchase of materials and equipment; service contracts for professional services; 
and contracts for the disposal of surplus materials and demolitions. 
Construction industry development can be linked to the development of new 
entrant small businesses and existing small and medium enterprises.  In most 
countries there are basic constraints to growth, or barriers to entry, in the 
emerging business sector. The primary constraints and barriers are linked to 
access to markets, credit, skills and supportive institutional arrangements 
(Gounden, 2000). 
In a report prepared for the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements 
(UNCHS) on policies and measures for small contractor development, Ofori 
(1995) identified a range of problems confronting small and medium enterprises 
(SME’s). These included discrimination by financial institutions against SMEs 
which have little collateral; projects that are not packaged or structured to 
facilitate SMEs undertaking them; weaknesses in management; lack of 
entrepreneurship; difficulty in accessing information; a lack of market exposure; 
and excessive competition. 
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Procurement interventions can provide direct access to markets and, as such, 
can address one of the main constraints to contractor development. If applied 
correctly, appropriate procurement policies can be an effective demand side 
mechanism for targeted businesses (Watermeyer et al, 2000c). However, for the 
full enablement of emerging construction businesses specific supply side 
measures are also required.  
If the objective is to grow and develop contractors it must be asked: growth and 
development to what level? And for how long? Programmes intended to meet 
socio-economic objectives require clear and measurable milestones and 
timelines so that they don’t continue to operate indefinitely if progress is not 
being made, or carrying on after the objective has clearly been achieved and the 
intervention is no longer necessary. International best practice suggests that 
programmes should continue until such time as there are no discernible 
differences in performance between those who were targeted and those who 
were not (Gounden, 2000). 
The purposeful flow of public funds directed to and through historically 
disadvantaged or discriminated population groups can be achieved by making 
the tender opportunities more accessible to these target groups without 
guaranteeing work to them by competitive tendering, notwithstanding the 
preferencing advantages provided to the target groups. 
The Green Paper furthermore suggests that the aim of empowering small, 
medium and micro enterprises is to enable them to access the procurement 
process which will be directed towards having a spin-off in the formalisation of a 
previously informal sector of the economy. This in turn will have spin-offs in the 
form of a broadened tax base, improved labour standards and structured 
economic growth (RSA, 1997). 
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The Green Paper (RSA, 1997) also argues that procurement policy should 
complement the macro-economic strategy and extend into the area of economic 
development. It suggests that Black economic empowerment needs to be a focal 
point of this policy. Such a system should comprise of an affirmative enterprise 
participation programme with easy access to tendering opportunities together 
with a preference price mechanism that favours targeted enterprises in the 
award of tenders on construction projects.  
2.7.4 Addressing Supply Side Constraints 
Businesses which are owned, managed and controlled by HDIs frequently face 
impediments to their growth and development arising from factors such as lack 
of inter-generational wealth transfer, continuing discrimination along 
racial/ethnic/gender lines, substandard educational backgrounds and limited 
exposure to commercial activities (Watermeyer et al, 2000a; Watermeyer et al, 
2000c). 
South Africa’s preferential procurement policy creates increased access to 
government contracts for targeted enterprises and provides access to markets 
for HDI owned businesses. Markets are driven by supply and demand and 
procurement creates a demand for services and products. In this way, 
procurement provides access to markets for both targeted enterprises and 
targeted labour. Supply side interventions are essential to ensure that the 
demand created by government is balanced by the supply of businesses capable 
of meeting it. Government can improve this supply by minimizing barriers to 
small enterprise start up and operation. This is a particularly important 
consideration if the goal is to encourage emerging SMEs to develop into 
sustainable enterprises. Supply side measures and the associated institutional 
arrangements for supply side interventions are, as a result, dependent upon 
factors such as socio-economic policy choices, and targeting and contracting 
strategies (Gounden, 2000). 
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2.7.5 Contractor Development Programmes 
In 1997, the National Department of Public Works launched an Emerging 
Contractor Development Programme (ECDP) to address supply side constraints 
facing black contractors in the construction industry who wanted to avail 
themselves of the opportunities created by the Affirmative Procurement Policy 
(Gounden, 2000). A national ECDP was put in place with the objective of ensuring 
that appropriate strategies and supply side measures were in place to develop 
sustainable black owned and controlled businesses. The ECDP was focused on 
contractors who had the required technical skills, but were unable to source 
work opportunities from the public sector due to a lack of expertise in submitting 
quotations and tenders. The ECDP aimed to harness the synergy between three 
fundamental stakeholder groupings, namely: 
 The National Department of Public Works, which could provide work 
opportunities and had the authority to facilitate an environment in which 
emerging contractors would have the opportunity to develop themselves 
into market-competitive contractors. 
 Emerging contractors who were technically competent but lacked 
knowledge of the Department's procedures, competitive estimating 
techniques, business management skill, and access to finance and 
suppliers. 
 Other organizations that had an interest in the development of emerging 
contractors and who had resources required by the emerging contractors. 
These organizations included other government departments, the private 
sector and NGOs. 
In addition to the ECDP, the National Contractor Development Programme 
(NCDP) was also implemented. The ECDP is a partnership between the CIDB, 
national and provincial departments of public works and related stakeholders. Its 
primary objective is to develop previously disadvantaged contractors by 
enhancing capacity and promoting equity ownership across the different CIDB 
Chapter 2: The Role of Public Procurement as a Mechanism to Promote Socio-Economic Objectives 
93 
 
categories and grades (CIDB, 2009). To this end, public sector procurement can 
provide an effective demand-side intervention to develop sustainable 
contracting capacity and to elevate development of enterprises owned by HDIS 
in the construction industry. 
2.7.6 The Role of the Construction Industry Development Board 
Construction is an important contributor to South Africa’s economic and social 
development and is a large-scale provider of employment throughout the 
downstream supply chain. The construction industry, as a result of the legacy of 
apartheid, inherited many development and transformation challenges. In 1997, 
government published the White Paper on Creating an Enabling Environment for 
Reconstruction, Growth and Development in the Construction Industry (RSA, 
1999) which addressed several aspects of construction related procurement. 
Because it formed the basis of policy on construction industry development it 
was an integral part of general procurement policy, and of related development 
within the emerging contractor sector. 
The White Paper also set the path for the establishment of the CIDB (CIDB; CIDB, 
2009). The CIDB was mandated through the Construction Industry Development 
Board Act 38 of 2000 to support and promote contractor development. The Act 
also has specific objectives that relate to procurement and delivery 
management. These include the determination and establishment of best 
practice that promotes procurement and delivery management reform, and the 
promotion, establishment or endorsement of uniform standards and ethical 
standards that regulate the actions, practices and procedures of parties engaged 
in construction contracts (RSA, 2000b). The Act requires that the CIDB do this 
within the framework of the procurement policy of Government. In this regard, 
the CIDB has published a Code of Conduct for all Parties engaged in Construction 
Procurement; a Standard for Uniformity in Construction Procurement; and a 
Library of Construction Procurement Best Practice and Contractor Registration. 
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The CIDB Act mandates its Board, inter alia, to establish a National register of 
contractors to systemically regulate, monitor and promote the performance of 
the construction industry with the objective of achieving sustainable growth, 
effective delivery and economic empowerment of historically disadvantaged 
individuals (RSA, 2000b). 
The Construction Industry Development Board (Act 38 of 2000) defines an 
“emerging enterprise” as an enterprise which is owned, managed and controlled 
by previously disadvantaged persons and which is overcoming business 
impediments arising from the legacy of apartheid and the “emerging sector” as 
that sector of the construction industry which comprises emerging enterprises 
(RSA, 2000b, p. 4). 
One of the essential functions of the CIDB is its Construction Registers Service 
which consists of two parts, the Register of Contractors and the Register of 
Projects. The Register of Contractors allows the CIDB to gather and provide data 
on the size and distribution of contractors that operate in the industry (RSA, 
2000b).  
Registration with the CIDB is mandatory for any contractor that tenders or 
contracts for construction works in the public sector. As a result, the register 
provides data that reflects the status of transformation of the construction 
industry at a specific point in time, and can therefore be used as an indicator of 
economic empowerment of HDIs. 
The Register of Contractors provides for a grading system of all contractors in 
terms of their capability to undertake and complete construction contracts by 
assessing their financial and works capabilities based on past performance. The 
Register has nine grading levels, with each grade indicating the size of contract 
that a contractor is capable of undertaking within one or more work categories. 
The contractor grading consists of alphanumeric characters that represent the 
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capability of the contractor in a particular class or category of work.  Table 2.16 
illustrates the nine contractor grades and the contract value range that 
contractors are considered capable of undertaking. For example, from the table 
it can be seen that a contractor with a grading of 3 is one that is capable of 
successfully completing a contract with a maximum value of R 2 million. It should 
be noted that the CIDB has also established a long list of construction categories 
which form the “alpha” part of the grading. For example, a grading of 3GB 
indicates a contract that is capable of successfully completing a contract with a 
maximum value of R 2 million in a General Building (GB) category. 
Table 2.16: CIDB Contractor Grades 
Tender Value Range 
Designation 
Range of tender values, inclusive of VAT 
Greater than Less than or equal to 
1 R 0 R 200 000 
2 R 200 000  R 650 000 
3 R 650 000 R 2 000 000 
4 R 2 000 000 R 4 000 000 
5 R 4 000 000 R 6 500 000  
6 R 6 500 000 R 13 000 000 
7 R 13 000 000 R 40 000 000 
8 R 40 000 000 R 130 000 000 
9 R 130 000 000 No limit 
Source: CIDB, http://www.cidb.org.za/  
One of the many benefits of the Register of Contractors is that it enables 
effective targeting of contractors for development while providing information 
on size, distribution, capability and population demographics. As a result, the 
CIDB is able to provide an overview of the structure of the construction industry 
and the state of contractor development in South Africa (CIDB, 2012). The data 
obtained from the Register of Contractors is used as input by government 
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institutions to assist in developing targeted intervention strategies in support of 
contractor development and, in this research, is used as a basis for assessing the 
preferential procurement interventions in the construction industry. 
However, while trends in the number of registrations and in the number of 
grading increases or decreases are useful indicators of the level of contractor 
development, it is important to note that it may not necessarily relate directly to 
preferential procurement intervention strategies in the public sector since many 
CIDB registered contractors also tender in the private sector. As an indicator of 
empowerment, the CIDB uses the annual turnover of black and women owned 
companies based on the value of contracts awarded in both the public and 
private sectors (CIDB). CIDB defines black and women owned businesses as those 
with ownership greater than 50% as recorded in the CIDB Register of Contractors 
(www.cidb.co.za). 
It is significant to note that although the CIDB is able to derive the relative value 
of public sector contracts awarded to black and women owned businesses from 
its Register of Projects, it acknowledges that the information recorded on its 
Register of Projects is incomplete (CIDB, 2012). 
2.8  MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS OF PREFERENTIAL 
PROCUREMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Even the best intended policies will be ineffective if they are implemented badly. 
Accordingly to Yusof et al (2008), policies need to be turned into actions to 
deliver results that are tangible and successful implementation requires effective 
institutions, leadership, clarity of purpose, well documented processes and 
mechanisms. Policies must be coordinated and be consistent. A system of 
oversight on implementation is essential and should be developed and 
maintained at all levels of government. Over the last few years there has been a 
great deal of emphasis on implementation and improving the delivery system of 
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the government (Watermeyer, 2011) Adapting strategies and policies to 
changing conditions is a prerequisite for sustaining growth and achieving 
specified objectives - speedy adaptation is even better. A speedy response is a 
hallmark of decisive leadership and appropriate mechanism for analysis and 
implementation, and enhances reputation by improving outcomes. Political and 
social conditions must also be conducive for implementing change without 
unproductive opposition. Implementation of policies should also be re-assessed 
continuously in the context of broader economic performance and specific 
targets. Sunset clauses are also necessary to review and modify targets as and 
when necessary (Gounden, 2000). The Malaysian experience over thirty years is 
an example of how an economy can address its re-distribution imperatives over a 
relatively short period (Yusof et al, 2008; Puthucheary, 1993)). Built into the 
implementation of the NEP were the mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and, 
where possible, to adjust the linkages between economic growth and 
distribution.  
Transparency regarding the planned and actual distributional consequences of 
preferential procurement policies is also necessary to demonstrate 
accountability. Transparency means that the rules and procedures of a 
procurement system is made available and known to all. Transparency therefore 
not only responds to the principles of justice but also to efficiency because it 
makes available to all the information needed in order to make efficient 
decisions (Trionfetti, 2003). Accountability means that the tendering entity or 
procuring agency is responsible for the functioning of the system and for the 
discretional choices made when so required. Therefore, accountability also 
responds to a principle of justice and therefore improves efficiency because it 
brings certainty to procurement procedures and thereby develops trust in the 
system.  
According to the Green Paper on Procurement (1997), the achievement of socio-
economic objectives is not a simple process, even when a well-developed 
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instrument guides the implementation thereof. In order to successfully use 
procurement as an instrument of social policy, it is necessary to consider firstly 
those external factors over which the procuring entity of the project has no 
control. These are listed as follows (RSA, 1997): 
 Government’s commitment to the attainment of stated objectives 
from the highest levels; 
 Endorsement and support from policy makers, senior 
administrators and those accountable for procurement activities; 
 Motivation amongst target groups to take advantage of the 
opportunities presented; and 
 Personnel who are conversant with and competent in implementing 
policies. 
 
Furthermore, it is also necessary to consider the following factors which are 
within the control of the procuring entity: 
 Comprehensive and unambiguous supporting documentation and 
implementation procedures to enable specific objectives to be 
achieved; 
 Effective monitoring,  auditing and reporting systems; and 
 A means by which the bona fides of any target group can readily 
be established and checked for contract compliance. 
 
In this regard, if the procurement system is to be effective and efficiently 
implemented it is necessary to: 
 systematically measure the achievements towards socio-economic 
objectives; 
 evaluate the cost effectiveness of the measures which are 
adopted on an ongoing basis; 
 ensure that clear and unambiguous deliverables are in fact being 
achieved; 
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 strictly monitor outcomes and compliance with stated 
requirements; 
 enforce requirements; and 
 provide for remedies for non-compliance which are sufficiently 
punitive to encourage compliance. 
According to Gounden (2000), there were not many programmes where use has 
been made of procurement as an instrument of social policy which provided 
both quantitative and qualitative data to support that the intent of a policy had 
been met. An assessment of the results of affirmative action programmes 
depends on how success or failure is defined and measured. The experience in 
Malaysia has shown that quotas are much less acceptable than targets and goals 
(Yusof et al, 2008) since quotas contribute to ethnic tensions because there are 
so blatantly discriminatory. Goals and targets by contrast are primarily 
guidelines. It is argued by Puthucheary (1993), that after its initial twenty year 
period Malaysia did not reach the goal of thirty percent Bumiputra ownership 
mainly because this was set as only a goal and not a quota. In the South African 
scenario, public procurement as the provider of access to tenders and contract 
opportunities can be used as an indicator of effectiveness in the construction 
industry if data indicates a trend in the growth of business opportunities for 
targeted enterprises (Gounden, 2000). 
Trionfetti (2003) suggests that in order to assess effectiveness in procurement 
policies, it is necessary to define “efficient” or “optimal” within the context of 
the government’s procurement system and policy objectives. An optimal 
procurement system is one that allows government to achieve its objectives at 
minimal cost (Trionfetti 2003). For example if the objective of government is to 
promote socio-economic objectives, then an optimal procurement system is one 
that procures all goods and services in support of the objective at the minimum 
possible additional cost. This definition of optimal procurement also corresponds 
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to the concepts of “efficiency”, “cost effectiveness”, and “value for money” as is 
required in the SA Constitution (RSA, 1996b).   
The method/s used in this study has a number of features and elements worth 
mentioning. The first one is that it utilizes actual outcomes based on government 
data rather than making assumptions or interpolating information from limited 
data. The second is that it is based on recorded data rather than being based on 
case studies or anecdotal evidence. The third one is that the method captures 
the quantity together with the cost and price preferences of contract awarded in 
line with the PPPFA. This allows the researcher to capture the cost of the price 
preference mechanism since it is based on relevant information that reveals the 
price margins on which the tenders have been awarded.  
2.9 SUMMARY 
The chapter examined the development of affirmative action policies and its 
impact on preferential procurement initiatives. In particular, the experiences of 
USA and Malaysia were reviewed in terms of its influence on policy development 
in South Africa. It shows that although the South African experience can be 
described as unique in many ways, the outcomes of international experience 
provide useful insights on key lessons learnt. 
This chapter documented the concepts of preferential procurement and its 
relationship to affirmative action and black economic empowerment in South 
Africa. A chronology of the development of preferential procurement legislation 
in South Africa was discussed.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
A research design presents a structured framework that explains how the 
research process will be conducted to address the research objectives. Key 
considerations in selecting a compelling and pragmatic research design include 
the philosophical framework, as well as the integration of the various elements 
of the design. This includes data gathering methods, data analysis processes and 
the interpretation of results that shaped the research study (Babbie & Mouton, 
2006; Tan, 2007; Creswell, 2009). 
This chapter outlines the research context, design and methodology that guided 
the present study. It then describes and discusses the approach and procedures 
used to collect and analyze the data. 
3.2. RESEARCH DESIGN CONTEXT: IDENTIFYING A WORKABLE 
RESEARCH PROJECT 
The intention of the research study was to examine the effectiveness of the 
application of preferential procurement in South Africa. Ongoing engagements 
with National Treasury officials led to the identification of a database of 
procurement statistics collected since April 2006. These data were gathered by 
the Directorate: Norms and Standards in the Supply Chain Management Division 
of National Treasury from national and provincial government departments in 
compliance with the requirements of the Preferential Procurement Policy 
Framework Act (PPPFA) of 2000. Written approval from the Minister of Finance 
was required to access these data for use in the present research study.  
In November 2007 the researcher wrote to the then Minister of Finance, Mr. 
Trevor Manuel, explaining the purpose of the research and requesting access to 
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the Preferential Procurement Statistics Database collected by National Treasury. 
(See Appendix 3.1 for the Letter sent to Minister Manuel). In mid-2009 a follow-
up inquiry was made to the new Minister of Finance, Mr. Pravin Gordhan, 
regarding the status of the 2007 letter requesting access to Treasury data. The 
response from the Minister in December 2009 was positive, albeit conditional. 
(See Appendix 3.2 for Minister Gordhan’s response).  
The Minister granted the Chief Directorate: Norms and Standards permission to 
release the relevant dataset, available as at December 2009, to the researcher 
for research purposes. The researcher was subsequently able to supplement the 
original dataset with additional data from the National Treasury, thereby 
compiling a dataset covering the five-year period from April 2006 to March 2011. 
The five-year dataset enabled the researcher to support his research objectives 
more conclusively.  
Based on a preliminary review of the data made available by the National 
Treasury, and coupled with additional desktop research into the subject matter, 
the focus of the study was streamlined to examine the effectiveness of the 
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (PPPFA) of 2000 on the 
construction industry sector in South Africa.  
The National Treasury dataset presented a reliable starting point to collect 
additional primary research data to address the following research objectives: 
(1) To measure the number and value of government contracts awarded to 
businesses with HDI shareholding in comparison with the total number of 
contracts awarded; 
(2) To analyse the distribution of contracts awarded to HDI’s on the basis of 
race and gender as provided for in the PPPFA (2000), at both national and 
provincial levels; 
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(3) To determine the financial cost premiums incurred through the 
implementation of the PPPFA of 2000;    
(4) To establish whether the application of the PPPFA of 2000 had helped 
HDI contractors to grow their businesses; and  
(5) To determine whether HDI owned contracting enterprises, as 
beneficiaries of the policy, understood the intention and application of 
the PPPFA of 2000. 
Moreover, the collection of both primary and secondary data would serve to 
strengthen the research design and methodology thereby increasing the 
probability that the research results produced would meaningfully contribute to 
the existing body of knowledge on the subject being researched.  
The relevance of this study is timely given that the regulations governing the 
application of the PPPFA of 2000 were replaced with a new set of regulations in 
December 2011. Essentially, the new regulations replaced the previous 
preferential point scoring mechanism with a Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (BBBEE) scorecard system for allocating procurement preference 
points. 
3.3. RESEARCH DESIGN FRAMEWORK 
Current research design and practice are premised on three dominant 
methodological paradigms: quantitative, qualitative and participatory action 
research. According to the literature, the historical antecedents of these research 
approaches can be traced to particular schools of thought linked to 
positivism/post-positivism, phenomenology, and critical theory, respectively 
(Babbie & Mouton, 2006).  
The quantitative approach represents a traditional and dominant form of 
research conducted during the 1940’s and 50’s. Characterized by a 
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scientific/empirical or positivistic perspective, the approach is premised on the 
initial procedural assumptions first made by logical positivists in the 1930’s and 
subsequently refined. Essentially, the positivistic approach recognizes the merits 
of using statistics in research studies to prove concepts of “truth”, “rationality” 
and “objectivity”. Scientific knowledge is defined as a set of statements which 
experts assess to be “truthful” when thorough scrutiny is applied to prove 
“rationality”, and rigorous methods and techniques are used in gathering the 
best supporting evidence to prove “objectivity” (Babbie & Mouton, 2006).  
According to Babbie and Mouton (2006) and Creswell (2009), the initial 
operational formulations of logical positivism were later challenged by other 
researchers resulting in a paradigm shift from narrow assumptions made about 
knowledge generation. Essentially, there emerged a reformist school of 
positivists who challenged the traditional knowledge claims of “absolute or 
positive truth” in relation to human behavior and actions. 
The origins of qualitative research can be traced back to the research conducted 
by sociologists at the University of Chicago in the USA in the first part of the 20
th
 
century. Also referred to as naturalistic or causal research, the approach 
popularized the use of various qualitative data gathering methods, including 
participant observation used by anthropologists, in-depth interviews and 
personal documents. Advocates of this approach known as subjectivists, or 
constructivists, follow an interpretive or qualitative approach to science. In 
challenging the concept of “the truth”, these theorists introduced the notion of 
“multiple truths” that validate different viewpoints (Creswell, 2009). The 
approach emphasized that fieldwork be carried out in the natural setting of 
respondents to gain a deeper understanding of human intentions, and give to 
meaning to phenomena (Babbie & Mouton, 2006; Creswell, 2009).  
From the 1960’s onwards, purists in the research field contested the legitimacy 
of a qualitative approach to research (Babbie & Mouton, 2006). This compelled 
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supporters of the qualitative perspective to justify the theoretical underpinnings 
of their approach as a viable and relevant research methodology (Babbie & 
Mouton, 2006). According to Leedy (1992), each of the approaches can be used 
to serve particular research purposes. Leedy (1992) describes "the descriptive 
survey method" (qualitative) which is used to obtain data from observations 
either by visual or verbal interactions preferably with questionnaires while the 
"analytical survey methods" (quantitative) is used to obtain data that will provide 
meaning and trends through statistical/empirical analysis.  
In the 1970’s and 80’s, during a period of ongoing contestation about the 
respective merits and compatibility of the two dominant paradigms, a third 
research paradigm called participatory action research, with its antecedents 
traced to critical theory, emerged (Babbie & Mouton, 2006). This approach, 
which emphasizes participation and action in conducting research studies, is 
assumed to have dichotomous roots. The northern tradition is supposedly linked 
to the action research approach used in development studies. The southern 
tradition, which is said to have emerged from the particular experiences of 
emancipation from colonialism, is more concerned with issues of power and 
social justice (Babbie & Mouton, 2006).  
Some purists contend that the various paradigms are essentially incompatible 
(Bogdan & Biklen, 1982; Guba & Lincoln, 1985). A more conciliatory school of 
thought proposes that a combination of approaches provides several benefits, 
and that in some situations a combination of approaches can prove superior to 
any single approach (Miles & Huberman, 1984; Smith, 1986). In fact, research 
practice has shown how different techniques can be combined successfully 
within a single inquiry to complement and provide a greater understanding of 
the phenomenon being examined (Green & McClintock, 1985; Smith, 1986). The 
authors of more recent publications on the topic acknowledge that the various 
approaches are relevant because they serve different, but necessary, purposes in 
research studies (Creswell, 2009; Tan, 2007; Babbie & Mouton, 2006).  
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The literature shows that until recently it was accepted that the dominant 
research paradigm used in the construction management field favoured the 
rationalistic quantitative approach and its associated methodological 
assumptions (Seymour & Rooke, 1995; Runeson, 1997; Raftery et al, p. 1997). In 
1995, Seymour & Rooke made a compelling argument for researchers in this field 
to consider the merits of an alternative qualitative approach to achieve particular 
research objectives, as well as make research more relevant and responsive to 
the changing culture and practices of the construction industry. This led to 
robust debate on both sides about the merits of the preferred approach to 
research, and the weakness of the opposing view (Seymour & Rooke, 1995; 
Runeson, 1997).    
A careful consideration of the different research paradigms described above 
established that the research design framework should be informed by the 
specific objectives of a study. This led to the determination that the positivistic 
approach, that uses quantitative data collection and analysis techniques to 
validate the research finding, best suited the objectives of this study. This 
approach offered the most pragmatic research design framework because it 
permits the researcher to adopt the scientific approach in the collection of 
primary data on contractors’ perceptions of the effectiveness of the PPPFA in the 
construction industry sector. In turn, the findings of the primary data were used 
to validate the findings of secondary data provided by the National Treasury and 
verify the researcher’s propositions. A more detailed description of this approach 
and its relevance to this study is presented below.  
Positivists claim to adhere to a deterministic philosophy which advocates that 
causes most likely determine effects or outcomes (Guba & Lincoln, 1985; Philips 
& Burbules, 2000; Babbie & Mouton, 2006; Creswell, 2009). Research studies 
using a positivistic approach usually seek to identify and assess the 
causes/factors that influence outcomes. This paradigm advocates a reductionist 
approach whereby testing is only conducted after the research ideas/problem 
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statement is reduced to a small, discrete set of ideas, such as variables that 
comprise hypotheses and research questions (Guba & Lincoln, 1985; Babbie & 
Mouton, 2006; Philips & Burbules, 2000; Creswell, 2009). The intention is to 
derive knowledge based on empirical observation and the measurement of the 
objective reality that exists “out there” in the world (Guba & Lincoln, 1985; 
Creswell, 2009). 
Vital components of the positivistic philosophical paradigm include the 
development of numeric measures of observation, as well as a careful 
examination of the responses collected from study respondents. Positivists 
recognise that the world is regulated by laws or theories and contend that these 
have to be tested in order to better comprehend the world (Creswell, 2009). 
Therefore, when using the scientific method to conduct research the positivists 
propose a structured approach that starts with a theory/hypothesis, followed by 
the collection of objective data to verify the theory (Guba & Lincoln, 1985; Philips 
& Burbules, 2000; Creswell, 2009). 
The primary purpose of conducting quantitative research is to explain the 
objective relationship among measured variables to test deductively a 
theory/hypothesis, so that the findings can be generalized and replicated (Philips 
& Burbules, 2000; Guba & Lincoln, 1985; Babbie & Mouton, 2006; Tan, 2007; 
Creswell, 2009). In this approach the variables are usually measured by 
instruments that collect numerical data, which can be statistically analyzed and 
interpreted.  
Table 3.1 below is adapted from Creswell (2009) and provides a checklist of key 
features of a quantitative research design approach against which the research 
framework of this study was considered.  
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Table 3.1: Key Features of a Quantitative Research Design Approach 
Quantitative Approach Description 
Applicability 
to Study 
Philosophical assumptions Positivist knowledge claims √ 
Strategy of inquiry Survey √ 
Methods employed  Close-ended questions √ 
Pre-determined approach √ 
Numeric data gathered √ 
Research practices adopted Tests or verifies theories or 
explanations 
√ 
Identifies variables to study √ 
Relates variables to questions 
or hypotheses 
√ 
Uses standards of validity and 
reliability 
√ 
Observes, measures and 
interprets information 
numerically 
√ 
Uses unbiased approaches  √ 
Employs statistical 
procedures 
√ 
Source: Creswell (2009) 
The following summary, adapted from Philips and Burbules (2000), aptly outlines 
the key assumptions of the positivistic position which guided this study:  
1) Knowledge is conjectural and anti-foundational. This assumption is 
derived from the refined formulation in positivism that there is no 
“absolute truth” in scientific research. Based on this premise, adherents 
to the positivists school of thought contend that researchers should not 
attempt to prove a hypothesis, but rather fail to reject it; 
2) Research involves a process of making, refining and rejecting claims: The 
claims are based on objective evidence that is collected and analyzed for 
the primary purpose of testing or verifying a theory; 
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3) Data, evidence and rational considerations shape knowledge: The 
researcher designs appropriate data collection instruments to measure 
and observe responses; 
4) Research seeks to develop relevant, true statements to explain causal 
relationship among variables. This approach enables the researcher to 
suggest a relationship among variables by presenting them in terms of 
questions or hypothesis; and 
5) An essential aspect of competent inquiry is objectivity: The researcher 
must use standards of validity and reliability to check for bias in the study.  
Figure 3.1 below presents a diagrammatic description of the research design 
framework used in this study. The framework was adapted from Creswell 
(2009:5). 
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3.4. RESEARCH METHOD 
In conducting social science research, the choice of research methods is guided 
by what one wants to know about a situation or programme, whilst taking into 
consideration time and resource constraints that impact on the research 
activities (Guba & Lincoln, 2000; Babbie & Mouton, 2006; Tan, 2007; Creswell, 
2009). Research methods involve the forms of data collection, analysis and 
interpretation that researchers propose for their studies. In this regard 
researchers need to consider the full range of possibilities of data collection, as 
well as the organization of methods to suit the particular purpose of the study 
(Creswell, 2009). 
Because quantitative research studies have remained the dominant research 
paradigm, there exist carefully worked out procedures and rules for this mode of 
empirical inquiry. For the purposes of this particular study, a quantitative 
approach, which offers a systematic and structured guiding framework and 
procedures, is best suited to determine the following broad research objectives:  
i. the effectiveness of an  intervention;  
ii. the factors that influence a specific outcome;  
iii. the best predictors of outcomes; and  
iv. the testing of a theory/hypotheses or explanation (Creswell, 
2009). 
According to the literature, the two organizing principles of empirical research 
are observation and interpretation. Measurement, a type of observation, is 
claimed to be more deliberate and rigorous on the basis that what is observed is 
considered to be as important as how it is observed or measured (Babbie & 
Mouton, 2006). The two most common data collection instruments used in 
quantitative studies are experiments and surveys. 
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3.5. SELECTION OF DATA COLLECTION METHOD 
For this particular cross-sectional study the survey research technique was most 
appropriate because it enabled the researcher to collect information from a large 
group of respondents, control for time, and determine associations or establish 
causes (Creswell, 2009). The statistical findings from a sample of respondents 
from a population can be used to describe quantitative or numeric trends, 
attitudes or opinions for a broader research population (Babbie, 1990; Creswell, 
2009).This technique also enabled the researcher to determine the breadth, 
variability and generalizibility of the data (Babbie & Mouton, 2006).  
The quantitative technique, using both primary and secondary data sources, 
allowed the researcher to examine the following propositions: 
1. That government has contributed to the increased participation of 
enterprises with HDI shareholding in public sector construction 
contracts through the application of the preferential procurement 
policy in terms of the PPPFA; 
2. That the application of preferential procurement results in 
excessive cost premiums in relation to that provided for in the initial 
formulation of the policy; and 
3. That preferential procurement served as an effective mechanism 
for HDI contractors to grow their businesses. 
The complementary and iterative use of multiple data sources enabled the 
researcher to fill the information gaps left by one dataset with another more 
appropriate one, to examine the research propositions convincingly. 
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3.6. DATA COLLECTION AND PROCESSING 
In order to answer the research questions and examine the propositions outlined 
above, the researcher obtained national and provincial data from the National 
Treasury covering a period of five years (from April 2006 to March 2011) and 
supplemented this data with primary data collected through a survey 
questionnaire. The National Treasury is empowered by the Public Management 
Finance Act (PFMA) of 1999 to oversee and monitor the implementation of 
public procurement (also referred to as the supply chain management function) 
and the achievement of government’s socio-economic policy objectives. In 
support of this, the PPPFA requires that all socio-economic goals be measurable, 
quantifiable and monitored for compliance (RSA, 2000a). 
In order to give effect to this provision, National Treasury issued Practice Note 
Number SCM 3 of 2004 dated 23
rd
 August 2004 (See Appendix 3.3) which, inter 
alia, provided a checklist for the implementation of supply chain management 
and the monthly reporting of supply chain management information. To enable 
uniformity in reporting, National Treasury developed the “Monthly Reporting 
Questionnaire” template, (See Appendix 3.4) which became effective from April 
2004. The Practice Note states that primary purpose of collecting this monthly 
information was to provide the Minister of Finance with consolidated reports on 
the progress made in the public procurement reform process, with particular 
focus on Black Economic Empowerment.  
The practice note stipulated that completed monthly reporting questionnaires 
had to be submitted to National Treasury within 15 days after the end of each 
month. In an interview with the Chief Director; Norms and Standards at National 
Treasury, the researcher learned that this data was only systematically captured 
onto a computerized system from April 2006. Prior to this date, limited 
information was recorded and only included the name of the contractor and the 
value of the awarded contract. The primary purpose of collecting this basic 
Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology 
113 
 
information was to enable the South African Revenue Service (SARS) to monitor 
tax compliance. The Chief Director also informed the researcher that the 
accounting officers of national government departments and heads of provincial 
treasuries were required, on a six monthly basis, to certify the correctness of the 
information submitted to National Treasury. 
A completed monthly report questionnaire provided information, inter alia, on 
the percentage equity ownership by black persons, black women and white 
women; percentage of local content; total contract price; total price of lowest 
acceptable bid; and the premium paid expressed both in value and as a 
percentage of the lowest acceptable tender (See Appendix 3.5 for an example of 
a completed monthly report).  
The data obtained from National Treasury for this research was categorized into 
the commodity type of “building and construction”, and included contracts 
pertaining to the maintenance of buildings and some civil engineering type 
projects related to building and construction. Contracts awarded to HDI’s were 
summarized into categories of black owned enterprises, black women owned 
enterprises and white women owned enterprises.  
Each of these categories was further separated into sub-categories based on 
shareholding of ≤25%, >25% & ≤50%, and >50% & ≤100%. This system of 
categorization, which is used by National Treasury, resulted in contracts being 
allocated in more than one HDI category, e.g. a contract awarded to an HDI 
owned enterprise with black male shareholding of 50%; black female 
shareholding of 30% and white female shareholding of 20% was recorded as 
being awarded to a black enterprise (>50% and ≤100% shareholding); to a black 
women owned enterprise (>25% and ≤50% shareholding); and to a white women 
owned enterprise (≤25% shareholding). 
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The PPPFA makes provision for preferences to be awarded to HDI's classified in 
terms of race, gender and disability. The data obtained from the National 
Treasury provides extensive information on the awarding of contracts to Black 
and Women business categories. However, the dataset is limited because no 
data were collected for enterprises with disabled shareholders. In addition, there 
were no data collected on whether preferences were awarded for the 
achievement of Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) objectives, 
as proposed in the PPPFA. The likely reason for this particular omission in data 
collection is the wide variation found in RDP target groups among different 
organs of state.   
Within the context of these limitations, the examination and analysis of the data 
provided by the National Treasury included the following: 
1. The total number of construction related contracts awarded on an 
annual basis; 
2. The total value of the contracts awarded on an annual basis; 
3. The number and value of contracts awarded to black owned enterprises 
to  examine effectiveness of the PPPFA,  as referred to in the 
Constitution;  
4. The number and value of contracts awarded to women owned 
enterprises in order to examine the effectiveness of the PPPFA, as 
referred to in the Constitution; 
5. The value of the preference premium and related percentage of 
procurement spend in order to examine the cost effectiveness of the 
PPPFA, as required by the Constitution;  
6. The annual trends in the awarding of government contracts to HDIs and 
their associated premiums; 
7. A differentiation of contracts awarded between black owned businesses 
generally and black women owned businesses, specifically; 
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8. A differentiation of contracts awarded between women owned 
businesses generally and white women owned businesses, specifically; 
and  
9. A separation of data showing tenders below the value of R500 000 and 
above the value of R500 000 in order to differentiate between contracts 
using the 80/20 and 90/10 points scoring systems, respectively. 
A preliminary review of the data from the National Treasury showed that the raw 
data was not arranged in a format that could be used for the types of analysis 
outlined above. Therefore, a comprehensive process was undertaken firstly to 
check the various datasets for completeness, accuracy and consistency, and then 
to reformat and categorize the datasets for the purpose of statistical analyses. 
The primary data for this study were collected using a survey questionnaire. This 
particular method of data collection was selected because it is considered to be 
the most appropriate technique to conduct a numerical survey. In developing the 
items for the questionnaire, careful consideration was given to the categories 
and the type of information required of CIDB graded contractors in order to 
address the research objectives. The questionnaire was structured to include 
mostly close-ended responses, which served the requirements of 
representatively and easily standardized data. However, during the development 
phase the recognition that close-ended questions confined responses to pre-
established parameters led to the inclusion of selected open-ended responses 
that were intended to elicit the respondent’s perceptions and opinions. This is 
permitted practice in survey questionnaires (Babbie & Mouton, 2006).  
The first step in the development of the survey instrument involved the 
identification of items. For the structured survey questionnaire a comprehensive 
list of questions were generated using multiple resources that included 
secondary information gathered from desktop research; the dataset from 
National Treasury; and the researcher’s firsthand knowledge of the PPPFA and 
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the construction industry sector. Appendix 3.6 presents the draft survey 
questionnaire that was developed containing 3 sections: Section 1: Demographic 
Information, Section 2: Access to preferential Opportunities and Section 3: 
Institutional Arrangements/Supply Side Measures. Where more information was 
required for some of the structured questions, provision was made for an open-
ended response. 
The second step in the development process was to test the instrument. Before 
the instrument was piloted it was pre-tested with a group of 4 built environment 
professionals who were knowledgeable about the research focus. The purpose of 
the pre-test was to assess item and question clarity and the functionality of the 
instrument. The feedback received from the pre-test group was generally 
positive in terms of ease of understanding the questions. In general, the pre-test 
candidates did not find any of the questions to be ambiguous or unclear or 
confusing. In the area of irrelevance and redundancy, and formatting errors, 
some suggestions were made to rework and rephrase specific questions. Some 
concerns were expressed regarding the length of the questionnaire, but 
additional discussion revealed that this perception was linked to an underlying 
disinterest by certain respondents in completing the questionnaire. More 
general comments and suggestions offered by the pre-test group that were 
determined to be useful were incorporated into the pilot survey questionnaire 
instrument. (Appendix 3.7 presents a report of the feedback received during the 
pre-test). 
3.7. PILOT SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN AND TESTING 
The revised pilot survey questionnaire retained the three sections (A copy of the 
pilot questionnaire is included as Appendix 3.8). Fourteen contractors were 
identified on a non-random quota sampling basis in order to ensure 
representation across various CIDB grades. Of the 14 contractors, 11 agreed to 
participate. A variety of techniques, including emails, faxes, telephone and face-
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to-face interactions, were used in administering the pilot questionnaire to the 11 
selected contractors. The purpose of using the telephonic and face-to-face 
techniques was to observe through personal contact how the respondents dealt 
with the questionnaire (A detailed report of the finding of the pilot is presented 
in Appendix 3.9).  
The piloting of the questionnaire was conducted in August 2011 and their 
responses were received by the set deadline date of 02
nd
 September 2011. 
Initially, the contractors were asked to participate in a personal (face-to-face) 
interview to complete the questionnaire. Due to a poor response to this 
approach contractors were then encouraged to e-mail or fax their questionnaire 
responses to the researcher. Despite this adjustment, some contractors 
remained reluctant to complete the survey because they perceived it to be too 
time consuming. As a result they were then offered the option of participating in 
a telephone survey.  
Table 3.2 below presents the CIDB grading of the contractors who participated in 
the pilot survey. 
Table 3.2:  CIDB grading of the contractors who participated in the pilot 
survey 
Respondent No. CIDB Grade:  
General Building (GB) 
CIDB Grade:  
Civil Engineering (CE) 
1 2 1 
2 4 N/A 
3 4 3 
4 5 N/A 
5 6 6 
6 7 5 
7 8 7 
8 N/A 3 
9 N/A 4 
10 N/A 8 
11 3 N/A 
Source: Pilot Survey 
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Of the 11 respondents, one completed the questionnaire in a face-to-face 
interaction with the researcher, one by fax, three by email, and six over the 
telephone. Following the completion of the questionnaire all respondents were 
contacted again and asked a standardized set of questions regarding the design, 
format and content of the instrument. In general, the responses received were 
positive and most of the respondents found the questions reasonable, straight 
forward and easy to understand. Additional information on the demographic 
details was requested from each respondent, with only one person declining to 
answer. Regarding the length of the questionnaire, respondents felt that while 
they considered the questionnaire to be lengthy it was manageable because 
most questions required a yes/no response. Ten respondents found the 
questionnaire useful and the questions clearly presented, and therefore easy to 
understand. 
The only significant problem identified was with two questions that asked 
respondents to estimate their turnover and tender award on a yearly basis for a 
five year period going back to 2006. Although all of the respondents managed to 
answer this question, many were concerned about the accuracy of the 
information provided because they could not easily recall it. Also, there was 
some concern raised about the confidentiality of this information. These specific 
questions and other issues were addressed during the process of developing and 
completing the final survey questionnaire. Except for some minor revisions, the 
final survey instrument remained fundamentally the same as the pilot 
questionnaire. (See Appendix 3.10) 
3.8. SAMPLING OF DATA AND SAMPLE SIZE 
The target population for the survey questionnaire was enterprises with majority 
Historically Disadvantaged Individual (HDI) ownership as categorized in the 
PPPFA. The designated categories included black females, black males and white 
females. It was determined that the most accessible and pragmatic approach to 
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select the respondents was to use the CIDB register of contractors still active as 
at 31 March 2011. The CIDB register had a total of 1985 “Active” contractors in 
Grades 2 to 9. For the present study probability sampling, using the population of 
1985 of still active contractors were stratified according to ownership on the 
CIDB Register. For each population cell a sub-sample was randomly selected 
using an electronic random number generator to select the required sample size 
of 596. This sample size of 596 was increased by 50% to 877 in order to achieve a 
meaningful response rate. The total population of contractors were then 
assigned random identifiers from 1 to 1985 (e.g. BF1026, BM263, WF23). Using 
the Excel software for generating random numbers (randbetween command), 
877 random numbers were obtained. These numbers were then matched with 
the name of the contractor associated with the specific number allocated to the 
total population. This method was used to select the survey sample. 
In CIDB grade categories where the sample size was large, a proportional 
stratified sample of respondents was selected. In those grades where the sample 
size was very small, i.e. Grades 8 and 9, the selected sample proportion of 
respondents exceeded the calculated proportion in order to ensure at least 
minimum representivity from those grades. An “eyeballing” exercise was 
conducted to ensure that there was adequate representation of contractors in 
the grading categories 2 to 9 and, in addition a representative spread of the 9 
provinces. This exercise confirmed that the representation was adequate for the 
purpose of this research. 
In total, 877 copies of the survey questionnaires were sent to randomly selected 
respondents using electronic response mechanisms including email and fax. In 
instances where the selected respondents did not have access to these facilities, 
the questionnaire was administered telephonically. Due to an initial poor 
response rate the deadline for submission of responses was extended several 
times. Contractors were contacted telephonically to request completion of the 
questionnaire and three follow-up e-mail reminders were sent to the selected 
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respondents in an effort to improve the response rate (Refer to Appendix 3.11 – 
3.13). 
3.9. DATA CAPTURING AND ANALYSIS  
Both the primary and secondary data used in this study were essentially numeric 
information that was collected using instruments that measure performance, 
attitudes or perceptions. Therefore, the information was analyzed using 
statistical procedures.  
Using Microsoft Excel software, all data were initially captured separately by two 
individuals and then matched for discrepancies as a quality control measure to 
minimize errors. This quality control process included examination of data ranges 
for implausible values, logic checks for ensuring answer validity and consistency, 
and incorporation of automated skip patterns. All analyses were done using 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software, version 21. 
3.10. SECONDARY DATA ANALYSIS 
Data obtained from the National Treasury were analyzed to establish whether 
the PPPFA had been effective during the period under review in achieving the 
socio-economic objectives of procurement preferencing in the South African 
context. The data were distributed over HDI status, as well as the provincial and 
national distribution of contracts awarded. Using SPSS, the data were verified 
through a process of quality assurance and quality control by an examination of 
data ranges for implausible values, logic checks for ensuring answer validity and 
consistency. Differences between the proportions and percentages of groupings 
found in the data were compared using standard error and confidence intervals. 
The z-scores calculated using this analysis informed the p-value or value of 
significance. 
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 −  = 	100 −  + 100 −   
SE = Standard Error 
P1 = Proportion Population 1 
P2 = Proportion Population 2 
n1 = Number of P1 
n2 = Number of P2 
The equation above was used to calculate the Confidence Interval of the 
proportions or percentages observed in the data. P indicates the proportions of 
each population under review and n represents the exact number. The z-scores 
that indicate the p-value are calculated to indicate the significant difference 
between the proportions using the figure highlighted below. The p in this 
equation is amalgamated.  
d% = 	100 −  + 100 −   
P = P1 + P2  (from previous formula) 
Proportions among different groups were calculated to evaluate whether the 
PPPFA was effective in terms of the premiums paid for contracts awarded to 
HDI’s, as well as the number of contracts given to HDI owned enterprises. 
T-tests assess whether the averages (means) of two groups of people in a sample 
are statistically dissimilar from each other. This type of analysis is appropriate for 
associating the (means) averages of two groups. In this study, t-tests were used 
to establish significant differences in averages between the different target 
groups of the PPPFA. 
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The chi-square (X
2
) test for independence (or goodness of fit test) determines 
whether a relationship exists between categorical variables. This test can also be 
used as an analysis method that utilizes frequency data from the sample to 
establish whether a hypothesis applies to the population proportion. In this 
study, Chi-square analyses were conducted to test differences in frequencies 
between categorical variables in the data. 
Significance testing for both t-tests and Chi-square tests were performed at a 
0.05 level of significance (p-values). Significance levels are often indicated with 
asterisks. However, there is no consistent convention linking a certain number of 
asterisks to a significance level. In this study the use of asterisks indicating 
significance levels are defined as follows:  
Asterisk Code Significance Comment 
*** 0.001 High significance 
** 0.01 Medium significance 
* 0.05 Low significance 
 
3.11. PRIMARY DATA ANALYSIS 
The primary survey data were analyzed to support the results of the national and 
provincial Treasury data, and to establish the extent to which derived results 
represent the occurrences at an individual level. Appendix 3.14 presents the 
rationale and motivation for proposing the various questions in the survey in 
order to address the research objectives. Selection criteria for the target 
population in the study is all CIDB registered contractors in Grades 2 to 9.  
After the data collection, data entry, data verification processes were completed, 
frequency distributions of categorical variables were calculated. Continuous 
variables included number and value of contracts awarded, average annual 
turnover, percentage of HDI shareholding and number of years the enterprise 
had been in business. Categorical variables included race, gender, CIDB grading, 
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certification, level of understanding of PPPFA, and number of tender 
submissions. Bar charts, histograms, line diagrams and pi-charts were used to 
depict frequency distributions for categorical and continuous variables as 
appropriate. Bi-variate analysis was conducted using the Pearsons chi-squared 
test for categorical data and the Spearman’s Correlation Test was used for 
continuous data. A p < 0.05 was considered as statistically significant. Chi-square 
(Pearson) was used to highlight differences in frequency within the groups of the 
data. Correlations were analyzed using Pearson’s Correlation figures to establish 
whether correlations were significant and in which direction. 
3.12. PARTICIPANT AND DATA CONFIDENTIALITY 
All information obtained during the study from survey and secondary data 
sources were handled in a strictly confidential manner. In the publication of 
research results and reports, all data will be treated as grouped, thus no 
individual will be identified from such documentation. 
As part of the agreement to obtain the National Treasury dataset the researcher 
agreed to keep the raw dataset and data findings strictly confidential. For this 
reason all the raw data and all finding/analysis based on the National Treasury 
dataset, including Chapters 4, 6 and 7 of this thesis, will not be made available to 
any person or organization without prior written approval from the Minister of 
Finance.  
3.13. SUMMARY 
This chapter described the research methodology and philosophical paradigm 
that guided the selection of the research methods and data analysis. The 
quantitative research paradigm which underpins the research is discussed and is 
followed by the research methods and techniques that were used to collect and 
analyze the data. The following two chapters present the results obtained from 
the Treasury Data and the Questionnaire Survey Data. 
 124 
 
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF TREASURY DATA 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents and discusses the results and findings obtained from the 
analysis of the National Treasury data collected for this study.   
The 5-year data set (April 2006 to March 2011) pertaining to the commodity type 
described as “Building and Construction” obtained from the Treasury was 
analysed to address the following research objectives: 
i. To measure the number and value of contracts awarded to businesses 
with HDI shareholding in comparison with the total number and value of 
contracts awarded;  
ii. To analyse the distribution of contracts awarded to HDI’s on the basis of 
race and gender as provided for in the PPPFA at both national and 
provincial levels; and 
iii. To determine what financial cost premiums were incurred through the 
implementation of the preferential procurement policy. 
4.2 TREASURY DATA 
The PPPFA (RSA, 2000a) stipulates all socio-economic goals to be measurable, 
quantifiable and monitored for compliance. The data received from National 
Treasury provided information on each awarded contract with the name of the 
successful tenderer; contract date; percentage equity ownership by black 
persons, black women and white women; contract value; and the amount of 
premium paid, if applicable. In order to address the research objectives of the 
study, the raw datasets from National Treasury were reformatted and 
categorized as was necessary for the purposes of statistical analyses.
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For ease of reference, Table 4.1 presents a list of the types of HDI enterprises 
referred to in this chapter and their definitions. 
Table 4.1:  Categories of HDI Enterprises 
Enterprise Type Definition 
HDI Enterprise 
Enterprise with HDI shareholding between  >0% and 
≤100% 
Non-HDI Enterprise Enterprise with no HDI shareholding 
HDI Enterprise with  
Black Shareholding ≤50% 
Enterprise with black (male and female) 
shareholding less than or equal to 50% 
HDI Enterprise with 
Black Shareholding >50% 
Enterprise with black (male and female) 
shareholding greater than 50% 
HDI Enterprise with Black Female 
Shareholding ≤50% 
Enterprise with black female shareholding less than 
or equal to 50% 
HDI Enterprise with  
Black Female Shareholding >50% 
Enterprise with black female shareholding greater 
than 50% 
HDI Enterprise with White Female 
Shareholding ≤50% 
Enterprise with white female shareholding less than 
or equal to 50% 
HDI Enterprise with  
White Female Shareholding >50% 
Enterprise with white female shareholding greater 
than 50% 
HDI Enterprise with  
Combined HDI Shareholding ≤50% 
Enterprise with a combination of black (male and 
female) and white female shareholding less than or 
equal to 50% 
HDI Enterprise with  
Combined HDI Shareholding >50% 
Enterprise with a combination of black (male and 
female) and white female shareholding greater than 
50% 
HDI Enterprise with  
Combined Female Shareholding ≤50% 
Enterprise with a combination of black female and 
white female shareholding less than or equal to 50% 
HDI Enterprise with  
Combined Female Shareholding >50% 
Enterprise with a combination of black female and 
white  female shareholding greater than 50% 
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4.3 NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS 
4.3.1 Distribution of contracts awarded over the five-year period 2006/07 – 
2010/11 
 
Table 4.2:  NATIONAL -  Number and value of contracts awarded over the five-
year period 2006/07 – 2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
All Contracts ≤R500 000 Contracts >R500 000 Contracts 
No. 
% of 
5-year total  
contracts 
Total Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of 
5-year 
total 
value 
No. 
% of 
yearly 
total 
Total Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of 
yearly 
total 
No. 
% of 
yearly 
total 
Total Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of 
yearly 
total 
2006/07 318 19.3% R  1 121 264 5.0% 183 57.5% R 32 846 2.9% 135 42.5% R 1 088 417 97.1% 
2007/08 262 16.0% R 2 293 776 10.3% 99 37.8% R 22 460 1.0% 163 62.2% R 2 271 317 99.0% 
2008/09 291 17.7% R 14 003 600 63.0% 77 26.5% R 16 179 0.1% 214 73.5% R 13 987 421 99.9% 
2009/10 229 14.0% R 1 377 645 6.2% 120 52.4% R 26 157 1.9% 109 47.6% R 1 351 488 98.1% 
2010/11 541 33.0% R 3 454 418 15.5% 296 54.7% R 69 947 2.0% 245 45.3% R 3 384 472 98.0% 
Total 1 641 100.0% R 22 250 703 100.0% 775  R 167 589  866  R 22 083 115  
% of Total 47.2% 0.8% 52.8% 99.2% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.2 presents the number of contracts, and their total value, that were 
awarded by national government departments between 01 April 2006 and 31 
March 2011. These data are then disaggregated into those contracts which had a 
value ≤R500 000 and those which had a value >R500 000. It should be noted that 
the contract value refers to the award value, i.e. not necessarily the final amount 
paid upon completion which might also include price adjustments, variations, 
etc. The table shows that over this five-year period a total of 1641 contracts with 
a combined value of R22.3 billion were awarded. The data reveal a wide range in 
the number of contracts awarded per year and their total value. The fewest 
number of contracts (n=229) were awarded in 2009/10 and the highest number 
(n=541) in 2010/11. The 229 contracts awarded in 2009/10 constituted 14.0% of 
the total number of contracts during the five-year period, while the 541 
contracts awarded in 2010/11 accounted for 33% of the contracts during the 
five-years.  
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The table shows that although the number of contracts awarded in 2006/07 
(n=318) was 19.3% of the total, their total value was the lowest, constituting only 
5.0% of the total value over the five-year period. This was due to a large 
percentage of those contracts being valued at ≤R500 000. The total value of all 
contracts in a single year was largest in 2008/2009 at just over R14 billion, which 
was approximately twelve times greater than the lowest yearly value, which 
occurred in 2006/07.   
It can also be noted that over the five-year period the total number of contracts 
awarded in the ≤R500 000 category (n=775) was only 5.6% less than the total 
number of contracts awarded in the >R500 000 value category (n=866). Within 
year variations, however, were sometimes large as occurred in 2008/09 when 
73.5% of the contracts awarded were in the >R500 000 value category. 
What is particularly striking is a comparison of the total value of the contract 
categories during this period. The total value of all contracts awarded in the 
≤R500 000 category between 01 April 2006 and 31 March 2011 was just under 
R168 million, whereas the total value for the >R500 000 category was just over 
R22 billion – which represents 99.2% of total value of all contracts. 
The largest spend in the five-year period was in 2008/09 which accounted for 
63.0% of the total value of contracts over the five-year period. This significantly 
higher value can most likely be attributed to the many government projects that 
were initiated for the 2010 FIFA World Cup soccer tournament that was held in 
South Africa. 
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Table 4.3:  NATIONAL –  Contracts awarded over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11, disaggregated by national government 
departments 
Department 
5-year TOTAL 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
No. 
% of 5- 
year total 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of 5- year 
total 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Department of Public 
Works 1198 73.0% R20 739 236 93.2% 171 R 1 033 040 188 R 1 932 439 197 R 13 399 862 169 R 1 199 105 473 R 3 174 790 
Department of Water 
and Environmental 
Affairs 
57 3.5% R 749 340 3.4% 4 R 52 321 8 R 321 331 21 R 169 974 14 R 121 270 10 R 84 444 
Department of 
International Relations 
and Co-operation 
12 0.7% R 334 385 1.5% 0 R 0 2 R 2 321 7 R 330 337 3 R 1 727 0 R  0 
South African Police 
Services (SAPS) 133 8.1% R 249 921 1.1% 84 R 19 377 19 R 5 175 15 R 48 641 7 R 2 285 8 R 174 443 
Sub Total 1400 85.3% R 22 072 882 99.2% 259 R 1 104 738 217 R 2 261 266 240 R 13 948 814 193 R 1 324 387 491 R 3 433 677 
All other national 
departments 
241 14.7% R 177 819 0.8% 59 R 16 528 45 R 32 510 51 R 54 785 36 R 53 256 50 R 20 740 
TOTAL 1 641 100.0% R 22 250 701 100.0% 318 R 1 121 266 262 R 2 293 776 291 R 14 003 599 229 R 1 377 643 541 R 3 454 417 
Note: Data shown in this table are only for those government departments in which accumulative spend exceeded 1% of the total value of all contracts awarded over the 5-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11 
Source: Treasury Data (2011)  
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Table 4.3 presents the number of contracts awarded by national government 
departments over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11. Data shown are only 
for those government departments in which accumulative spend exceeded 1% of 
the total value of all contracts awarded over the 5-year period 2006/07 – 
2010/11. The data show that the National Department of Public Works awarded 
73% of all contracts during that period (n=1198) with a value equating to 93% of 
the total. The departments with the next highest total value of contracts were 
the Department of Water and Environmental Affairs, Department of 
International Relations and Co-operation and South African Police Services 
(SAPS). All other national government departments combined made up only 
0.8% of the total value of contracts awarded over this period. 
 
Table 4.4:  NATIONAL – Number and Total Value of Contracts Awarded to HDI 
and Non-HDI Enterprises over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
Total HDI Enterprises Non-HDI Enterprises 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
2006/07 318 R 1 121 264 260 R 912 934 58 R 208 330 
2007/08 262 R 2 293 777 242 R 2 260 725 20 R 33 052 
2008/09 291 R 14 003 600 247 R 13 421 995 44 R 581 605 
2009/10 229 R 1 377 646 191 R 1 211 098 38 R 166 548 
2010/11 541 R 3 454 418 470 R 2 815 557 71 R 638 861 
Total 1641 R 22 250 705 1410 R 20 622 309 231 R 1 628 396 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.4 lists the number and total value of contracts awarded to HDI and non-
HDI enterprises by national government departments between 2006/07 – 
2010/11. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 below take the same data and present it graphically 
based on percentages. The data reveal that a higher number of contracts were 
awarded to HDI enterprises than to non-HDI enterprises. For each year during 
 this period HDI enterprises consistently received more than 80% of the contracts 
awarded.  
On a contract value basis
equated to more than 80% of the total value for any given year
Over the 5-year period the contracts awarded to HDI enterprises constituted 
92.7% of the total value of all contracts awarded.
Figure 4.1:  NATIONAL 
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, HDI enterprises always received contracts that 
 
 
-  Percentage of the total number of contracts 
awarded to HDI enterprises compared to non
HDI enterprises over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 
Source: Treasury Data (2011)
 
 
(See Figure 4.2). 
 
-
 
 Figure 4.2:  NATIONAL 
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-  Percentage of the total value of contracts 
awarded to HDI enterprises compared to non
HDI enterprises over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 
Source: Treasury Data (2011)
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TABLE 4.5:  NATIONAL – Number and total value of contracts awarded over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11, disaggregated 
by HDI status 
Financial 
Year 
Total 
Contracts awarded to enterprises with ≤50 percent HDI 
shareholding 
Contracts awarded to enterprises with >50% HDI 
shareholding Contracts 
awarded to Non-
HDI enterprises 
Black Ownership 
(male and/or female) 
White Female 
Ownership 
Combination of 
HDI Ownership  
(black and white) 
Black Ownership 
(male and/or female) 
White Female 
Ownership 
Combination of 
HDI Ownership  
(black and white) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 
000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 
000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 
000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 
000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
2006/07 318 R 1 121 264 26 R 378 250 0 R 0 2 R 7 771 213 R 470 496 5 R 11 991 14 R 44 426 58 R 208 330 
2007/08 262 R 2 293 777 24 R 599 747 2 R 9 113 2 R 28 671 195 R 1 295 179 8 R 38 805 11 R 289 210 20 R 33 052 
2008/09 291 R 14 003 600 29 R 9 602 222 5 R 20 566 4 R 190 359 197 R 3 499 155 3 R 327 9 R 109 366 44 R 581 605 
2009/10 229 R 1 377 646 27 R 358 706 2 R 1 580 3 R 23 485 154 R 790 261 1 R 199 4 R 36 867 38 R 166 548 
2010/11 541 R 3 454 418 32 R 588 979 2 R 19 160 4 R 9 830 416 R 2 149 638 9 R 21 088 7 R 26 862 71 R 638 861 
Total 1641 R 22 250 705 138 R 11 527 904 11 R 50 419 15 R 260 116 1175 R 8 204 729 26 R 72 410 45 R 506 731 231 R 1 628 396 
% of Total 100% 100% 8.4% 51.8% 0.7% 0.2% 0.9% 1.2% 71.6% 36.9% 1.6% 0.3% 2.7% 2.3% 14.1% 7.3% 
% of Total No. 10.0% 75.9% 14.1% 
% of Total Value 53.2% 39.5% 7.3% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
 
  
 Figure 4.3:  NATIONAL 
Table 4.5 and Figure 4.3 show that enterprises with black shareholding >50% 
received the highest number of contracts over the 
nearly 80% in 2010/11. Enterp
≤50% generally received less than
year period. Enterprises with white female shareholding in both 
the >50% categories received a compa
Enterprises with non
with white female shareholding. 
Over the five-year period across
enterprises (black male and/or fe
of contracts and most of the contract value as compared to enterprises owned 
by white females, or 
female.  
When comparing across the three categories for th
seen that enterprises with 
1641 contracts, but these had a combined value equal to 53.2% of the total. In 
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- Number of contracts awarded over the 
period 2006/07 – 2010/11,  expressed as a 
percentage and disaggregated by HDI status
Source: Treasury Data (2011)
five-year period, peaking at 
rises with black shareholding (male and female) 
 9% of the number of contracts over the 
ratively lower number of contracts. 
-HDI shareholding received more contracts than enterprises 
 
 both HDI ownership categories
male ownership) always received the majority 
by a combination of  black (male and female) and white 
e five-year period it can be 
≤50% HDI ownership received only 10% of the total 
 
 
five-year 
 
 
five-
the ≤50% and 
 black owned 
 contrast, enterprises with
but their combined value only represented 39.5% of the total. Non
enterprises received 14.1% of the contracts which were worth only 7.3% of the 
total value. 
 Figure 4.4:  NATIONAL 
Table 4.6 presents the number and total value of all contracts awarded over the 
five-year period 2006/07 
The data show that of the 1641 contracts awarded 68.1% went to 100% HDI 
enterprises, although the value of these contracts represented only 22.9% of the 
total.  Conversely, the 164 contracts awarded to enterprises with 
shareholding represen
value. This was a result of the 38 contracts awarded in this category in 2008/09 
with a value that represented 82.9% of the total in that category for the 
period. Non-HDI enterprises recei
only 7.3% of the total value.
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 >50% HDI ownership received 75.9% of the con
- Value of contracts awarded over the five
2006/07 – 2010/11, expressed as a percentage and 
disaggregated by HDI status   
Source: Treasury Data (2011)
– 2010/11 disaggregated by level of HDI shareho
ted only 10.0% of the total number but 53.2% of the total 
ved 14.1% of all contracts, but this equated to 
 
 
tracts, 
-HDI 
 
-year period 
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TABLE 4.6:  NATIONAL –  Number and total value of contracts awarded over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11, disaggregated by level of 
HDI shareholding 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
Y
e
a
r
 
Total 
Contracts awarded to enterprises with 
≤50% HDI shareholding 
Contracts awarded to enterprises 
with 
>50% and <100% HDI shareholding 
Contracts awarded to enterprises with 
100% HDI shareholding 
Contracts awarded to Non-HDI 
enterprises 
No. 
Total Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
% of Total 
No. for 
≤50%  
Ownership 
Category 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of Total 
Value for 
≤50%  
Ownership 
Category 
No. 
% of Total 
No. for 
>50% and 
<100% 
Ownership 
Category 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of Total 
Value 
for >50% 
and <100% 
Ownership 
Category 
No. 
% of Total 
No. 
for >100%  
Ownership 
Category 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of Total 
Value 
for >100%  
Ownership 
Category 
No. 
% of Total 
No. for 
Non-HDI 
Ownership 
Category 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of Total 
Value 
for 
Non-HDI 
Ownership 
Category 
2006/07 318 R 1 121 264 28 17.1% R 386 021 3.3% 33 25.8% R 199 836 5.4% 199 17.8% R 327 077 6.4% 58 25.1% R 208 330 12.8% 
2007/08 262 R 2 293 777 28 17.1% R 637 531 5.4% 30 23.4% R 577 931 15.7% 184 16.5% R 1 045 263 20.5% 20 8.7% R 33 052 2.0% 
2008/09 291 R 14 003 600 38 23.2% R 9 813 147 82.9% 22 17.2% R 1 828 914 49.6% 187 16.7% R 1 779 934 34.9% 44 19.0% R 581 605 35.7% 
2009/10 229 R 1 377 646 32 19.5% R 383 771 3.2% 14 10.9% R 378 964 10.3% 145 13.0% R 448 363 8.8% 38 16.5% R 166 548 10.2% 
2010/11 541 R 3 454 418 38 23.2% R 617 969 5.2% 29 22.7% R 703 972 19.1% 403 36.0% R 1 493 616 29.3% 71 30.7% R 638 861 39.2% 
Total 1641 R 22 250 705 164 100.0% R 11 838 439 100.0% 128 100.0% R 3 689 617 100.0% 1118 100.0% R 5 094 253 100.0% 231 100.0% R 1 628 396 100.0% 
% of Total  10.0%  53.2%  7.8%  16.6%  68.1%  22.9%  14.1%  7.3%  
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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TABLE 4.7:  NATIONAL –  Number and value of contracts awarded to enterprises with 100% HDI shareholding over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11, disaggregated by HDI status 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
Y
e
a
r
 
All contracts 
awarded to 100% 
HDIs 
100% Black Male 100% Black Female 
Combined Black 
Male and Female 
100% White Female 
Combined Black Female  
and White Female 
Combined Black Female, 
Black Male and  
White Female 
No. Value No. 
% of 
Total 
No. 
Value 
% of 
Total 
Value 
No. 
% of 
Total 
No. 
Value 
% of 
Total 
Value 
No. 
% of 
Total 
No. 
Value 
% of 
Total 
Value 
No 
% of 
Total 
No. 
Value 
% of 
Total 
Value 
No. 
% of 
Total 
No. 
Value 
% of 
Total 
Value 
No 
% of 
Total 
No. 
Value 
% of 
Total 
Value 
2006/07 199 R 327 077 76 38.2% R 151 195 46.2% 54 27.1% R 82 455 25.2% 57 28.6% R 85 491 26.1% 4 2.0% R 2 518 0.8% 3 1.5% R 4 924 1.5% 5 2.5% R 494 0.2% 
2007/08 184 R 1 045 263 81 44.0% R 519 508 49.7% 35 19.0% R 90 167 8.6% 56 30.4% R 380 979 36.4% 7 3.8% R 38 688 3.7% 2 1.1% R 13 092 1.3% 3 1.6% R 2 829 0.3% 
2008/09 187 R 1 779 934 78 41.7% R 653 968 36.7% 54 28.9% R 188 831 10.6% 44 23.5% R 849 533 47.7% 3 1.6% R 327 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 8 4.3% R 87 275 4.9% 
2009/10 145 R 448 363 61 42.1% R 208 404 46.5% 39 26.9% R 50 135 11.2% 42 29.0% R 187 522 41.8% 1 0.7% R 199 0.0% 1 0.7% R 623 0.1% 1 0.7% R 1 480 0.3% 
2010/11 403 R 1 493 616 262 65.0% R 866 378 58.0% 88 21.8% R 308 900 20.7% 39 9.7% R 284 122 19.0% 9 2.2% R 21 088 1.4% 2 0.5% R 11 278 0.8% 3 0.7% R 1 850 0.1% 
Total 1118 R 5 094 253 558 49.9%   R 2 399 453  47.1% 270 24.2% R 720 488 14.1% 238 21.3% R 1 787 647 35.1% 24 2.1% R 62 820 1.2% 8 0.7% R 29 917 0.6% 20 1.8% R 93 928 1.8% 
Total as a % of contracts awarded to 
enterprises with 100% HDI 
shareholding (n=1118) 
49.9%  47.1%  24.2%  14.1%  21.3%  35.1%  2.1%  1.2%  0.7%  0.6%  1.8%  1.8%  
Total as a % of all contracts awarded  
(n=1641)  
34.0%  10.8%  16.5%  3.2%  14.5%  8.0%  1.5%  0.3%  0.5%  0.1%  1.2%  0.4%  
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
 Table 4.7 presents the number and value of contracts awarded 
period 2006/07 – 2010/11 to enterprises with 100% HDI shareholding only, 
disaggregated by HDI status. The data show that during this period 1118 
contracts with a value of R 5 094 253 were awarded in this category. The data 
show that enterprises 100% owned by black males received 49.9% of the total 
number of contracts which equated to 47.1% of the total value.
100% owned by black females were awarded 24.2% of the contracts worth 14.1% 
of the total value. HDI enterprises 100
males and females were awarded 21.3% of 
total value.  All other types of ownership (i.e. involving white females, black 
females and black males) received a combined total of 4.6% of th
worth 3.7% of the total value.  
 
Figure 4.5:  NATIONAL 
 
Figure 4.5 presents the total number of contracts awarded to HDI enterprises 
with female shareholding over the 
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over the 
% owned through a combination of black 
the contracts worth 35.1% of the 
 
-  Number of contracts awarded to HDI enterprises 
with female shareholding over the five
2006/07 – 2010/11, expressed as a percentage 
Source: Treasury Data (2011)
five-year period 2006/07 
 
five-year 
 HDI enterprises 
e contracts 
-year period 
 
 
– 2010/11, 
 expressed as a percentage. The graph 
enterprises with black female sha
highest number of contracts compared to other enterprises with female 
shareholding. The number of contracts awarded to enterprises with black female 
shareholding >50% peaked at 
Figure 4.6:   NATIONAL 
Figure 4.6 presents the total value of contracts awarded to
female shareholding over the 
percentage. The graph shows
female shareholding 
more than 40% of the total 
Interestingly, this amount peaked in 2008/09 when the value of the contracts 
received by this group amounted to over 60% of the
in that year, but the category is almost non
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indicates that in each of the 
reholding >50% consistently received the 
just over 20% in 2008/09.  
-  Total value of contracts awarded to HDI enterprises 
with female shareholding over the five
2006/07 – 2010/11, expressed as a percentage
Source: Treasury Data (2011)
 HDI enterprises with 
five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11, expressed as a 
 that during this period HDI enterprises with black 
≤50% received contracts with a value that represented 
amount awarded to female owned enterprises. 
 total for female enterprises
-existent in all other years
 
five-years HDI 
-year period 
 
 
 
. 
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Table 4.8:  NATIONAL – NUMBER and VALUE of contracts awarded over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11, disaggregated by CIDB 
Grading Categories  
G
r
a
d
e
 
CIDB Value 
Threshold 
Total 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
Total 
No. 
% of 
Total 
No. 
Total Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of 
Total 
Value 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
 (ZAR 000’s) 
1 ≤ R0.2 m 454 27.7% R 62 024 0.3% 144 R 19 521 52 R 6 436 45 R 5 323 72 R 10 201 141 R 20 543 
2 > R0.2m to ≤ R0.65m  394 24.0% R 147 492 0.7% 58 R 24 583 60 R 23 297 39 R 14 760 57 R 21 161 180 R 63 691 
3 > R0.65m to ≤ R2m  238 14.5% R 278 682 1.3% 42 R 49 861 53 R 64 078 41 R 45 808 34 R 41 335 68 R 77 600 
4 > R2m to ≤ R4m  129 7.9% R 357 999 1.6% 23 R 65 924 23 R 62 202 38 R 101 296 13 R 33 535 32 R 95 042 
5 > R4m to ≤ R6.5m  99 6.0% R 512 101 2.3% 16 R 83 225 17 R 86 888 32 R 161 880 13 R 69 530 21 R 110 578 
6 > R6.5m to ≤ R13m  127 7.7% R 1 189 498 5.3% 12 R 101 432 18 R 161 223 34 R 308 421 16 R 168 834 47 R 449 588 
7 > R13m  to ≤ R40m  136 8.3% R 2 906 605 13.0% 20 R 484 706 29 R 589 006 33 R 744 512 19 R 415 013 35 R 673 368 
8 > R40m to ≤ R130m  40 2.4% R 2 542 201 11.4% 2 R 156 854 7 R 491 812 17 R 963 026 3 R 173 009 11 R 757 500 
9 > R130m 24 1.5% R 14 254 102 64.1% 1 R 135 158 3 R 808 834 12 R 11 658 574 2 R 445 027 6 R 1 206 509 
Total 1641 100% R 22 250 704 100% 318 R1 121 264 262 R2 293 776 291 R 14 003 600 229 R 1 377 645 541 R 3 454 419 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 4.8 presents the number and value of contracts awarded over the five-year 
period 2006/07 – 2010/11, disaggregated by CIDB Grading Categories. The data 
show that the highest number of contracts awarded during this period (n=454) 
were to CIDB Grade 1 contractors. Although this represents 27.7% of the total 
number of contracts (n=1641), their value equates to only 0.3% of the total. 
Combining the data for Grades 1 and 2 shows that these categories represented 
51.7% of the total number of contracts, but just 1.0% of the total value. In 
comparison, only 1.5% of all contracts were awarded to Grade 9 contractors but 
the value of those 24 contracts equated to 64.1% of the total value for all 
contracts. 
Table 4.9:  NATIONAL - Number and Total Value of contracts awarded over the 
five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11, disaggregated by 
value categories ≤R1 000 000 and >R1 000 000 
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l 
Y
e
a
r 
All Contracts 
Value Category 
Contracts with a value 
 ≤R1 000 000  
Contracts with a value 
 >R1 000 000  
No.  
% of 
Total 
No. 
Value  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of 
Total 
Value 
No.  
% of 
No. 
Value  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of 
Value 
No.  
% of 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of 
Value 
2006/07 318 19.4% R 1 121 264 5.0% 217 23.8% R 388 185 63.3% 101 13.9% R 733 079 3.4% 
2007/08 262 16.0% R 2 293 776 10.3% 133 14.6% R 47 002 7.7% 129 17.7% R 2 246 774 10.4% 
2008/09 291 17.7% R 14 003 600 62.9% 103 11.3% R 36 251 5.9% 188 25.8% R 13 967 349 64.6% 
2009/10 229 14.0% R 1 377 645 6.2% 108 11.8% R 32 577 5.3% 121 16.6% R 1 345 068 6.2% 
2010/11 541 33.0% R 3 454 419 15.5% 351 38.5% R 108 889 17.8% 190 26.1% R 3 345 530 15.5% 
Total 1641 100.0% R 22 250 704 100.0% 912 100.0% R 612 904 100.0% 729 100.0% R 21 637 800 100.0% 
% of Total 55.6%  2.8%  44.4%  97.2%  
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
As from 2011 PPPFA Regulations now set the threshold value for allocating 
preference points at R1 000 000. For contracts with a value ≤R1 000 000 a 
maximum of 20 preference points can be given to qualifying tenderers during the 
tender evaluation stage.  For contracts with a value >R1 000 000 a maximum of 
10 preference points can be given to qualifying tenderers.  
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Table 4.9 presents the National Treasury data disaggregated by these threshold 
values. The data show that 55.6% of the contracts awarded over the five-year 
period 2006/07 – 2010/11 were for a value ≤R1 000 000 and 44.4% were for 
contracts values >R1 000 000. However, the value of all the ≤R1 000 000 
contracts represented only 2.8% of the total, whereas the value of all the 
>R1 000 000 contracts equated to 97.2% of the total. 
4.3.2 National: Premiums incurred over the five-year period 2006/07 – 
2010/11 
Table 4.10:  NATIONAL -  Premiums incurred over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
Total No. 
of 
contracts 
Total Value of 
contracts  
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. of 
contracts 
awarded with 
premiums 
Value of 
premium paid 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of 
contracts 
awarded 
with 
premiums 
% premium 
paid 
2006/07 318 R 1 121 264 41 R 11 609 12.9% 1.0% 
2007/08 262 R 2 293 776 33 R 18 480 12.6% 0.8% 
2008/09 291 R 14 003 600 38 R 180 052 13.1% 1.3% 
2009/10 229 R 1 377 645 15 R 13 112 6.6% 1.0% 
2010/11 541 R 3 454 418 19 R 211 854 3.5% 6.5% 
Total 1641 R 2 250 703 146  R 435 107   
5-year 
average 
    8.9% 2.0% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.10 shows the number of contracts that incurred premiums and their 
value for national contracts awarded over the five-year period 2006/07 – 
2010/11. The data show that although the number of contracts incurring 
premiums averaged 8.9% for the 5 years, the value of those premiums 
represented only 2.0% of the total.  
The distribution of premiums incurred indicates that the highest value occurred 
in 2010/11 at 6.5%, whilst in each of the other four years the premium value 
remained consistently at about the 1% level.  In terms of the number of contracts 
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that incurred premiums, during the first three years under review the percentage 
remained in the 12.6% – 13.1% range, then dropped significantly in the last 2 
years to a low of 3.5% in 2010/11. At the same time as the number of contracts 
incurring premiums was declining the amount of the premium was increasing to 
6.5% in 2010/11. This indicates that the value of premiums during the last year 
was substantially higher than for the first 4 years under review.  
Table 4.11 shows the distribution of premiums incurred over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11, disaggregated according to the two categories of threshold 
values where the 80/20 and 90/10 preference point system was applied, i.e. 
contracts ≤R500 000 (80/20) and >R500 000 (90/10). The data show little 
difference between the average premium paid over the 5 years in either the 
≤R500 000 category (1.2%) or the >R500 000 category (2.0%).  
 In 2010/11 the percentage premium incurred for the contracts >R500 000 was 
6.7%, which was substantially higher than the percentage premium incurred for 
the remaining four years, and much higher than the five-year average of 2%. In 
addition, in 2010/11, the 6.7% premium for contracts >R500 000 was much 
higher than the 0.3% premium incurred for contracts in the ≤R500 000 category. 
In terms of value of premiums incurred, the highest amount was incurred in 
2010/11 in the >R500 000 category, despite the highest procurement spend 
being in 2008/09, as shown in Table 4.2. The percentage of the number of 
contracts awarded with premiums was much higher in the first three years for 
contracts ≤R500 000 as compared to the last 2 years, as well as being above the 
five-year average of 6.7%. For contracts >R500 000 awarded in the first four 
years, the percentage of the number of contracts awarded with premiums was 
much higher than in the last year (5.7%). 
According to the price preference formula the maximum premium that is 
permitted is 25% above the lowest responsive tender for contracts with a value 
≤R500 00, and 11.1% for contracts with a value >R500 000. Looking at Table 4.11 
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it can be seen that in 2009/10 the actual percent premium paid in the ≤R500 00 
category on those 3 contracts that incurred a premium was 42.1%. Similarly, the 
actual percent premium paid in the >R500 00 category was 17.6% on those 17 
contracts awarded in 2006/07 that incurred premiums, while the premium was 
20.4% for those 14 contracts awarded in 2010/11 that incurred premiums. 
Table 4.12 provides an analysis of the contracts that incurred premiums over the 
five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11. To interpret this table it is essential to 
understand that the PPPFA regulations applicable at the time established a 
preference point scoring system from which a formula was derived that 
calculated, among other things, the maximum price premium that could be 
incurred within the preferencing framework. Contracts with a value ≤R500 000 
used the 80/20 points system that set the maximum allowable price premium at 
25% of the lowest responsive tender. Contracts with a value >R500 000 used the 
90/10 points system that set the maximum allowable price premium at 11.1% of 
the lowest responsive tender. 
The table contains three key elements. Firstly, it presents data on those contracts 
awarded that incurred premiums during the five-year period. Secondly, it 
indicates those contracts in which the premium incurred exceeded the maximum 
percentage allowable. Lastly, it applies the data to derive an estimated value of 
the excess premium paid on the basis that the price preferencing formula was 
applied correctly. 
The analysis reveals that for contracts ≤R500 000, which should have incurred a 
maximum premium of 25%, the actual percentage premium incurred ranged 
from 43% to 882%. For contracts >R500 000, which should have incurred a 
maximum premium of 11.1%, the actual percentage premium incurred ranged 
from 15% to 153%. In monetary terms, the estimated value of the excess 
premiums incurred over the five-year period was R 779 000 for contracts 
≤R500 000 and R 177 926 000 for contracts >R500 000. 
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Table 4.11:  NATIONAL -  Analysis of premiums incurred over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11, disaggregated by contract 
threshold value categories 
Financial 
Year 
Contract Values ≤R500 000 Contract Values >R500 000 
Total 
No. 
Total value of 
all contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium (%) 
incurred on 
contracts 
that incurred 
premiums 
Total 
No. 
Total value of all 
contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts that 
incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium (%) 
incurred on 
contracts that 
incurred 
premiums 
2006/07 183  R   32 846  R 805 2.5% 24 13.1%  R     5 175  18.4% 135  R     1 088 417   R   10 805  1.0% 17 12.6% R 72 057 17.6% 
2007/08 99  R   22 460   R 508 2.3% 12 12.1%  R    5 263  10.7% 163  R     2 271 317   R   17 972  0.8% 21 12.9% R 204 719 9.6% 
2008/09 77  R     16 179   R 247  1.6% 8 10.4%  R     2 391  11.5% 214  R  13 987 421  R 179 805 1.3% 30 14.0% R 2 533 437 7.6% 
2009/10 120  R    26 157   R 152  0.6% 3 2.5%  R        513  42.1% 109  R     1 351 488   R   12 960  1.0% 12 11.0% R 258 328 5.3% 
2010/11 296  R   69 947  R 203  0.3% 5 1.7%  R      1 751  13.1% 245  R   3 384 472   R  211 651  6.7% 14 5.7% R 1 247 455 20.4% 
Total 775 R 167 589 R 1 915  52   R 15 093   866 R 22 083 115 R 433 193   94   R 4 315 996   
5-year 
Average 
      1.2%   6.7%   14.5%       2.0%   10.9%   11.2% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 4.12:  NATIONAL -  Analysis of contracts incurring premiums over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
Contracts that incurred premiums Contracts that exceeded the maximum allowable premium Implication on premiums incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
awarded 
with 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
 (ZAR 000's) 
Total 
premium 
incurred 
(ZAR 000's) 
No. of 
contracts 
with 
premiums 
exceeding 
maximum 
allowable 
% of Total 
No. 
Value of 
CONTRACTS 
with premiums 
exceeding 
maximum 
allowable  
(ZAR 000's) 
% of Total 
Value 
Value of 
PREMIUMS for 
those contracts 
that had 
premiums 
exceeding 
maximum 
allowable 
(ZAR 000's) 
Estimated 
value of the 
lowest 
priced 
TENDERS 
(ZAR 000's) 
%  premium 
incurred on 
the estimated 
lowest priced 
TENDERS 
Estimated 
value of 
maximum 
allowable 
premium  
(ZAR 000's) 
Estimated 
value of 
excess 
premium 
paid   
(ZAR 000's) 
Contracts ≤R500 000 (maximum allowable premium = 25%) 
2006/07 24 R 5 175 R 805 4 16.7% 676 13.1%  R   545   R    131  416%  R        33   R     512  
2007/08 12 R 5 263 R 508 0 0.0% 0 0.0%  R       -    R       -   0.0%  R         -    R        -   
2008/09 8 R 2 391 R 247 1 12.5% 160 6.7%  R      85   R      75  113%  R        19   R       66  
2009/10 3 R 513 R 152 1 33.3% 167 32.6%  R   150   R      17  882%  R           4   R     146  
2010/11 5 R 1 751 R 203 1 20.0% 430 24.6%  R   130   R    300  43%  R        75   R       55  
Total  52 R 15 093 R 1 915 7 13.5% 1433 9.4%  R   910   R    523  174%  R      131   R     779  
Contracts >R500 000 (maximum allowable premium = 11.1%) 
2006/07 17 R 72 057 R 10 805 8 47.1% R 37 518 52.1% R 9 048  R 28 470  32%  R 3 160   R       5 888  
2007/08 21 R 204 719 R 17 972 3 14.3% R 23 655 11.6% R 10 585  R 13 070  81%  R 1 451   R       9 134  
2008/09 30 R 2 533 437 R 179 805 10 33.3% R 91 613 3.6% R 55 425  R 36 188  153%  R 4 017   R     51 408  
2009/10 12 R 258 328 R 12 960 5 41.7% R 34 753 13.5% R 4 514  R 30 239  15%  R 3 357   R       1 157  
2010/11 14 R 1 247 455 R 211 651 3 21.4% R 354 787 28.4% R 134 761  R 220 026  61%  R 24 423   R   110 338  
Total  94 R 4 315 996 R 433 193 29 31.2% R 542 326 12.6%  R 214 333   R 327 993  65%  R 36 407   R   177 926  
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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A list of the contracts that exceeded the maximum allowable premiums is 
provided in Appendix 4.1 
4.4 PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS 
The data presented in the tables and graph in this section are for the contracts 
awarded by provincial governments across the nine provinces of South Africa, i.e. 
Kwa-Zulu Natal, Limpopo, Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, Free State, Gauteng, 
Northern Cape, North West and Western Cape. 
4.4.1 Distribution of Contracts 
 
Table 4.13:  PROVINCIAL - Number and value of contracts awarded over the 
five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11 
Finan
cial 
Year 
All Contracts ≤R500 000 Contracts >R500 000 Contracts 
No.  
% of  
5-year 
total 
Value  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of  
5-year 
total 
No.  
% of 
 5-
year 
total 
Value  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of  
5-
year 
total 
No.  
% of 
5-
year 
total 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of  
5- 
year 
total 
2006/07 1836 22.1% R 4 710 057 16.0% 717 39.1% R 310 436 6.6% 1119 60.9% R 4 399 621 93.4% 
2007/08 1930 23.2% R 6 340 883 21.5% 987 51.1% R 209 366 3.3% 943 48.9% R 6 131 517 96.7% 
2008/09 1885 22.7% R 8 734 286 29.6% 1023 54.3% R 211 294 2.4% 862 45.7% R 8 522 992 97.6% 
2009/10 1300 15.6% R 3 087 525 10.5% 831 63.9% R 161 087 5.2% 469 36.1% R 2 926 438 94.8% 
2010/11 1363 16.4% R 6 604 905 22.4% 594 43.6% R 284 807 4.3% 769 56.4% R 6 320 098 95.7% 
Total 8314 100% R 29 477 656 100% 4152  R 1 176 990  4162  R 28 300 666  
% of Total  49.9% 4.0% 50.1% 96.0% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.13 presents the number and value of contracts awarded by provincial 
departments over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11 across the nine 
provinces of South Africa. A total of 8314 contracts with a total value of R29.4 
billion were awarded during this period. These values can be contrasted with 
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similar data presented in the previous section which showed that during the 
same period national departments awarded only 1641 contracts, but these had a 
total value of R22.2 billion. The large difference in the number of contracts 
awarded indicates that the average value of an individual contract awarded at 
provincial level was much lower than one awarded at national level.  
The table shows there was little difference in the number of contracts awarded 
during this period between the ≤R500 000 value category (n=4152) and the 
>R500 000 category (n=4162). There was a large difference, however, in the total 
value of the contracts with the value of contracts awarded in the ≤R500 000 
category representing only 4% of the total value of all contracts whereas those 
awarded in the >R500 000 category represented 96% of the total. 
Overall, the highest number of contracts (23.2%) were awarded in 2007/08 
whilst the largest spend (29.6%) occurred in 2008/09. Similar to national 
government, this higher spend in 2008/09 can probably be attributed to 
expanded infrastructure investment in preparation for the 2010 FIFA World Cup 
tournament held in South Africa.  
Table 4.14 presents data on the number and value of contracts awarded per 
province over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11. Figure 4.7 illustrates data 
on the number of contracts awarded per province (expressed as a percentage) 
and Figure 4.8 illustrates data on the total value of contracts awarded per 
province (expressed as a percentage).  
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Table 4.14:  PROVINCIAL  - Number and Value of contracts awarded per province over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11 
Province 
Total 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
No. of 
contracts 
% of 5-year 
total 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of 5-year 
total 
No. of 
contracts 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. of 
contracts 
Value 
 (ZAR 000’s) 
No. of 
contracts 
Value 
 (ZAR 000’s) 
No. of 
contracts 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. of 
contracts 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Kwa-Zulu Natal 2 770 33.3% R4 173 596 14.2% 665 R 776 004 694 R1 059 182 540 R 1 051 330 502 R 433 737 351 R 853 343 
Limpopo 1 040 12.5% R3 356 302 11.4% 427 R 688 831 360 R339 871 63 R 153 213 41 R 209 506 149 R 1 964 881 
Eastern Cape 1 607 19.3% R 5 563 855 18.9% 142 R 756 191 256 R1 519 129 653 R 2 038 131 297 R 734 874 259 R 515 530 
Mpumalanga 748 9.0% R 4 776 651 16.2% 217 R 843 306 190 R1 665 330 101 R 1 213 586 49 R 409 471 191 R 644 958 
Free State 877 10.6% R 3 346 953 11.3% 83 R 662 012 174 R1 004 829 205 R 1 108 283 179 R 40 630 236 R 531 199 
Gauteng 496 6.0% R 3 740 565 12.7% 21 R 17 873 85 R36 180 230 R 2 105 696 82 R 146 398 78 R 1 434 418 
Northern Cape 335 4.0% R 1 371 488 4.7% 112 R 513 767 84 R353 302 57 R 177 209 30 R 213 279 52 R 113 931 
North West 313 3.8% R 1 877 357 6.3% 152 R 436 374 78 R357 438 34 R 787 077 22 R 172 987 27 R 123 481 
Western Cape 128 1.5% R 1 270 890 4.3% 17 R 15 699 9 R5 622 2 R 99 761 80 R 726 644 20 R 423 164 
Total 8 314 100.0% R 29 477 657 100.0% 1 836 R 4 710 057 1 930 R 6 340 883 1 885 R 8 734 286 1 300 R 3 087 526 1363 R 6 604 905 
% of Total 
 
22.1% 16.0% 23.2% 21.5% 22.7% 29.6% 15.6% 10.5% 16.4% 22.4% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Figure 4.7:  PROVINCIAL -  Distribution of contracts awarded per province over 
the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
 
Figure 4.8:  PROVINCIAL – Distribution of the value of contracts awarded per 
province over the five-year period 2006/07 – 
2010/11 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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The data show that the highest percentage of contracts awarded over the five-
year period were in KwaZulu-Natal (33%), followed by the Eastern Cape (19%) 
and Limpopo (13%). The lowest percentage of contracts was awarded in the 
Western Cape (2%). Data on the total value of contracts awarded show that 
Eastern Cape awarded the highest percentage value (19%) over the five-year 
period, followed by Mpumalanga (16%). The lowest percentages of contract 
value were awarded by Western Cape (4%), Northern Cape (6%) and North West 
(7%). 
Table 4.15:  PROVINCIAL –  Number and Total Value of contracts awarded to 
HDI and non-HDI enterprises by provincial 
departments over the five-year period 2006/07 – 
2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
Total HDI Enterprises Non-HDI Enterprises 
No. of 
Contracts 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. of 
Contracts 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. of 
Contracts 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
2006/07 1836 R 4 710 057 1585 R 4 018 311 251 R 691 746 
2007/08 1930 R 6 340 883 1588 R 5 533 962 342 R 806 921 
2008/09 1885 R 8 734 286 1510 R 7 418 058 375 R 1 316 228 
2009/10 1300 R 3 087 526 1099 R 2 509 603 201 R 577 923 
2010/11 1363 R 6 604 905 1231 R 5 852 936 132 R 751 969 
Total 8314 R 29 477 657 7013 R 25 332 870 1301 R 4 144 787 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Figure 4.9:  PROVINCIAL -  Percentage of the total number of contracts 
awarded by provincial departments to HDI 
enterprises compared to Non-HDI enterprises 
over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11  
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.15 and Figure 4.9 present data that indicate 84.4% of the total number of 
contracts awarded by provincial departments over the five-year period went to 
HDI enterprises. These enterprises consistently received over 80% of contracts in 
each of the five-years with a peak of 90.3% in 2010/11. This provincial 
distribution follows a trend similar to that of the national departments as was 
illustrated previously in Figure 4.1, with the noticeable difference being that for 
provinces the awarding of contracts to HDI enterprises peaked in 2010/11 while 
for national government departments the peak was in 2007/08. 
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Figure 4.10:  PROVINCIAL - Percentage of the total value of contracts 
awarded by provincial departments to HDI 
enterprises compared to Non-HDI enterprises 
over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.15 and Figure 4.10 present data that indicate 85.1% of the total value of 
contracts awarded by provincial departments over the five-year period went to 
HDI enterprises. Again, these enterprises consistently received contracts 
equating to over 80% of the total value of all contracts in each of the five-years, 
with a peak of 88.6% in 2010/11. The data also follow a pattern similar to that of 
the national departments, as was illustrated previously in Figure 4.2.  
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Table 4.16:  PROVINCIAL –  Number and Total Value of contracts awarded by provincial departments over the five-year period 2006/07 – 
2010/11 disaggregated by HDI status 
Financial 
Year 
Total 
Contracts awarded to enterprises  
with ≤50% HDI shareholding 
Contracts awarded to enterprises  
with >50% HDI shareholding Contracts 
awarded to Non-
HDI enterprises 
Black Ownership 
(male and/or female) 
White Female 
Ownership 
Combined HDI 
Ownership 
(black and white) 
Black Ownership 
(male and/or female) 
White Female 
Ownership 
Combined HDI 
Ownership 
(black and white) 
No. of 
Contracts 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
2006/07 1836 R 4 710 057 96 R 460 329 10 R 56 017 9 R 525 322 1436 R 2 834 257 13 R 16 275 21 R 126 111 251 R 691 746 
2007/08 1930 R 6 340 883 107 R 1 519 860 1 R 614 2 R 637 1445 R 3 765 371 8 R 2 582 25 R 244 898 342 R 806 921 
2008/09 1885 R 8 734 286 187 R 1 185 283 13 R 49 473 4 R 195 320 1261 R 5 645 838 31 R 36 610 14 R 305 534 375 R 1 316 228 
2009/10 1300 R 3 087 526 59 R 423 257 3 R 2 270 0 R 0 991 R 1 887 075 27 R 45 066 19 R 151 935 201 R 577 923 
2010/11 1363 R 6 604 905 108 R 474 290 6 R 11 308 2 R 2 817 1098 R 5 349 600 12 R 6 084 5 R 8 837 132 R 751 969 
Total 8314 R 29 477 657 557 R 4 063 019 33 R 119 682 17 R 724 096 6231 R 19 482 141 91 R 106 617 84 R 837 315 1301 R 4 144 787 
% of Total 6.7% 13.8% 0.4% 0.4% 0.2% 2.5% 74.9% 66.1% 1.1% 0.4% 1.0% 2.8% 15.6% 14.1% 
% of Total No. 7.3% 77.1% 15.6% 
% of Total Value 16.7% 69.3% 14.1% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Figure 4.11:  PROVINCIAL -  Percentage of the total number of contracts 
awarded by provincial departments to HDI 
enterprises over the five-year period 2006/07 – 
2010/11, disaggregated by HDI status 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.16 and Figure 4.11 indicate that enterprises with black shareholding 
>50% were awarded the highest number of contracts over the five-year period, 
peaking in 2010/11 at 80% of the total for that category. Enterprises with white 
female shareholding in both ≤50% and >50% shareholding categories received 
substantially fewer contracts than either black HDI or non-HDI enterprises, as did 
enterprises with combined (black and white) HDI ownership.  
This pattern is continued when looking at the data from a contract value 
perspective, as shown in Figure 4.12 below. For the total five-years, amongst 
enterprises with ≤50% HDI ownership black owned enterprises (black male 
and/or female ownership) received contracts with a value of just over R4 billion, 
which equates to 13.8% of the total value of all contracts awarded in all 
categories. Similarly, during the same period amongst enterprises with  >50% 
HDI ownership black owned enterprises (black male and/or female ownership) 
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received contracts with a total value of just under R19.5 billion, which equates to 
66.1% of the total for all categories.  
When comparing across the three categories for the five-year period it can be 
seen that enterprises with ≤50% HDI ownership received only 7.3% of the total 
8314 contracts but these had a combined value equal to 16.7% of the total. In 
contrast, enterprises with >50% HDI ownership received 77.1% of the contracts 
with a combined value representing 69.3% of the total. Non-HDI enterprises 
received 15.6% of the contracts, which were worth 14.1% of the total. 
 
 
Figure 4.12:  PROVINCIAL -  Percentage of the total value of contracts awarded 
by provincial departments to HDI enterprises over 
the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11, 
disaggregated by HDI status 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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TABLE 4.17:  PROVINCIAL – Number and Total Value of contracts awarded by provincial departments over the five-year period  
 2006/07 – 2010/11, disaggregated by HDI shareholding categories 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
Y
e
a
r
 
All Contracts 
Contracts awarded to  
enterprises with  
≤50 percent HDI shareholding 
Contracts awarded to  
enterprises with  
>50% and <100% HDI shareholding 
Contracts awarded to  
enterprises with  
100% HDI shareholding 
Contracts awarded to 
Non-HDI Enterprises 
No. 
Value  
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
% of 
Total 
Value  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of 
Total 
No. 
% of 
Total 
Value  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of 
Total 
No. 
% of 
Total 
Value  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of 
Total 
No. 
% of 
Total 
Value  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of 
Total 
2006/07 1 836 R 4 710 057 115 18.9% R 1 041 668 21.2% 88 26.0% R 1 018 802 32.6% 1 382 22.8% R1 957 841 11.3% 251 19.3% R 691 746 16.7% 
2007/08 1 930 R 6 340 883 110 18.1% R 1 521 111 31.0% 85 25.1% R 968 934 31.0% 1 393 23.0% R3 043 917 17.6% 342 26.3% R 806 921 19.5% 
2008/09 1 885 R 8 734 286 204 33.6% R 1 430 076 29.1% 68 20.1% R 609 635 19.5% 1 238 20.4% R5 378 347 31.1% 375 28.8% R 1 316 228 31.8% 
2009/10 1 300 R 3 087 526 62 10.2% R 425 527 8.7% 60 17.7% R 392 862 12.6% 977 16.1% R1 691 214 9.8% 201 15.4% R 577 923 13.9% 
2010/11 1 363 R 6 604 905 116 19.1% R 488 415 10.0% 38 11.2% R 136 030 4.4% 1 077 17.8% R5 228 491 30.2% 132 10.1% R 751 969 18.1% 
Total 8 314 R 29 477 657 607 7.3% R 4 906 797 16.6% 339 4.1% R 3 126 263 10.6% 6 067 73.0% R17 299 810 58.7% 
1 
301 
15.6% R 4 144 787 14.1% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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TABLE 4.18:  PROVINCIAL –  Number and Total Value of contracts awarded by provincial departments over the five-year period  
 2006/07 – 2010/11 to enterprises with 100% HDI shareholding, disaggregated by HDI status 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
Y
e
a
r
 
All Contracts Black Male Black Female 
Combined Black Male and 
Female 
White Female 
Combined Black Female and 
White Female 
Combined Black Female, 
Black Male and White 
Female 
No. 
Value  
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
% of 
Total 
Value  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of 
Total 
No. 
% of 
Total 
Value  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of 
Total 
No. 
% of 
Total 
Value  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of 
Total 
No. 
% of 
Total 
Value  
(ZAR 
000’s) 
% of 
Total 
No. 
% of 
Total 
Value  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of 
Total 
No. 
% of 
Total 
Value  
(ZAR 000’s) % of 
Total 
2006/07 1 836 R 4 710 057 624 34.0% R 1 109 499 23.6% 539 29.4% R500 700 10.6% 201 10.9% R303 791 6.4% 6 0.3% R 2 826 0.1% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 12 0.7% R41 025 0.9% 
2007/08 1 930 R 6 340 883 667 34.6% R 1 852 078 29.2% 490 25.4% R503 112 7.9% 220 11.4% R615 570 9.7% 6 0.3% R 2 031 0.0% 2 0.1% R 246 0.0% 8 0.4% R70 880 1.1% 
2008/09 1 885 R 8 734 286 773 41.0% R 3 916 419 44.8% 283 15.0% R816 695 9.4% 146 7.7% R322 478 3.7% 30 1.6% R23 432 0.3% 4 0.2% R 273 522 3.1% 2 0.1% R25 801 0.3% 
2009/10 1 300 R 3 087 526 595 45.8% R 978 837 31.7% 238 18.3% R334 571 10.8% 109 8.4% R242 089 7.8% 24 1.8% R39 896 1.3% 2 0.2% R 547 0.0% 9 0.7% R95 274 3.1% 
2010/11 1 363 R 6 604 905 550 40.4% R 2 130 563 32.3% 315 23.1% R2116 579 32.0% 199 14.6% R970 907 14.7% 10 0.7% R5 538 0.1% 2 0.1% R 2 037 0.0% 1 0.1% R2 867 0.0% 
Total 8 314 R29477657 3209 38.6% R 9 987 396 33.9% 1865 22.4% R4271657 14.5% 875 10.5% R2 454 835 8.3% 76 0.9% R73 723 0.3% 10 0.1% R 276352 0.9% 32 0.4% R235 847 0.8% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Figure 4.13:  PROVINCIAL -  Number of contracts awarded to HDI enterprises 
with female shareholding for all nine provinces 
over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11, 
expressed as a percentage 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Figure 4.13 presents the total number of contracts awarded to HDI enterprises 
with female shareholding for all nine provinces over the five-year period 2006/07 
– 2010/11, expressed as a percentage. The graph indicates that HDI enterprises 
with black female shareholding >50% consistently received the highest number 
of contracts compared to other enterprises with female shareholding in each of 
the five-years. The number of contracts awarded to enterprises with black 
female shareholding >50% peaked at just under 30% in 2006/07.  
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Figure 4.14:  PROVINCIAL –  Total Value of contracts awarded to HDI 
enterprises with female shareholding for all nine 
provinces over the five-year period 2006/07 – 
2010/11, expressed as a percentage 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Figure 4.14 presents the total value of contracts awarded to HDI enterprises with 
female shareholding for all nine provinces over the five-year period 2006/07 – 
2010/11, expressed as a percentage. The graph shows that during this period, 
HDI enterprises with black female shareholding >50% received contracts with a 
value that represented just under 15% of the total amount awarded to female 
owned enterprises. This value peaked sharply in 2010/11 to over 30% of the total 
for female enterprises in that year. 
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Table 4.19: PROVINCIAL - NUMBER and VALUE of contracts awarded by all nine provinces over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11, 
disaggregated by CIDB Grading Categories 
G
r
a
d
e
s
 
CIDB Value 
Threshold 
All contracts 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
No. % 
Value 
 (ZAR 000’s) 
% No. 
Value 
 (ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
 (ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
 (ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
 (ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
 (ZAR 000’s) 
1 ≤R0.2 M 2422 29.1% R 283 723 1.0% 301 R 30 452 608 R 80 849 602 R 70 861 544 R 61 628 367 R 39 933 
2 >R0.2M to ≤ 0.65M  2360 28.4% R 884 719 3.0% 657 R 218 007 547 R 224 576 514 R 193 232 352 R 132 484 290 R 116 420 
3 >R0.65M to ≤ R2M  1647 19.8% R 1  713 293 5.8% 530 R 459 296 330 R 397 873 290 R 322 839 215 R 210 979 282 R 322 306 
4 >R2 M to ≤ R4M  607 7.3% R 1 677 026 5.7% 134 R 300 666 151 R 429 930 142 R 418 983 53 R 151 412 127 R 376 035 
5 >R4 M to ≤ R6.5M  495 6.0% R 2 466 094 8.3% 80 R 302 898 121 R 607 183 116 R 596 539 50 R 258 923 128 R 700 551 
6 >R6.5 M to ≤ R13M  364 4.3% R 3 199 042 10.9% 73 R 527 505 76 R 671 820 92 R 846 229 34 R 292 367 89 R 861 121 
7 >R13 M  to ≤ R40 M  307 3.7% R 7 123 731 24.1% 36 R 641 208 72 R 1770 401 92 R 2 157 268 39 R 798 663 68 R 1 756 191 
8 >R40 M  to ≤ R130M  89 1.1% R 7 272 276 24.7% 18 R 839 252 21 R 1 426 803 26 R 1 787 654 12 R 786 219 12 R 2 432 348 
9 >R130M  23 0.3% R 4 857 753 16.5% 7 R 1 390 773 4 R 731 448 11 R 2 340 681 1 R 394 851 0 R 0 
Total 8314 100.0% R 29 477 657 100.0% 1 836 R 4 710 057 1 930 R 6 340 883 1 885 R 8 734 286 1300 R 3 087 526 1363 R6 604 905 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 4.19 presents the number and value of contracts awarded by all nine 
provinces over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11, disaggregated by CIDB 
Grading Categories. The data show that the highest number of contracts 
awarded during this period (n=2422) were to CIDB Grade 1 contractors. Although 
this represents 29.1% of the total number of contracts (n=8314), their value 
equates to only 1.0% of the total. Combining the data for Grades 1 and 2 show 
that these categories represented 57.5% of the total number of contracts, but 
just 4.0% of the total value. In comparison, only 0.3% of all contracts were 
awarded to Grade 9 contractors but the value of those 23 contracts equated to 
16.5% of the total value for all contracts. 
Table 4.20: PROVINCIAL -  Number and Total Value of contracts awarded by all 
nine provinces over the five-year period 2006/07 – 
2010/11, disaggregated by value categories 
  ≤R1 000 000 and >R1 000 000 
Financial 
Year 
All Contracts ≤R1 000 000 Contracts >R1 000 000 Contracts 
No.  % 
Value  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% No.  % 
Value  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% No.  % 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
2006/07 1836 22.1% R 4 710 057 16.0% 1176 21.2% R 384 299 21.9% 660 23.9% R 4 325 758 15.6% 
2007/08 1930 23.2% R 6 340 883 21.5% 1280 23.1% R 408 852 23.3% 650 23.5% R 5 932 031 21.4% 
2008/09 1885 22.7% R 8 734 286 29.6% 1265 22.8% R 389 399 22.1% 620 22.5% R 8 344 887 30.1% 
2009/10 1300 15.6% R 3 087 526 10.5% 1030 18.5% R 298 481 17.0% 270 9.8% R 2 789 045 10.1% 
2010/11 1363 16.4% R 6 604 905 22.4% 802 14.4% R 275 400 15.7% 561 20.3% R 6 329 505 22.8% 
Total 8314 100.0% R 29 477 657 100.0% 5553 100.0% R 1 756 431 100.0% 2761 100.0% R 27 721 226 100.0% 
% of Total  66.8% 6.0% 33.2% 94.0% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
As stated earlier, PPPFA Regulations (2011) now set the threshold value for 
allocating preference points at R1 000 000. For contracts with a value ≤R1 
000 000 a maximum of 20 preference points can be given to qualifying tenderers 
during the tender evaluation stage.  For contracts with a value >R1 000 000 a 
maximum of 10 preference points can be given to qualifying tenderers.  
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Table 4.20 presents the National Treasury data for provinces disaggregated by 
these threshold values. The data show that 66.8% of the contracts awarded over 
the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11 were for a value ≤R1 000 000 and 33.2% 
were for contracts values >R1 000 000. However, the value of all the ≤R1 000 000 
contracts represented only 6.0% of the total, whereas the value of all the 
>R1 000 000 contracts equated to 94.0% of the total. 
4.4.2 Premiums incurred over the five-year period 
 
Table 4.21: PROVINCIAL - Premiums incurred over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
Total No. 
of 
contracts 
Total Value of 
contracts  
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. of 
contracts 
awarded with 
premiums 
Value of 
premium paid 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of 
contracts 
awarded 
with 
premiums 
% 
premium 
paid 
2006/07 1836 R 4 710 057 207 R 62 785 11.3% 1.4% 
2007/08 1930 R 6 340 883 67 R 22 272 3.5% 0.4% 
2008/09 1885 R 8 734 286 61 R 94 472 3.2% 1.1% 
2009/10 1300 R 3 087 525 40 R 43 201 3.1% 1.4% 
2010/11 1363 R 6 604 905 51 R 62 977 3.7% 1.0% 
Total 8314 R 29 477 656 426 R 285 707   
5-year 
Average 
    5.1% 1.0% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.21 presents the number of contracts that incurred premiums and their 
value for contracts awarded by all nine provinces over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11. The data show that although the number of contracts 
incurring premiums averaged 5.1% for the 5 years, the value of those premiums 
represented only 1.0% of the total.  
The distribution of premiums incurred indicates that the value ranged from 0.4% 
to 1.4% over the five-years. In terms of the number of contracts that incurred 
premiums, during the first year under review the percentage was 11.3%, while in 
the last four year it remained in the 3.1% – 3.7% range.  
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Table 4.22: PROVINCIAL -  Analysis of premiums incurred over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11 for contracts awarded by all 
nine provinces, disaggregated by contract threshold value categories 
F
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n
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Y
e
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Contracts≤R500 000 Contracts>R500 000 
Total 
No. 
Total value 
of all 
contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium (%) 
incurred on 
contracts that 
incurred 
premiums 
Total 
No. 
Total value of 
all contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
Premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts 
that incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium (%) 
incurred on 
contracts 
that incurred 
premiums 
2006/07 717 R 310 436 R 2 163 0.7% 94 13.1% R 29 902 7.8% 1119 R 4 399 621 R 60 622 1.4% 113 10.1% R 613 019 11.0% 
2007/08 987 R 209 366 R 61 0.03%* 9 0.9% R 188 610 0.03%* 943 R 6 131 517 R 22 211 0.4% 58 6.2% R 330 201 7.2% 
2008/09 1 023 R 211 294 R 9 899 4.9% 13 1.3% R 143 747 7.4% 862 R 8 522 992 R 84 573 1.0% 48 5.6% R 714 174 13.4% 
2009/10 831 R 161 087 R 148 0.1% 11 1.3% R 1 735 9.3% 469 R 2 926 438 R 43 053 1.5% 29 6.2% R 394 314 12.3% 
2010/11 594 R 284 807 R 651 0.2% 14 2.4% R 4 165 18.5% 769 R 6 320 098 R 62 326 1.0% 37 4.8% R 700 588 9.8% 
Total  4152 R 1 176 990 R 12 922  141  R 368 159  4 162 R 28 300 666 R 272 785  285  R 2 752 296  
Average    1.1%  3.4%  3.6%    1.0%  6.9%  11.0% 
*  This value is shown to 2 decimal places due to the percent premium incurred being very low. 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Results and Discussion of Treasury Data 
164 
 
Table 4.22 presents  the distribution of premiums incurred over the five-year 
period 2006/07 – 2010/11 for contracts awarded by all nine provinces, 
disaggregated according to the two categories of threshold values where the 
80/20 and 90/10 preference point system was applied, i.e. contracts ≤R500 000 
(80/20) and >R500 000 (90/10).  
The key elements of the table are: 
 the total number of contracts that incurred a premium (e.g. 141 of the 
4152 contracts awarded in the ≤R500 000 category) and expressed as a 
percentage (in the case above, the % of contracts incurring premiums was 
3.4%); 
 the total premium incurred (e.g., in the ≤R500 000 category the five-year 
total premium incurred was R12 922 000); 
 the total value of the contracts that incurred a premium (e.g. R 
368 159 000 for the 141 contracts mentioned above); and  
 the actual premium incurred, expressed as a percentage, on those 
contracts that incurred a premium. For example, in the ≤R500 000 
category the premium incurred was 3.6% based on a premium amount of 
R12 922 000 and an amount of R 368 159 000 for the total value of 
contracts that incurred premiums. 
The data show that the total number of contracts incurring premiums was 141 of 
the 4152 contracts awarded in the ≤R500 000 category (3.4%) and 285 of the 
4162 contracts awarded in the >R500 000 category (6.9%). There was significant 
variation across years with 13.1% of the contracts awarded in the ≤R500 000 
category incurring a premium in 2006/07, then declining to not more than 2.4% 
for each of the following four years. The percentage in the >R500 000 category 
ranged from 4.1% to 10.1% 
The total premium incurred was R12 922 000 in the ≤R500 000 category and 
R272 785 000 in the >R500 000 category. The data show little difference 
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between the average premium incurred over the 5 years in either the ≤R500 000 
category (1.1%) or the >R500 000 category (1.0%). In 2008/09 the percentage 
premium incurred for contracts ≤R500 000 was 4.9% which was significantly 
higher than the percentage premium incurred for the remaining four years, and 
much higher than the five-year average of 1.1%. In addition, in 2007/08 an 
average premium of only 0.03% was paid for contracts ≤R500 000. There was 
little variation in the average premium incurred in the >R500 000 category across 
all five-years. 
Table 4.23 provides an analysis of the contracts awarded by all nine provinces 
that incurred premiums over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11. As with the 
national data, in order to interpret this table it is essential to understand that the 
PPPFA regulations applicable at the time established a preference point scoring 
system from which a formula was derived that calculated, among other things, 
the maximum price premium that could be incurred within the preferencing 
framework. Contracts with a value ≤R500 000 used the 80/20 points system that 
set the maximum allowable price premium at 25% of the lowest responsive 
tender. Contracts with a value >R500 000 used the 90/10 points system that set 
the maximum allowable price premium at 11.1% of the lowest responsive 
tender. 
Table 4.23 is similar to Table 4.12 in that it contains three key elements. Firstly, it 
presents data on those contracts awarded that incurred premiums during the 
five-year period. Secondly, it indicates those contracts in which the premium 
incurred exceeded the maximum percentage allowable. Lastly, it applies the data 
to derive an estimated value of the excess premium paid assuming that the price 
preferencing formula was applied correctly. 
The analysis reveals that for contracts ≤R500 000, which should have incurred a 
maximum premium of 25%, the actual percentage premium incurred ranged 
from 52% to 79%. For contracts >R500 000, which should have incurred a 
Chapter 4: Results and Discussion of Treasury Data 
166 
 
maximum premium of 11.1%, the actual premium incurred ranged from 28% to 
95%. In monetary terms the estimated value of the excess premiums incurred 
over the five-year period was R 1 510 000 for contracts ≤R500 000 and  
R 112 875 000 for contracts >R500 000. 
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Table 4.23: PROVINCIAL -  Analysis of contracts incurring premiums over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11 
 Contracts that incurred premiums 
Contracts that exceeded the  
maximum allowable premium 
Implication on premiums incurred 
F
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No. of 
contracts 
awarded 
with 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums  
(ZAR 000's) 
Total 
premium 
incurred  
(ZAR 000's) 
No. of 
contracts 
with 
premiums 
exceeding 
maximum 
allowable 
% of 
Total 
No. 
Value of 
CONTRACTS 
with premiums 
exceeding 
maximum 
allowable  
(ZAR 000's) 
% of 
Total 
Value 
Value of 
PREMIUMS for 
those contracts 
that had 
premiums 
exceeding 
maximum 
allowable 
(ZAR 000's) 
Estimated 
value of the 
lowest priced 
TENDERS  
(ZAR 000's) 
%  premium 
incurred on the 
estimated 
lowest priced 
TENDERS 
Estimated 
value of 
maximum 
allowable 
premium  
(ZAR 000's) 
Estimated 
value of excess 
premium paid   
(ZAR 000's) 
Contracts ≤R500 000 (maximum allowable premium = 25%) 
2006/07 94 R 29 902 R 2 163 8 8.5% R 2 811 9.4% R 961  R 1 850  52%  R 205   R 756  
2007/08 9 R 188 610 R 61 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% R 0  R -    -   R -    R -   
2008/09 13 R 143 747 R 9 899 4 30.8% R 1 823 1.3% R 806  R 1 017  79%  R 113   R 693  
2009/10 11 R 1 735 R 148 1 9.1% R 171 9.9% R 72  R 99  73%  R 11   R 61  
2010/11 14 R 4 165 R 651 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% R 0  R -    -   R -    R -   
Total 141 R 368 159 R 12 922 13 9.2% R 4 805 1.3%  R 1 839   R 2 966  62%  R 329   R 1 510  
Contracts >R500 000 (maximum allowable premium = 11.1%) 
2006/07 113 R 613 019 R 60 622 19 16.8% R 143 032 23.3% R 31 717  R 111 315  28%  R 12 356   R 19 361  
2007/08 58 R 330 201 R 22 211 18 31.0% R 63 829 19.3% R 14 477  R 49 352  29%  R 5 478   R 8 999  
2008/09 48 R 714 174 R 84 573 15 31.3% R 116 050 16.2% R 56 441  R 59 609  95%  R 6 617   R 49 824  
2009/10 29 R 394 314 R 43 053 15 51.7% R 109 213 27.7% R 31 856  R 77 357  41%  R 8 587   R 23 269  
2010/11 37 R 700 588 R 62 326 19 51.4% R 62 364 8.9% R 16 511  R 45 853  36%  R 5 090   R 11 421  
Total  285 R 2 752 296 R 272 785 86 30.2% R 494 488 18.0%  R 151 002   R 343 486  44%  R 38 127   R 112 875  
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
  
Chapter 4: Results and Discussion of Treasury Data 
168 
 
4.5  DISTRIBUTION OF CONTRACTS PER PROVINCE 
The data presented in the tables and graph in this section are for the contracts 
awarded by provincial governments across the nine provinces of South Africa, i.e. 
Kwa-Zulu Natal, Limpopo, Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, Free State, Gauteng, 
Northern Cape, North West and Western Cape. 
The results of the data from the nine provincial governments (consolidated) as 
discussed in Section 4.3 indicate a general trend of preferential procurement 
outcomes across provinces, and is useful for comparing outcomes with that of 
national government. However, it is also useful to ascertain and compare the 
trends in each province separately due to inherent differences in population 
demographics, infrastructure budgets and socio-economic disparities between 
HDI and non-HDI enterprises across provinces. This comparison is done in the 
following discussion. 
4.5.1 Kwa-Zulu Natal 
Table 4.24: Kwa-Zulu Natal - Number and Total Value of contracts 
awarded to HDI and non-HDI enterprises 
over the five-year period 
 2006/07 – 2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
All Contracts HDI Enterprises Non-HDI Enterprises 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
2006/07 665 R 776 004 581 R 666 714 84 R 109 290 
2007/08 694 R 1 059 182 565 R 950 394 129 R 108 788 
2008/09 540 R 1 051 330 472 R 946 109 68 R 105 221 
2009/10 520 R 433 737 445 R 370 061 75 R 63 676 
2010/11 351 R 853 343 348 R 843 586 3 R 9 757 
Total 2770 R 4 173 596 2411 R 3 776 864 359 R 396 732 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Figure 4.15: KwaZulu-Natal - Percentage of the total number of 
contracts awarded to HDI Enterprises 
compared to Non-HDI Enterprises  
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.24 and Figure 4.15 present data that indicate 87% of the total number of 
contracts awarded by the Kwa-Zulu Natal government over the five-year period 
went to HDI enterprises. These enterprises consistently received over 80% of 
contracts in each of the five-years with a peak of 99.1% in 2010/11. Non-HDI 
enterprises received between 10% - 20% of the contracts for the first four years 
under review, then dropped sharply to 0.9% in 2010/11. 
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Figure 4.16: KwaZulu-Natal -  Percentage of the total value of contracts 
awarded to HDI Enterprises compared to 
Non-HDI Enterprises 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.24 and Figure 4.16 present data that indicate that over the five-year 
period 90.5% of the value of contracts awarded by the Kwa-Zulu Natal 
government went to HDI enterprises, with a peak of 98.9% in 2010/11. Non-HDI 
enterprises received between 10% - 15% of the value of contracts for the first 
four years under review, then dropped substantially to 1.1% in 2010/11. 
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4.5.2 Limpopo 
Table 4.25: Limpopo -  Number and Total Value of contracts awarded 
to HDI and non-HDI enterprises over the five-
year period 2006/07 – 2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
All Contracts HDI Enterprises Non-HDI Enterprises 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
2006/07 427 R 688 831 415 R 645 017 12 R 43 814 
2007/08 360 R 339 871 347 R 303 537 13 R 36 334 
2008/09 63 R 153 213 62 R 152 874 1 R 339 
2009/10 41 R 209 506 39 R 209 062 2 R 444 
2010/11 149 R 1 964 881 138 R 1 862 529 11 R 102 352 
Total 1040 R 3 356 302 1001 R 3 173 019 39 R 183 283 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
 
Figure 4.17: Limpopo -  Percentage of the total number of contracts 
awarded to HDI Enterprises compared to Non-
HDI Enterprises 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 4.25 and Figure 4.17 present data that indicate 96.3% of the total number 
of contracts awarded by the Limpopo government over the five-year period went 
to HDI enterprises. These enterprises consistently received over 90% of contracts 
in each of the five-years with a peak of 98.4% in 2008/09. Non-HDI enterprises 
received 3.7% of the contracts for the five-year period, with a low of 1.6% in 
2008/09 and a high of 7.4% in 2010/11. 
 
 
Figure 4.18: Limpopo -  Percentage of the total value of contracts 
awarded to HDI Enterprises compared to Non-
HDI Enterprises  
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.24 and Figure 4.18 present data indicating that over the five-year period 
94.5% of the value of contracts awarded by the Limpopo government went to 
HDI enterprises, with a peak of 99.8% in both 2008/09 and 2009/2010. The value 
of contracts received by non-HDI ranged widely from 0.2 to 10.7%. 
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4.5.3 Eastern Cape 
Table 4.26: Eastern Cape -  Number and Total Value of contracts 
awarded to HDI and non-HDI enterprises 
over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
All Contracts HDI Enterprises Non-HDI Enterprises 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
2006/07 142 R 756 191 94 R 623 657 48 R 132 534 
2007/08 256 R 1 519 129 188 R 1 347 421 68 R 171 708 
2008/09 653 R 2 038 131 524 R 1 209 366 129 R 828 765 
2009/10 297 R 734 874 239 R 670 446 58 R 64 428 
2010/11 259 R 515 530 190 R 303 369 69 R 212 161 
Total 1607 R 5 563 855 1235 R 4 154 259 372 R 1 409 596 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
 
Figure 4.19: Eastern Cape -  Percentage of the total number of contracts 
awarded to HDI Enterprises compared to 
Non-HDI Enterprises  
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 4.26 and Figure 4.19 present data that indicate 76.9% of the total number 
of contracts awarded by the Eastern Cape government over the five-year period 
went to HDI enterprises, with a low of 66.2% in 2006/07 and a high of 80.5% in 
2009/10. These values show a much larger percentage of contracts being 
awarded to non-HDI enterprises in the Eastern Cape as compared to Limpopo 
and other provinces. For example, non-HDI enterprises received 33.8% of the 
contracts in 2006/07 and an average of 23.1% for the five-year period. 
 
Figure 4.20: Eastern Cape -  Percentage of the total value of contracts 
awarded to HDI Enterprises compared to 
Non-HDI Enterprises  
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Data for the total value of contracts awarded by the Eastern Cape government 
reveal a widely fluctuating pattern, as shown in Table 4.26 and Figure 4.20. For 
HDI enterprises the average value of the contracts over the five-year period was 
74.7%, although the yearly averages ranged from a low of 58.8% in 2010/11 to a 
high of 91.2% in 2009/10. This pattern is reflected in the value of contracts 
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received by non-HDI enterprises which averaged 25.3% over the five-years, but 
ranged from 8.8% in 2009/2010 to 41.2% in 2010/11.  
4.5.4 Mpumalanga 
Table 4.27: Mpumalanga –  Number and Total Value of contracts 
awarded to HDI and non-HDI enterprises 
over the five-year period 2006/07 – 
2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
Total HDI Enterprises Non-HDI Enterprises 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
2006/07 217 R 843 306 182 R 746 107 35 R 97 199 
2007/08 190 R 1 665 330 172 R 1 502 547 18 R 162 783 
2008/09 101 R 1 213 586 90 R 1 182 613 11 R 30 973 
2009/10 49 R 409 471 48 R 405 866 1 R 3 605 
2010/11 191 R 644 958 176 R 616 660 15 R 28 298 
Total 748 R 4 776 651 668 R 4 453 793 80 R 322 858 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
The data presented in Table 4.27 and Figure 4.21 indicate that 89.3% of the total 
number of contracts awarded by the Mpumalanga government over the five-
year period went to HDI enterprises. These enterprises consistently received 
over 80% of contracts in each of the five-years with a peak of 98.0% in 2009/10. 
Although non-HDI enterprises received an average of 10.7% of the contracts for 
the five-year period, this varied widely by year from a low of 2.0% in 2009/10 to 
a high of 16.1% in 2006/07. 
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Figure 4.21: Mpumalanga - Percentage of the total number of contracts 
awarded to HDI Enterprises compared to 
Non-HDI Enterprises 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
 
Figure 4.22: Mpumalanga -  Percentage of the total value of contracts 
awarded to HDI Enterprises compared to 
Non-HDI Enterprises  
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 4.27 and Figure 4.22 present data that indicate that over the five-year 
period 93.2% of the value of contracts awarded by the Mpumalanga government 
went to HDI enterprises, with a peak of 99.1% in 2009/2010. The value of 
contracts received by non-HDI enterprises ranged widely from 0.9 in 2009/10 to 
11.5% in 2006/07. 
 
4.5.5 Free State. 
 
Table 4.28: Free State –  Number and Total Value of contracts awarded 
to HDI and non-HDI enterprises over the five-
year period 2006/07 – 2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
Total HDI Enterprises Non-HDI Enterprises 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
2006/07 83 R 662 012 54 R 452 497 29 R 209 515 
2007/08 174 R 1 004 829 107 R 998 263 67 R 6 566 
2008/09 205 R 1 108 283 84 R 1 039 900 121 R 68 383 
2009/10 179 R 40 630 138 R 34 706 41 R 5 924 
2010/11 236 R 531 199 235 R 531 044 1 R 155 
Total 877 R 3 346 953 618 R 3 056 410 259 R 290 543 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
Data for the number of contracts awarded by the Free State government reveal a 
widely fluctuating pattern, as shown in Table 4.28 and Figure 4.23. For HDI 
enterprises the average number of contracts received over the five-year period 
was 70.5%, although the yearly averages ranged from a low of 41.0% in 2008/09 
to a high of 99.6% in 2010/11. This pattern is reflected in the number of 
contracts received by non-HDI enterprises which averaged 29.5% over the five-
years, but ranged from 0.4% in 2010/2011 to 59.9% in 2008/09.  
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Figure 4.23: Free State -  Percentage of the total number of contracts 
awarded to HDI Enterprises compared to Non-
HDI Enterprises 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
 
Figure 4.24: Free State -  Percentage of the total value of contracts 
awarded to HDI Enterprises compared to Non-
HDI Enterprises  
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 4.28 and Figure 4.24 present data that indicate that the total value of 
contracts awarded by the Free State government fluctuated considerably over 
the five-year period.  For HDI enterprises the average value of the contracts over 
the five-year period was 91.3%, although the yearly averages ranged from a low 
of 68.4% in 2006/07 to a high of 100% in 2010/11. This pattern is reflected in the 
value of contracts received by non-HDI enterprises which averaged 8.7% over the 
five-years, but ranged from 0% in 2010/2011 to 31.6% in 2006/07.  
4.5.6 Gauteng 
Table 4.29: Gauteng –  Number and Total Value of contracts awarded to 
HDI and non-HDI enterprises over the five-year 
period 2006/07 – 2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
Total HDI Enterprises Non-HDI Enterprises 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
2006/07 21 R 17 873 20 R 17 431 1 R 442 
2007/08 85 R 36 180 67 R 18 702 18 R 17 478 
2008/09 230 R 2 105 696 206 R 1 878 299 24 R 227 397 
2009/10 82 R 146 398 75 R 116 047 7 R 30 351 
2010/11 78 R 1 434 418 67 R 1 081 898 11 R 352 520 
Total 496 R 3 740 565 435 R 3 112 377 61 R 628 188 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
Table 4.29 and Figure 4.25 present data that indicate 87.7% of the total number 
of contracts awarded by the Gauteng government over the five-year period went 
to HDI enterprises. The yearly averages for these enterprises ranged from 78.8% 
in 2007/08 to 95.2% in 2006/07. Non-HDI enterprises received an average of 
12.3% of the contracts for the five-years, with a range of 4.8% in 2006/07 to 
21.2% in 2007/08. 
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Figure 4.25: Gauteng -  Percentage of the total number of contracts awarded 
to HDI Enterprises compared to Non-HDI Enterprises 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
 
Figure 4.26: Gauteng - Percentage of the total value of contracts awarded to 
HDI Enterprises compared to Non-HDI Enterprises 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Data for the total value of contracts awarded by the Gauteng government reveal 
a widely fluctuating pattern, as shown in Table 4.29 and Figure 4.26. For HDI 
enterprises the average value of the contracts over the five-year period was 
83.2%, although the yearly averages ranged from a low of 51.7% in 2007/08 to a 
high of 97.5% in 2006/07.  This pattern is reflected in the value of contracts 
received by non-HDI enterprises which averaged 16.8% over the five-years, but 
ranged from 2.5% in 2006/2007 to 48.3% in 2007/08.  
 
4.5.7 Northern Cape 
 
Table 4.30: Northern Cape –  Number and Total Value of contracts 
awarded to HDI and non-HDI enterprises 
over the five-year period 2006/07 – 
2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
Total HDI Enterprises Non-HDI Enterprises 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
2006/07 112 R 513 767 91 R 508 018 21 R 5 749 
2007/08 84 R 353 302 67 R 94 792 17 R 258 510 
2008/09 57 R 177 209 39 R 122 669 18 R 54 540 
2009/10 30 R 213 279 15 R 198 772 15 R 14 507 
2010/11 52 R 113 931 35 R 99 144 17 R 14 787 
Total 335 R 1 371 488 247 R 1 023 395 88 R 348 093 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Data for the number of contracts awarded by the Northern Cape government 
reveal a fluctuating trend, as shown in Table 4.30 and Figure 4.27. For HDI 
enterprises the average number of contracts received over the five-year period 
was 73.7%, although the yearly averages ranged from a low of 50.0% in 2009/10 
to a high of 81.3% in 2006/07. This pattern is reflected in the number of 
contracts received by non-HDI enterprises, which averaged 26.3% over the five-
years but ranged from 18.8% in 2006/2007 to 50.0% in 2009/10. These values 
show a much larger percentage of contracts being awarded to non-HDI 
enterprises in the Northern Cape, as compared to Limpopo and other provinces. 
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Figure 4.27: Northern Cape - Percentage of the total number of 
contracts awarded to HDI Enterprises 
compared to Non-HDI Enterprises 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
 
Figure 4.28: Northern Cape -  Percentage of the total value of contracts 
awarded to HDI Enterprises compared to 
Non-HDI Enterprises 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 4.30 and Figure 4.28 present data indicating that the total value of 
contracts awarded by the Northern Cape government fluctuated considerably 
over the five-year period. For HDI enterprises the average value of the contracts 
over the five-year period was 78.8%, although the yearly averages ranged from a 
low of 26.8% in 2007/08 to a high of 98.9% in 2006/07. This pattern is reflected 
in the value of contracts received by non-HDI enterprises, which averaged 21.2% 
over the five-years but ranged from 1.1% in 2006/07 to 73.2% in 2007/08.  
4.5.8 North West 
Table 4.31: North West –  Number and Total Value of contracts 
awarded to HDI and non-HDI enterprises over 
the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
Total HDI Enterprises Non-HDI 
Enterprises 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
2006/07 152 R 436 374 123 R 303 514 29 R 132 860 
2007/08 78 R 357 438 68 R 313 897 10 R 43 541 
2008/09 34 R 787 077 33 R 786 483 1 R 594 
2009/10 22 R 172 987 22 R 172 987 0 R 0 
2010/11 27 R 123 481 26 R 113 260 1 R 10 221 
Total 313 R 1 877 357 272 R 1 690 141 41 R 187 216 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
Table 4.31 and Figure 4.29 present data that indicate 86.9% of the total number 
of contracts awarded by the North West government over the five-year period 
went to HDI enterprises. These enterprises consistently received over 80% of 
contracts in each of the five-years, with a peak of 100% in 2009/10. Non-HDI 
enterprises received 13.1% of the contracts for the five-year period, with a low of 
0% in 2009/10 and a high of 19.1% in 2006/07. 
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Figure 4.29: North West - Percentage of the total number of contracts 
awarded to HDI Enterprises compared to 
Non-HDI Enterprises 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
 
Figure 4.30: North West – Percentage of the total value of contracts 
awarded to HDI Enterprises compared to 
Non-HDI Enterprises 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 4.31 and Figure 4.30 present data that indicate 90.0% of the total value of 
contracts awarded by the North West government over the five-year period 
went to HDI enterprises. In 2006/07 these enterprises received 69.6% of the 
value contracts, with the percentage growing steadily to a peak of 100% in 
2009/10. Non-HDI enterprises received 10.0% of the contracts for the five-year 
period, with a low of 0% in 2009/10 and a high of 30.4% in 2006/07. 
 
4.5.9 Western Cape 
 
Table 4.32: Western Cape –  Number and Total Value of contracts 
awarded to HDI and non-HDI enterprises 
over the five-year period 2006/07 – 
2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
Total HDI Enterprises Non-HDI 
Enterprises 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
2006/07 17 R 15 699 12 R 12 076 5 R 3 623 
2007/08 9 R 5 622 8 R 4 412 1 R 1 210 
2008/09 2 R 99 761 2 R 99 761 0 R 0 
2009/10 80 R 726 644 78 R 332 160 2 R 394 484 
2010/11 20 R 423 164 16 R 400 276 4 R 22 888 
Total 128 R 1 270 890 116 R 848 685 12 R 422205 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
Table 4.32 and Figure 4.31 present data that indicate 90.6% of the total number 
of contracts awarded by the Western Cape government over the five-year period 
went to HDI enterprises, with a low of 70.6% in 2006/07 and a high of 100% in 
2008/09. Non-HDI enterprises received 9.4% of the contracts for the five-year 
period, with a low of 0% in 2008/09 and a high of 29.4% in 2006/07. 
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Figure 4.31: Western Cape -  Percentage of the total number of 
contracts awarded to HDI Enterprises 
compared to Non-HDI Enterprises 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
 
Figure 4.32: Western Cape -  Percentage of the total value of contracts 
awarded to HDI Enterprises compared to 
Non-HDI Enterprises 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 4.32 and Figure 4.32 present data indicating that the total value of 
contracts awarded by the Western Cape government fluctuated considerably 
over the five-year period. For HDI enterprises the average value of the contracts 
over the five-year period was 66.7%, although the yearly averages ranged from a 
low of 45.7% in 2009/10 to a high of 100% in 2008/09. This pattern is reflected in 
the value of contracts received by non-HDI enterprises which averaged 33.3% 
over the five-years, but ranged from 0% in 2008/09 to 54.3% in 2009/10. 
4.6 DISTRIBUTION OF PREMIUMS PER PROVINCE 
4.6.1 Kwa-Zulu Natal 
 
Table 4.33: KwaZulu-Natal -  Premiums incurred over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
Total No.  
of 
contracts 
Total value  
of contracts   
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. of 
contracts 
awarded 
with 
premiums 
Value of  
premiums paid  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of contracts 
awarded with 
premiums 
% 
premium 
paid 
2006/07 665 R 776 004 41 R 2 954 6.2% 0.4% 
2007/08 694 R 1 059 182 4 R 4 802 0.6% 0.5% 
2008/09 540 R 1 051 330 11 R 951 2.0% 0.1% 
2009/10 520 R 433 737 12 R 2 553 2.3% 0.6% 
2010/11 351 R 853 343 8 R 6 997 2.3% 0.8% 
Total 2770 R 4 173 596 76 R 18 257   
Average     2.7% 0.4% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.33 presents the number of contracts that incurred premiums and their 
values for contracts awarded by the Kwa-Zulu Natal government over the five-
year period 2006/07 – 2010/11. The data show that although the number of 
contracts incurring premiums averaged 2.7% for the 5 years, the value of those 
premiums represented only 0.4% of the total.  
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The distribution of premiums incurred indicates that the values ranged from 
0.1% to 0.8% over the five-years. In terms of the number of contracts that 
incurred premiums, during the first year under review the percentage was 6.2%, 
this dropped to 0.6% in 2007/08 while in the last three year it ranged from 2.0% 
to 2.3%.  
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Table 4.34: KwaZulu-Natal – Analysis of premiums incurred over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11, disaggregated by contract 
threshold value categories 
F
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n
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n
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a
l
 
Y
e
a
r
 Contracts ≤R500 000 Contracts >R500 000 
Total 
No. 
Total value of 
all contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts that 
incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium (%) 
incurred on 
contracts that 
incurred 
premiums 
Total 
No. 
Total value of 
all contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts that 
incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium (%) 
incurred on 
contracts that 
incurred 
premiums 
2006/07 327 R 171 273 R 613 0.4% 16 4.9% R 5 685 12.1% 338 R 538 810 R 2 341 0.4% 25 7.4% R 29 840 8.5% 
2007/08 406 R 92 517 R 10 0.01%* 2 0.5% R 372 2.8% 288 R 966 665 R 4 792 0.5% 2 0.7% R 10 440 84.8% 
2008/09 292 R 62 818 R 5 0.01%* 2 0.7% R 648 0.8% 248 R 988 512 R 946 0.1% 9 3.6% R 19 991 5.0% 
2009/10 338 R 51 233 R 70 0.1% 7 2.1% R 1 371 5.4% 182 R 382 581 R 2 483 0.7% 5 2.8% R 25 521 10.8% 
2010/11 204 R 185 633 R 1 0.001%* 1 0.5% R 468 0.2% 147 R 567 710 R 6 996 1.3% 7 4.8% R 55 081 14.6% 
Total 1 567 R 563 474 R 699  28  R 8 544   1203 R 3 444 278 R 17 558   48  R 140 873   
Average    0.1%  1.8%  8.9%    0.5%  4.0%  14.2% 
* This value is shown to 2 (or 3) decimal places due to the premium percentage value being very low. 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
Chapter 4: Results and Discussion of Treasury Data 
190 
 
Table 4.34 shows the distribution of premiums incurred over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 for contracts awarded by the Kwa-Zulu Natal government 
aggregated according to the two categories of threshold values where the 80/20 
and 90/10 preference point system was applied, i.e. contracts ≤R500 000 (80/20) 
and >R500 000 (90/10). The key elements of the table are described in detail 
following Table 4.11 and Table 4.22, above. 
The data show that the total number of contracts incurring premiums was 28 of 
the 1567 contracts awarded in the ≤R500 000 category (1.8%) and 48 of the 1203 
contracts awarded in the >R500 000 category (4.0%). There was variation across 
years with 4.9% of the contracts awarded in the ≤R500 000 category incurring 
premiums in 2006/07, then declining to 0.5% in 2010/11. The percentages in the 
>R500 000 category ranged from 0.7% to 7.4% 
The total premium incurred was R690 000 in the ≤R500 000 category and 
R17 558 000 in the >R500 000 category. The data show that the average 
premium incurred over the 5 years ranged from 0.1% in the ≤R500 000 category 
to 0.5% in the >R500 000 category.  
According to the price preference formula, the maximum premium that is 
permitted is 11.1% for contracts with a value >R500 000. Looking at Table 4.34 it 
can be seen that the average premium for >R500 000 contracts was 14.9%, with 
a peak of 84.8% in 2007/08.  
A list of the contracts that exceeded the maximum allowable premiums is 
provided in Appendix 4.2 
 
Chapter 4: Results and Discussion of Treasury Data 
191 
 
4.6.2 Limpopo 
Table 4.35: Limpopo -  Premiums incurred over the five-year period  
 2006/07 – 2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
Total No.  
of 
contracts 
Total value  
of contracts   
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. of 
contracts 
awarded 
with 
premiums 
Value of  
premiums paid  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of contracts 
awarded with 
premiums 
% premium 
paid 
2006/07 427 R 688 831 0 R 0 0.0% 0% 
2007/08 360 R 339 871 1 R 2 0.3% 0.001%* 
2008/09 63 R 153 213 6 R 2 887 9.5% 1.9% 
2009/10 41 R 209 506 1 R 319 2.4% 0.2% 
2010/11 149 R 1 964 881 6 R 4 986 4.0% 0.3% 
Total 1040 R 3 356 302 14 R 8 194 
  
Average     1.4% 0.2% 
* This value is shown to 2 (or 3) decimal places due to the premium percentage value being very low. 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.35 presents the number of contracts that incurred premiums and their 
value for contracts awarded by the Limpopo government between 2006/07 – 
2010/11. The data show that although the number of contracts incurring 
premiums averaged 1.4% for the 5 years, the value of those premiums 
represented only 0.2% of the total.  
The distribution of premiums incurred indicates that the values ranged from 
0.0% to 1.9% over the five-years. In terms of the number of contracts that 
incurred premiums, during the first year under review the percentage was 0.0%, 
followed by 0.3% in 2007/08, then increasing sharply to 9.5% in 2008/09. 
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Table 4.36: Limpopo –  Analysis of premiums incurred over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11, disaggregated by contract 
threshold value categories 
F
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r
 Contracts ≤R500 000 Contracts >R500 000 
Total 
No. 
Total value of 
all contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts that 
incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium (%) 
incurred on 
contracts that 
incurred 
premiums 
Total 
No. 
Total value of 
all contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts that 
incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual premium 
(%) incurred on 
contracts that 
incurred 
premiums 
2006/07 105 R 41 810 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 322 R 647 021 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 
2007/08 207 R 35 100 R 2 0.01%* 1 0.5% R 186 256 0.001%* 153 R 304 771 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 
2008/09 43 R 14 447 R 456 3.3% 4 9.3% R 1 654 38.1% 20 R 138 766 R 2 431 1.8% 2 10.0% R 7 695 46.2% 
2009/10 24 R 7 327 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 17 R 202 179 R 319 0.2% 1 5.9% R 8 227 4.0% 
2010/11 25 R 3 223 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 124 R 1 961 658 R 4 986 0.3% 6 4.8% R 52 312 10.5% 
Total 404 R 101 907 R 458   5  R 187 910   636 R 3 254 395 R 7 736   9  R 68 234   
Average    0.5%  1.2%  0.2%    0.2%  1.4%  12.8% 
* This value is shown to 2 (or 3) decimal places due to the premium percentage value being very low. 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 4.36 shows the distribution of premiums incurred over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 for contracts awarded by the Limpopo government 
aggregated according to the two categories of threshold values where the 80/20 
and 90/10 preference point system was applied. The key elements of the table 
are described in detail following Table 4.11 and Table 4.22, above. 
The data show that the total number of contracts incurring premiums was 5 of 
the 404 contracts awarded in the ≤R500 000 category (1.2%) and 9 of the 636 
contracts awarded in the >R500 000 category (1.4%). The largest number of 
contracts incurring premiums occurred in 2008/09 when 9.3% of the ≤R500 000 
contracts and 10.0% of the >R500 000 contracts incurred premiums. In the 
≤R500 000 category there were three years in which no contracts incurred 
premiums and in the >R500 000 category no contracts incurred premiums during 
the first two years of the period under review. 
The total premium incurred over the five-years was R458 000 in the ≤R500 000 
category and R7 736 000 in the >R500 000 category. The data show that the 
average premium incurred over the 5 years ranged from 0.2% in the ≤R500 000 
category to 12.8% in the >R500 000 category.  
As mentioned above, the maximum premium that is permitted is 25% above the 
lowest responsive tender for contracts with a value ≤R500 00, and 11.1% for 
contracts with a value >R500 000. Table 4.36 shows that the 25% limit was 
exceeded for ≤R500 000 contracts in 2008/09 when the percentage reached 
38.1%. For >R500 000 contracts the average premium for the 5 years was 14.9%, 
with a peak of 46.2% in 2008/09.  
A list of the contracts that exceeded the maximum allowable premiums is 
provided in Appendix 4.3 
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4.6.3 Eastern Cape 
Table 4.37: Eastern Cape -  Premiums incurred over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
Total No.  
of contracts 
Total value  
of contracts   
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. of 
contracts 
awarded with 
premiums 
Value of  
premiums paid  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of contracts 
awarded with 
premiums 
% premium 
paid 
2006/07 142 R 756 191 4 R 376 2.8% 0.0% 
2007/08 256 R 1 519 129 27 R 9 416 10.6% 0.6% 
2008/09 653 R 2 038 131 19 R 54 951 2.9% 2.8% 
2009/10 297 R 734 874 8 R 11 263 2.7% 1.6% 
2010/11 259 R 515 530 15 R 39 997 5.8% 8.4% 
Total 1607 R 5 563 855 73 R 116 003   
Average     4.5% 2.1% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.37 presents the number of contracts that incurred premiums and their 
value for contracts awarded by the Eastern Cape government between 2006/07 
– 2010/11. The data show that although the number of contracts incurring 
premiums averaged 4.5% for the 5 years, the value of those premiums 
represented only 2.1% of the total.  
The distribution of premiums incurred indicates that the values ranged from 
0.0% to 8.4% over the five-years. In terms of the number of contracts that 
incurred premiums, during the five-years under review the percentages ranged 
from 2.7% in 2009/10 to 10.6% in 2007/08. 
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Table 4.38: Eastern Cape – Analysis of premiums incurred over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11, disaggregated by contract 
threshold value categories 
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Contracts ≤R500 000 Contracts >R500 000 
Total 
No. 
Total value 
of all 
contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium (%) 
incurred on 
contracts 
that incurred 
premiums 
Total 
No. 
Total value of 
all contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium (%) 
incurred on 
contracts that 
incurred 
premiums 
2006/07 23 R 7 100 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 119 R 749 091 R 376 0.1% 4 3.4% R 10 830 3.6% 
2007/08 85 R 23 409 R 5 0.02%* 2 2.4% R 468 1.1% 171 R 1 495 720 R 9 411 0.6% 25 14.6% R 141 288 7.1% 
2008/09 367 R 92 902 R 9 411 11.3% 5 1.4% R 141 288 7.1% 286 R 1 945 229 R 45 540 2.4% 14 4.9% R 101 229 81.8% 
2009/10 163 R 31 268 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 134 R 703 606 R 11 263 1.6% 8 6.0% R 46 311 32.1% 
2010/11 162 R 47 814 R 44 0.1% 5 3.1% R 1 675 2.7% 97 R 467 716 R 39 953 9.3% 10 10.3% R 433 368 10.2% 
Total  800 R 202 493 R 9 460   12  R 143 431   807 R 5 361 362 R 106 543   61  R 733 026   
Average    4.9%  1.5%  7.1%    2.0%  7.6%  17.0% 
* This value is shown to 2 decimal places due to the premium percentage value being very low. 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 4.38 shows the distribution of premiums incurred over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 for contracts awarded by the Eastern Cape government 
aggregated according to the two categories of threshold values where the 80/20 
and 90/10 preference point system was applied. The key elements of the table 
are described in detail following Table 4.11 and Table 4.22, above. 
The data show that the total number of contracts incurring premiums was 12 of 
the 800 contracts awarded in the ≤R500 000 category (1.5%) and 61 of the 807 
contracts awarded in the >R500 000 category (2.0%). The largest number of 
contracts incurring premiums occurred in 2010/11 when 3.1% of the ≤R500 000 
contracts and 9.3% of the >R500 000 contracts incurred premiums. In the 
≤R500 000 category there were two years in which no contracts incurred 
premiums. 
The total premium incurred over the five-years was R1 892 000 in the ≤R500 000 
category and R1 072 272 in the >R500 000 category. The data show that the 
average premium incurred over the 5 years ranged from 7.1% in the ≤R500 000 
category to 17.0% in the >R500 000 category.  
As mentioned above, the maximum premium that is permitted is 11.1% for 
contracts with a value >R500 000. Table 4.38 shows that the 11.1% limit was 
exceeded for >R500 000 contracts in 2008/09 when the percentage reached 
81.8% and again in 2009/10 when it was 32.1%. For >R500 000 contracts the 
average premium for the 5 years was 17.0%. 
A list of the contracts that exceeded the maximum allowable premiums is 
provided in Appendix 4.4 
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4.6.4 Mpumalanga 
Table 4.39: Mpumalanga -  Premiums incurred over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
Total No.  
of 
contracts 
Total value  
of contracts   
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. of contracts 
awarded with 
premiums 
Value of  
premiums paid  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of contracts 
awarded with 
premiums 
% 
premium 
paid 
2006/07 217 R 843 306 113 R 35 555 52.1% 4.4% 
2007/08 190 R 1 665 330 2 R 526 1.1% 0.03% 
2008/09 101 R 1 213 586 17 R 8 714 16.8% 0.7% 
2009/10 49 R 409 471 9 R 10 849 18.4% 2.7% 
2010/11 191 R 644 958 12 R 9 675 6.3% 1.5% 
Total  748 R 4 776 651 153 R 65 319   
Average     20.5% 1.4% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.39 presents the number of contracts that incurred premiums and their 
value for contracts awarded by the Mpumalanga government between 2006/07 
– 2010/11. The data show that although the number of contracts incurring 
premiums averaged 20.5% for the 5 years, the value of those premiums 
represented only 1.4% of the total.  
The distribution of premiums incurred indicates that the values ranged from 
0.3% to 4.4% over the five-years. In terms of the number of contracts that 
incurred premiums, during the five-years under review the percentages ranged 
from 1.1% in 2007/08 to 52.1% in 20006/07. 
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Table 4.40: Mpumalanga –  Analysis of premiums incurred over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11, disaggregated by contract 
threshold value categories 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
Y
e
a
r
 
Contracts ≤R500 000 Contracts >R500 000 
Total 
No. 
Total value 
of all 
contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium 
(%) incurred 
on contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
Total 
No. 
Total value of 
all contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium (%) 
incurred on 
contracts that 
incurred 
premiums 
2006/07 74 R 21 140 R 914 4.5% 65 87.8% R 19 778 4.9% 143 R 822 166 R 34 641 4.4% 48 33.6% R 330 880 11.7% 
2007/08 36 R 8 925 R 0.4** 0.004%* 1 2.8% R 197 0.2% 154 R 1 656 405 R 526 0.0% 1 0.7% R 11 448 4.8% 
2008/09 29 R 6 966 R 20 0.3% 1 3.5% R 112 21.7% 72 R 1 206 620 R 8 694 0.7% 16 22.2% R 54 265 19.1% 
2009/10 23 R 21 227 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 26 R 388 244 R 10 849 2.9% 9 34.6% R 132 646 8.9% 
2010/11 47 R 14 956 R 93 0.6% 2 4.3% R 952 10.8% 144 R 630 002 R 9 582 1.5% 10 6.9% R 82 646 13.1% 
Total  209 R 73 214 R 1 027  69  R 21 039   539 R 4 703 437 R 64 292   84  R 611 885   
Average    1.4%  33.0%  5.1%    1.4%  15.6%  11.7% 
*  This value is shown to 3 decimal places due to the premium percentage value being very low. 
** This value is shown to 1 decimal place due to the premium value being very low. 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 4.40 shows the distribution of premiums incurred over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 for contracts awarded by the Mpumalanga government 
aggregated according to the two categories of threshold values where the 80/20 
and 90/10 preference point system was applied. The key elements of the table 
are described in detail following Table 4.11 and Table 4.22, above. 
The data show that the total number of contracts incurring premiums was 69 of 
the 209 contracts awarded in the ≤R500 000 category (33.0%) and 84 of the 539 
contracts awarded in the >R500 000 category (15.6%). The largest number of 
contracts incurring premiums occurred in 2006/07 when 87.8% of the ≤R500 000 
contracts and 4.4% of the >R500 000 contracts incurred premiums. In the 
≤R500 000 category there was 1 year in which no contracts incurred premiums. 
The total premium incurred over the five-years was R73 214 000 in the ≤R500 
000 category and R4 703 437 in the >R500 000 category. The data show that the 
average premium incurred over the 5 years ranged from 19.1% in the >R500 000 
category to 21.7% in the ≤R500 000 category.  
As mentioned above, the maximum premium that is permitted is 11.1% for 
contracts with a value >R500 000. Table 4.40 shows that the 11.1% limit was 
exceeded in three separate years for >R500 000 contracts; in 2006/07 it was 
11.7%, in 2008/09 it was 19.1%, and in 2010/11 it was 13.1%. For >R500 000 
contracts the average premium incurred for the 5 years was 11.7%. 
A list of the contracts that exceeded the maximum allowable premiums is 
provided in Appendix 4.5 
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4.6.5 Free State 
Table 4.41: Free State -  Premiums incurred over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
Total No.  
of 
contracts 
Total value  
of contracts   
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. of 
contracts 
awarded with 
premiums 
Value of  
premiums paid  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of contracts 
awarded with 
premiums 
% premium 
paid 
2006/07 83 R 662 012 10 R 8 075 12.1% 1.2% 
2007/08 174 R 1 004 829 14 R 1 771 8.1% 0.2% 
2008/09 205 R 1 108 283 4 R 15 281 2.0% 1.4% 
2009/10 179 R 40 630 1 R 0 0.6% 0.0% 
2010/11 236 R 531 199 4 R 490 1.7% 0.1% 
Total 877 R 3 346 953 33 R 25 617   
Average     3.8% 0.8% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.41 presents the number of contracts that incurred premiums and their 
value for contracts awarded by the Free State government between 2006/07 – 
2010/11. The data show that the number of contracts incurring premiums 
averaged 3.8% for the 5 years, with the value of those premiums representing 
only 0.8% of the total.  
The distribution of premiums incurred indicates that the values ranged from 0% 
to 1.4% over the five-years. In terms of the number of contracts that incurred 
premiums, during the five-years under review the percentages ranged from 0.6% 
in 2009/10 to 12.1% in 20006/07. 
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Table 4.42: Free State –  Analysis of premiums incurred over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11, disaggregated by contract 
threshold value categories 
 
Contracts ≤R500 000 Contracts >R500 000 
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Total 
No. 
Total value 
of all 
contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts 
that incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium (%) 
incurred on 
contracts that 
incurred 
premiums 
Total 
No. 
Total value of 
all contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts 
that incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium (%) 
incurred on 
contracts that 
incurred 
premiums 
2006/07 30 R 6 350 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 53 R 655 662 R 8 075 1.3% 10 18.9% R 61 019 15.3% 
2007/08 87 R 7 223 R 7 0.1% 1 1.2% R 373 1.9% 87 R 997 606 R 1 764 0.2% 13 14.9% R 92 390 2.0% 
2008/09 169 R 7 215 R 7 0.1% 1 0.5% R 45 18.4% 36 R 1 101 068 R 15 274 1.4% 3 8.3% R 400 797 4.0% 
2009/10 154 R 15 628 R 0.1** 0.001%* 1 0.7% R 31 0.3% 25 R 25 002 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 
2010/11 96 R 22 716 R 490 2.2% 4 4.2% R 343 -333.3%*** 140 R 508 483 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 
Total 536 R 59 132 R 504***   7  R 792   341 R 3 287 821 R 25 113   26  R 554 206   
Average    0.9%  1.3%  175.0%***    0.8%  7.6%  4.8% 
*  This value is shown to 3 decimal places due to the premium percentage value being very low. 
** This value is shown to 1 decimal place due to the premium value being very low. 
***  The table contains certain data (as reported by National Treasury) which appear to be incorrect. Specifically, in 2010/11 the reported value of all contracts in the ≤R500 000 category that 
incurred penalties was R343 000 (including premiums) yet the reported value of the premiums alone was R490 000. This discrepancy also renders the calculated 5-year average premium 
incurred (175%) unreliable for contracts in the ≤R500 000 category. In addition, it distorts the 5 year total of the premiums incurred for those contracts. However, the problem does not affect 
the reliability of other data in the table (including all other yearly data for ≤R500 000 contracts).  
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 4.42 shows the distribution of premiums incurred over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 for contracts awarded by the Free State government 
aggregated according to the two categories of threshold values where the 80/20 
and 90/10 preference point system was applied, i.e. contracts ≤R500 000 (80/20) 
and >R500 000 (90/10). The key elements of the table are described in detail 
following Table 4.11 and Table 4.22, above. 
With the exception of the data limitations indicated at the bottom of the table, 
the other data show that the total number of contracts incurring a premium was 
7 of the 536 contracts awarded in the ≤R500 000 category (1.3%) and 26 of the 
341 contracts awarded in the >R500 000 category (4.8%). There was variation 
across years with 4.2% of the contracts awarded in the ≤R500 000 category 
incurring premiums in 2010/11, but 0% in 2006/07. The percentages in the 
>R500 000 category ranged from 0% to 15.3%. The total premium incurred was 
R5 023 000 in the >R500 000 category and the average premium incurred over 
the 5 years in the >R500 000 category was 0.5%.  
According to the price preference formula the maximum premium that is 
permitted for contracts with a value >R500 000 is 11.1%. Looking at Table 4.42 it 
can be seen that the percentage premium paid in 2006/07 for >R500 000 
contracts was 15.3%. 
A list of the contracts that exceeded the maximum allowable premiums is 
provided in Appendix 4.6 
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4.6.6 Gauteng 
Table 4.43: Gauteng - Premiums incurred over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
Total No.  
of 
contracts 
Total value  
of contracts   
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. of 
contracts 
awarded with 
premiums 
Value of  
premiums 
paid  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of contracts 
awarded with 
premiums 
% 
premium 
paid 
2006/07 21 R 17 873 0 R 0 0.0% 0.0%** 
2007/08 85 R 36 180 0 R 0 0.0% 0.0%** 
2008/09 230 R 2 105 696 0 R 0 0.0% 0.0%** 
2009/10 82 R 146 398 0 R 0 0.0% 0.0%** 
2010/11 78 R 1 434 418 2 R 391 2.6% 0.03%* 
Total  496 R 3 740 565 2 R 391   
Average     0.4% 0.01%* 
*  This value is shown to 2 decimal places due to the premium percentage value being very low. 
** This value is shown to 1 decimal place due to the premium value being very low. 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.43 presents the number of contracts that incurred premiums and their 
value for contracts awarded by the Gauteng government between 2006/07 – 
2010/11. The data show that the number of contracts incurring premiums 
averaged 0.4% for the 5 years, with the value of those premiums representing 
only 0.01% of the total.  
The distribution of premiums incurred indicates that the values ranged from 0% 
to 0.3% over the five-years. From 2006/07 to 2009/2010 no contracts incurred 
premiums, and only 2.6% of the contracts awarded in 2010/11 incurred 
premiums.
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Table 4.44: Gauteng – Analysis of premiums incurred over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11, disaggregated by contract 
threshold value categories 
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Contracts ≤R500 000 Contracts >R500 000 
Total 
No. 
Total value 
of all 
contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium 
(%) incurred 
on contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
Total 
No. 
Total value 
of all 
contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium (%) 
incurred on 
contracts 
that incurred 
premiums 
2006/07 20 R 6 173 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 1 R 11 700 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 
2007/08 80 R 20 443 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 5 R 15 737 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 
2008/09 86 R 18 925 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 144 R 2 086 771 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 
2009/10 63 R 15 381 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 19 R 131 017 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 
2010/11 18 R 3 460 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 60 R 1 430 958 R 391 0.03%* 2 3.3% R 4 611 9.3% 
Total  267 R 64 382 R 0   0  R 0   229 R 3 676 183 R 391   2  R 4 611   
Average    0.0%  0.0%  0.0%    0.01%*  0.9%  9.3% 
*  This value is shown to 2 decimal places due to the premium percentage value being very low. 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 4.44 shows the distribution of premiums incurred over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 for contracts awarded by the Gauteng government 
aggregated according to the two categories of threshold values where the 80/20 
and 90/10 preference point system was applied, i.e. contracts ≤R500 000 (80/20) 
and >R500 000 (90/10). The key elements of the table are described in detail 
following Table 4.11 and Table 4.22, above. 
The data show that in only one of the five-years under review (2010/11) were 
contracts awarded that incurred premiums, and only in the >R500 000 category. 
Of the 229 contracts awarded in that year and that category only 2 (0.9%) 
incurred premiums. The total premium incurred was R391 000 which equated to 
9.3% of the total value of contracts incurring premiums.  
A list of the contracts that exceeded the maximum allowable premiums is 
provided in Appendix 4.7 
4.6.7 Northern Cape 
Table 4.45: Northern Cape - Premiums incurred over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
Total No.  
of 
contracts 
Total value  
of contracts   
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. of 
contracts 
awarded 
with 
premiums 
Value of  
premiums paid  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of contracts 
awarded with 
premiums 
% premium 
paid 
2006/07 112 R 513 767 0 R 0 0.0% 0.0% 
2007/08 84 R 353 302 1 R 12 1.2% 0.003%* 
2008/09 57 R 177 209 0 R 0 0.0% 0.0% 
2009/10 30 R 213 278 2 R 6 6.7% 0.003%* 
2010/11 52 R 113 931 0 R 0 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 335 R 1 371 487 3 R 18   
Average     0.9% 0.001%* 
*  This value is shown to 3 decimal places due to the premium percentage value being very low. 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 4.45 presents the number of contracts that incurred premiums and their 
value for contracts awarded by the Northern Cape government between 
2006/07 – 2010/11. The data show that the number of contracts incurring 
premiums was 3 of the 335 contracts awarded for an average of 0.9% for the 5 
years. These contracts were awarded in only 2 of the 5 years, 2007/08 and 
2009/10, with the value of those premiums representing only 0.001% of the five-
year total value. The distribution of premiums incurred indicates that the values 
ranged from 0% to 6.7% over the five-years. 
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Table 4.46: Northern Cape –  Analysis of premiums incurred over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11, disaggregated by 
contract threshold value categories 
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Contracts ≤R500 000 Contracts >R500 000 
Total 
No. 
Total value 
of all 
contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium 
(%) incurred 
on contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
Total 
No. 
Total value 
of all 
contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium (%) 
incurred on 
contracts 
that incurred 
premiums 
2006/07 77 R 33 490 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 35 R 480 277 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 
2007/08 54 R 14 290 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 30 R 339 012 R 12 0.004%* 1 3.3% R 2 453 0.5% 
2008/09 27 R 4 931 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 30 R 172 278 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 
2009/10 19 R 4 178 R 6 0.1% 2 10.5% R 162 3.9% 11 R 209 100 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 
2010/11 29 R 3 682 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 23 R 110 249 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 
Total 206 R 60 571 R 6  2  R 162   129 R 1 310 916 R 12   1  R 2 453   
Average    0.01%  1.0%  3.9%    0.001%*  0.8%  0.5% 
*  This value is shown to 3 decimal places due to the premium percentage value being very low. 
 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 4.46 shows the distribution of premiums incurred over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 for contracts awarded by the Northern Cape government 
aggregated according to the two categories of threshold values where the 80/20 
and 90/10 preference point system was applied, i.e. contracts ≤R500 000 (80/20) 
and >R500 000 (90/10). The key elements of the table are described in detail 
following Table 4.11 and Table 4.22, above. 
The data show that the total number of contracts incurring a premium was 2 of 
the 206 awarded in the ≤R500 000 category and 1 of the 129 contracts awarded 
in the >R500 000 category. In the ≤R500 000 category the 2 contracts incurring 
premiums were both awarded in 2009/10 and in the >R500 000 category the 1 
contract incurring a premium was awarded in 2007/08. The 2 contracts in the 
≤R500 000 category represented 10.5% of the contracts awarded in 2009/10, but 
only 1.0% of the five-year average. The 1 contract in the >R500 000 category 
represented 3.3% of the contracts awarded in 2007/08, but only 0.8% of the five-
year average.  
The total premium incurred was R6 000 in the ≤R500 000 category which 
represented 3.9% of the value of all contracts incurring premiums. The total 
premium incurred was R12 000 in the >R500 000 category which represented 
0.5% of the value of all contracts incurring premiums. 
A list of the contracts that exceeded the maximum allowable premiums is 
provided in Appendix 4.8 
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4.6.8 North West 
Table 4.47: North West - Premiums incurred over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
Total No.  
of 
contracts 
Total value  
of contracts   
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. of 
contracts 
awarded 
with 
premiums 
Value of  
premiums 
paid  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of contracts 
awarded with 
premiums 
% 
premium 
paid 
2006/07 152 R 436 374 38 R 15 636 25.0% 3.7% 
2007/08 78 R 357 438 18 R 5 743 23.1% 1.6% 
2008/09 34 R 787 077 3 R 3 278 8.8% 0.4% 
2009/10 22 R 172 987 5 R 8 023 22.7% 4.9% 
2010/11 27 R 123 481 1 R 3 3.7% 0.0% 
Total 313 R 1 877 357 65 R 32 683   
Average     20.8% 1.8% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.47 presents the number of contracts that incurred premiums and their 
value for contracts awarded by the North West government between 2006/07 – 
2010/11. The data show that the number of contracts incurring premiums 
averaged 20.8% for the 5 years, but the value of those premiums represented 
only 1.8% of the total.  
The distribution of premiums incurred indicates that the values ranged from 
0.4% to 4.9% over the five-years. In terms of the number of contracts that 
incurred premiums, during the five-years under review the percentages ranged 
from 3.7% in 2010/11 to 25.0% in 20006/07. 
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Table 4.48: North West –  Analysis of premiums incurred over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11, disaggregated by contract 
threshold value categories 
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Contracts ≤R500 000 Contracts >R500 000 
Total 
No. 
Total value 
of all 
contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium 
(%) incurred 
on contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
Total 
No. 
Total value of 
all contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium 
(%) incurred 
on contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
2006/07 53 R 16 109 R 447 2.9% 12 22.6% R 4 224 11.8% 99 R 420 265 R 15 189 3.8% 26 26.3% R 180 450 9.2% 
2007/08 30 R 6 865 R 37 0.5% 2 6.7% R 944 4.1% 48 R 350 573 R 5 706 1.7% 16 33.3% R 72 182 8.6% 
2008/09 9 R 2 951 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 25 R 784 126 R 3 278 0.4% 3 12.0% R 30 575 12.0% 
2009/10 8 R 1 647 R 72 4.6% 1 12.5% R 171 72.7% 14 R 171 340 R 7 951 4.9% 4 28.6% R 140 474 6.0% 
2010/11 5 R 2 057 R 3 0.2% 1 20.0% R 287 1.1% 22 R 121 424 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 
Total 105 R 29 629 R 559   16  R 5 626   208 R 1 847 728 R 32 124   49  R 423 681   
Average    1.9%  15.2%  11.0%    1.8%  23.6%  8.2% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 4.48 shows the distribution of premiums incurred over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 for contracts awarded by the North West government 
aggregated according to the two categories of threshold values where the 80/20 
and 90/10 preference point system was applied, i.e. contracts ≤R500 000 (80/20) 
and >R500 000 (90/10). The key elements of the table are described in detail 
following Table 4.11 and Table 4.22, above. 
The data show that the total number of contracts incurring premiums was 16 of 
the 105 contracts awarded in the ≤R500 000 category (15.2%) and 49 of the 208 
contracts awarded in the >R500 000 category (9.8%). There was variation across 
years with 0% of the contracts awarded in the ≤R500 000 category incurring a 
premium in 2008/09, but increasing to 22.6% in 2006/07. In the >R500 000 
category the percentages ranged from 0% in 2010/11 to 33.3% in 2007/08. 
The total premium incurred was R559 000 in the ≤R500 000 category and 
R32 124 000 in the >R500 000 category. The data show that the average 
premium incurred over the 5 years was 11.0% in the ≤R500 000 category and 
8.2% in the >R500 000 category.  
According to the price preference formula the maximum premium that is 
permitted is 25% above the lowest responsive tender for contracts with a value 
≤R500 000. Looking at Table 4.48 it can be seen that this maximum was 
exceeded in the ≤R500 000 category in 2009/10 (72.7%). 
A list of the contracts that exceeded the maximum allowable premiums is 
provided in Appendix 4.9 
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4.6.9 Western Cape 
Table 4.49: Western Cape -  Premiums incurred over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 
Financial 
Year 
Total No.  
of 
contracts 
Total value  
of contracts   
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. of 
contracts 
awarded 
with 
premiums 
Value of  
premiums paid  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of contracts 
awarded with 
premiums 
% premium 
paid 
2006/07 17 R 15 699 1 R 189 5.9% 1.2% 
2007/08 9 R 5 622 0 R 0 0.0% 0.0% 
2008/09 2 R 99 761 1 R 8 410 50.0% 9.2% 
2009/10 80 R 726 644 2 R 10 188 2.5% 1.4% 
2010/11 20 R 423 164 3 R 438 15.0% 0.1% 
Total 128 R 1 270 890 7 R 19 225   
Average     5.5% 1.5% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.49 presents the number of contracts that incurred premiums and their 
value for contracts awarded by the Western Cape government between 2006/07 
– 2010/11. The data show that the number of contracts incurring premiums 
averaged 5.5% for the 5 years, with the value of those premiums representing 
only 1.5% of the total.  
The distribution of premiums incurred indicates that the values ranged from 0% 
to 9.2% over the five-years. In terms of the number of contracts that incurred 
premiums, during the five-years under review the percentages ranged from 0% 
in 2007/8 to 50.0% in 20008/09. It should be noted, however, that this high 
percentage was due to the fact that only 2 contracts were awarded in that year, 
with 1 of them incurring a premium. 
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Table 4.50: Western Cape –  Analysis of premiums incurred over the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11, disaggregated by contract 
threshold value categories 
 
Contracts ≤R500 000 Contracts >R500 000 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
Y
e
a
r
 
Total 
No. 
Total value 
of all 
contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium 
(%) incurred 
on contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
Total 
No. 
Total value of 
all contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium 
(%) incurred 
on contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
2006/07 8 R 3 915 R 189 5.1% 1 12.5% R 215 726.9% 9 R 11 784 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 
2007/08 2 R 594 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 7 R 5 028 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 
2008/09 1 R 139 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 1 R 99 622 R 8 410 9.2% 1 100.0% R 99 622 9.2% 
2009/10 39 R 13 198 R 0 0.0% 0 0.0% R 0 0.0% 41 R 713 446 R 10 188 1.5% 2 4.9% R 41 135 32.9% 
2010/11 8 R 1 266 R 20 1.6% 1 12.5% R 440 4.8% 12 R 421 898 R 418 0.1% 2 16.7% R 72 570 0.6% 
Total 58 R 19 112 R 209   2  R 655   70 R 1 251 778 R 19 016   5  R213 327   
Average    1.1%  3.5%  46.9%    1.5%  7.1%  9.8% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 4.50 shows the distribution of premiums incurred over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 for contracts awarded by the Western Cape government 
aggregated according to the two categories of threshold values where the 80/20 
and 90/10 preference point system was applied, i.e. contracts ≤R500 000 (80/20) 
and >R500 000 (90/10). The key elements of the table are described in detail 
following Table 4.11 and Table 4.22, above. 
The data show that the total number of contracts incurring a premium was 2 of 
the 58 contracts awarded in the ≤R500 000 category (3.5%) and 5 of the 70 
contracts awarded in the >R500 000 category (7.1%). The total premium incurred 
was R209 000 in the ≤R500 000 category and R19 016 000 in the >R500 000 
category. The data show that the average premium incurred over the 5 years was 
1.1% in the ≤R500 000 category and 1.5% in the >R500 000 category.  
According to the price preference formula the maximum premium that is 
permitted is 25% above the lowest responsive tender for contracts with a value 
≤R500 00, and 11.1% for contracts with a value >R500 000. Looking at Table 4.50 
it can be seen that the average premium for ≤R500 000 contracts was 46.9%, 
which resulted from the very high premium percentage of 726.9% incurred by 1 
contract in 2006/07. For >R500 000 contracts the five-year average was 9.8%, 
with a peak of 32.9% in 2009/10.  
A list of the contracts that exceeded the maximum allowable premiums is 
provided in Appendix 4.10 
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4.7 RESULTS FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND 
PROVINCES COMBINED 
4.7.1 Distribution of contracts over the five-year period 
Table 4.51: COMBINED (National and Provincial) - Number and value of 
contracts awarded over the five-year period 
Financial 
Year 
All Contracts ≤R500 000 Contracts >R500 000 Contracts 
No.  % 
Value  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% No.  % 
Value  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% No.  % 
Value  
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
2006/07 2154 21.6% R 5 831 321 11.3% 900 41.8% R 343 282 5.9% 1254 58.2% R 5 488 038 94.1% 
2007/08 2192 22.0% R 8 634 659 16.7% 1086 49.5% R 231 826 2.7% 1106 50.5% R 8 402 834 97.3% 
2008/09 2176 21.9% R 22 737 886 44.0% 1100 50.6% R 227 473 1.0% 1076 49.4% R 22 510 413 99.0% 
2009/10 1529 15.4% R 4 465 170 8.6% 951 62.2% R 187 244 4.2% 578 37.8% R 4 277 926 95.8% 
2010/11 1904 19.1% R 10 059 323 19.4% 890 46.7% R 354 754 3.5% 1014 53.3% R 9 704 570 96.5% 
Total 9955 100.0% R 51 728 359 100.0% 4927 R 1 344 579 5028 R 50 383 781 
% of Total      49.5%  2.6% 50.5%  97.4% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.5.1 presents the combined number of contracts, and their total value, 
that were awarded by national and provincial government departments between 
01 April 2006 and 31 March 2011. These data are then disaggregated into those 
contracts which had values ≤R500 000 and those which had values >R500 000. 
The table shows that over this five-year period a total of 9955 contracts with a 
combined value of R51.7 billion were awarded. For all contracts the fewest 
number (n=1529) were awarded in 2009/10 and the highest number (n=2192) in 
2007/08. The 1904 contracts awarded in 2009/10 constituted 19.1% of the total 
number of contracts during the five-year period, while the 2192 contracts 
awarded in 2007/08 accounted for 22.0%.  
The table shows that the value of contracts awarded in 2009/10 was the lowest 
and represented 8.6% of the five-year total, although the number of contracts 
constituted 15.4% of the total. This was due to a large percentage (62.2%) of 
those contracts being valued at ≤R500 000. The total value of all contracts in a 
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single year was largest in 2008/2009 at just over R22.7 billion, which equated to 
44.0% of the value of all contracts awarded for the five-years. This significantly 
higher value can most likely be attributed to the many government projects that 
were initiated for the 2010 FIFA World Cup soccer tournament that was held in 
South Africa. 
It can also be noted that over the five-year period the total number of contracts 
awarded in the ≤R500 000 category (n=4927) was only 1% less than the total 
number of contracts awarded in the >R500 000 value category (n=5028). What is 
particularly striking is a comparison of the total value of the contract categories 
during this period. The total value of all contracts awarded in the ≤R500 000 
category was just over R1.3 billion, whereas the total value for the >R500 000 
category was just under R50.4 billion – which represents 97.4% of total value of 
all contracts. 
Figure 4.33 displays the combined data for the number of contracts awarded by 
national and provincial governments. It shows that provincial governments 
awarded substantially more construction related contracts (83%) than national 
government. Figure 4.34 displays the combined data for the value of contracts 
awarded by national and provincial governments. In terms of the value of 
contracts those awarded by provincial governments equated to 57% of the 
combined total, whilst those awarded by national government equated to 43%. 
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Figure 4.33: COMBINED -  Distribution of contracts awarded (national and 
provincial) over the five-year period 2006/07 – 
2010/11 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Provincial 
 
 
Figure 4.34: COMBINED -  Distribution of value of contracts awarded 
(national and provincial) over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 4.52: COMBINED (National and Provincial) - Number and Value of 
Contracts Awarded to HDI and Non-HDI Enterprises  
Financial 
Year 
Total HDI Enterprises Non-HDI Enterprises 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
No. 
Value 
(ZAR 000’s) 
2006/07 2 154 R 5 831 321 1 845 R 4 931 245 309 R 900 076 
2007/08 2 192 R 8 634 660 1 830 R 7 794 687 362 R 839 973 
2008/09 2 176 R 22 737 886 1 757 R 20 840 053 419 R 1 897 833 
2009/10 1 529 R 4 465 172 1 290 R 3 720 701 239 R 744 471 
2010/11 1 904 R 10 059 323 1 701 R 8 668 493 203 R 1 390 830 
Total 9 955 R 51 728 362 8 423 R 45 955 179 1 532 R 5 773 183 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.52 presents the combined number and total value of contracts awarded 
to HDI and non-HDI enterprises by national and provincial government 
departments between 2006/07 – 2010/11. Figures 4.35 and 4.36 below take the 
same data and present it graphically based on percentages. The data reveal that 
a significantly higher number of contracts were awarded to HDI enterprises than 
to non-HDI enterprises. For each year during this period HDI enterprises 
consistently received more than 80% of the number of contracts awarded.  
On a contract value basis, HDI enterprises always received contracts that 
equated to more than 80% of the total value for any given year. Over the 5-year 
period the contracts awarded to HDI enterprises constituted 88.8% of the total 
value of all contracts awarded. 
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Figure 4.35:  COMBINED (National and Provincial) - Percentage of the 
total number of contracts awarded to HDI 
Enterprises compared to Non-HDI Enterprises in 
both National and Provincial Departments 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
 
Figure 4.36:  COMBINED (National and Provincial) - Percentage of the 
total value of contracts awarded to HDI 
Enterprises compared to Non-HDI Enterprises in 
both National and Provincial Departments 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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4.7.2 Premiums incurred over the five-year period 
Table 4.53: COMBINED  (National and Provincial) -  Premiums incurred over 
the five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11 
Year 
Total No. 
of 
contracts 
Total Value of 
contracts  
 (ZAR 000’s) 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
premium paid 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% 
premium 
incurred 
2006/07 2 154 R 5 831 321 248 R 74 394 11.5% 1.3% 
2007/08 2 192 R 8 634 660 100 R 40 752 4.6% 0.5% 
2008/09 2 176 R 22 737 886 99 R 274 524 4.6% 1.2% 
2009/10 1 529 R 4 465 171 55 R 56 313 3.6% 1.3% 
2010/11 1 904 R 10 059 323 70 R 274 831 3.7% 2.8% 
Total 9 955 R 51 728 360 572 R 720 814    
Average     5.8% 1.4% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 4.53 presents combined data for the number of contracts that incurred 
premiums and their value for national and provincial contracts awarded over the 
five-year period 2006/07 – 2010/11. The data show that although the number of 
contracts incurring premiums averaged 5.8% for the 5 years, the value of those 
premiums represented only 1.4% of the total.  
The distribution of premiums incurred indicates that the highest value occurred 
in 2010/11 at 2.8%, whilst in each of the other four years the premium value 
remained consistently at about the 1% level. In terms of the number of contracts 
that incurred premiums, during the first year under review the percentage was 
11.5% then decreased and remained in the 3.6% – 4.6% range for the last four 
years. At the same time as the number of contracts incurring premiums declined 
and remained constant the amount of the premium of the last four years was 
increasing to 2.8% in 2010/11. This indicates that the value of premiums during 
the last year was higher than for the previous 3 years under review.  
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Table 4.54: COMBINED  (National and Provincial) - Distribution of Premiums incurred over the five-year period,  disaggregated for the 
≤R 500 000  and >R 500 000 value categories 
 
Contracts ≤R500 000 Contracts >R500 000 
Year 
Total 
No. 
Total value 
of all 
contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
Premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium 
(%) 
incurred 
on 
contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
Total 
No. 
Total value 
of all 
contracts 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Total 
premium 
incurred 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% 
Premium 
incurred 
No. of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
% of 
contracts 
incurring 
premiums 
Value of 
contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Actual 
premium 
(%) 
incurred 
on 
contracts 
that 
incurred 
premiums 
2006/07 900 R 343 282 R 2 968 0.9% 118 13.1% R 35 077 9.2% 1254 R 5 488 038 R 71 427 1.3% 130 10.4% R 685 076 11.6% 
2007/08 1 086 R 231 826 R 569 0.2% 21 1.9% R 193 873 0.3% 1106 R 8 402 834 R 40 183 0.5% 79 7.1% R 534 920 8.1% 
2008/09 1 100 R 227 473 R 10 146 4.7% 21 1.9% R 146 139 7.5% 1076 R 22 510 413 R 264 378 1.2% 78 7.2% R 3 247 611 8.9% 
2009/10 951 R 187 244 R 300 0.2% 14 1.5% R 2 248 15.4% 578 R 4 277 926 R 56 013 1.3% 41 7.1% R 652 642 9.4% 
2010/11 890 R 354 754 R 854 0.2% 19 2.1% R 5 916 16.9% 1014 R 9 704 570 R 273 977 2.9% 51 5.0% R 1 948 043 16.4% 
Total 4 927 R 1 344 579 R 14 837  193  R 383 253  5028 R 50 383 781 R 705 978  379  R 7 068 292  
Average    1.1%  3.9%  4.0%    1.4%  7.5%  11.1% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 4.54 presents the combined data for national and provincial governments 
and show the distribution of premiums incurred over the five-year period 
2006/07 – 2010/11, disaggregated according to the two categories of threshold 
values where the 80/20 and 90/10 preference point system was applied, i.e. 
contracts ≤R500 000 (80/20) and >R500 000 (90/10). The data show little 
difference between the average premium paid over the 5 years in either the 
≤R500 000 category (1.1%) or the >R500 000 category (1.4%).  
 In 2008/09 the percentage premium incurred for ≤R500 000 contracts was 4.7%, 
which was higher than the percentage premium incurred for the remaining four 
years, and much higher than the five-year average of 1.1%. The percentage of 
the number of contracts awarded with premiums was much higher in the first 
year for contracts ≤R500 000 as compared to the last 4 years, as well as being 
above the five-year average of 3.9%. For contracts >R500 000 awarded in the 
first year, the percentage of the number of contracts awarded with premiums 
was much higher than the five-year average of 7.5% 
According to the price preference formula the maximum premium that is 
permitted is 25% above the lowest responsive tender for contracts with a value 
≤R500 00, and 11.1% for contracts with a value >R500 000. Looking at Table 4.54 
it can be seen that in the >R500 00 category the actual percent premium paid in 
2006/07 was 11.6% and 16.4% in 2010/11. 
4.8 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the results and findings of the data analysis of the 
Treasury data in order to establish the number and value of contracts awarded 
to businesses with HDI shareholding and the distribution of these contracts on 
the basis of race and gender as provided for in the PPPFA at both national and 
provincial levels. In addition,  the results also establish the financial cost 
premiums that were incurred through the implementation of the preferential 
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procurement policy. The interpretation and discussion of these results in relation 
to the research objectives are addressed in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF SURVEY DATA 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents and discusses the results and findings from the analysis of 
the questionnaire survey.   
As described in Chapter 3, a sampling methodology was used to determine the 
survey sample size from a population of 1985 construction enterprises selected 
from the CIDB Register of Contractors (Grades 2 to 9). The original intention was 
to stratify the population according to both HDI status and provincial 
distribution. It was on this basis that a sample size of 596 was derived for a 
margin of error of 5 percent.  
However, in administering the Survey Questionnaire, and in spite of numerous 
follow up reminders to survey recipients, the response rate was low, with a 0% 
response rate from some provinces. To ensure credible and acceptable data, a 
decision was taken to drop provincial distribution as a stratification category and 
instead use the HDI status of respondent enterprises on a national level. 
Therefore, based on a population size of 1985, the return rate of 259 responses 
of a sample size was deemed to be acceptable for a 6% margin of error. The 
response rate of 259 returns exceeded the number of 236 required for the 6% 
margin of error. In comparison, the required number for a 5% margin of error is 
322. Although efforts were made to achieve a higher response rate, this proved 
to be unsuccessful. 
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According to Buys (2004), the response rate from respondents on other studies 
relating to the construction industry ranged from 7.3%; 16.3%; 19.25%; 25%; 
32.2% to 40%. The overall response rate for this study is 44% and is considered 
acceptable. 
The responses from 259 questionnaire responses were analysed to address the 
following research objectives: 
(i) To establish whether the preferential procurement policy helped 
contractors with HDI shareholding to grow their businesses; and  
(ii) To determine whether contractors with HDI shareholding contractors, as 
beneficiaries of the policy, understood the application (and intention) of 
the preferential procurement policy.  
5.2 RESULTS OF DESCRIPTIVE DATA ANALYSES AND DISCUSSION 
5.2.1 General Characteristics of Survey Enterprises 
A general description of the characteristics of the survey respondents is 
presented in Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5. 
For ease of reference the following definition of terms will apply for all data 
presented in this chapter: 
Black Male Enterprises:   having >50% ownership by black males 
Black Female Enterprises: having >50% ownership by black females 
White Female Enterprises: having >50% ownership by white females 
Female Enterprises: having >50% ownership by females. 
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Table 5.1: HDI and Gender Status of Responding Enterprises 
(n = 259) 
HDI Status Number % 
Black Female Enterprises  145  56.0% 
Black Male Enterprises   111  42.9% 
White Female Enterprises   3 1.2% 
Gender Number % 
Female Enterprises  148 57.1% 
Black Male Enterprises  111 42.9% 
Source: Survey Data 
 
Table 5.1 shows that 56% of enterprises that responded were majority owned by 
black females (n=145), with black males (n=111) constituting 42.9%, and white 
females (n=3) 1.2%. In total, 98.2% of the responding enterprises were majority 
black owned, 57.2% were female owned enterprises and 42.9% black male 
owned. Figure 5.1 illustrates the distribution of HDI status of the responding 
enterprises. 
Figure 5.1: Distribution of HDI Status of Responding Enterprises 
Source: Survey Data 
56%
43%
1%
black female black male white female
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Table 5.2: HDI Provincial Distribution 
Province 
White female 
enterprises 
(>50% ownership) 
Black female 
enterprises 
(>50% ownership) 
Black male 
enterprises 
(>50% ownership) 
Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Eastern Cape 1 33.3% 22 15.2% 21 18.9% 44 16.99% 
Free State 0 0.0% 22 15.2% 27 24.3% 49 18.92% 
Gauteng 2 66.7% 19 13.1% 27 24.3% 48 18.53% 
KwaZulu-Natal 0 0.0% 39 26.8% 19 17.1% 58 22.39% 
Limpopo 0 0.0% 21 14.5% 3 2.7% 24 9.27% 
Mpumalanga 0 0.0% 17 11.7% 5 4.5% 22 8.49% 
North West 0 0.0% 2 1.4% 2 1.8% 4 1.54% 
Northern Cape 0 0.0% 2 1.4% 0 0.0% 2 0.77% 
Western Cape 0 0.0% 1 0.7% 7 6.3% 8 3.09% 
Total 3 100% 145 100% 111 100% 259 100% 
Source: Survey Data 
Data from Table 5.2 show that 22.39% of the responding enterprises (n=58) were 
based in KwaZulu-Natal, while only 0.77% were from Northern Cape (n=2). The 
largest number of survey responses from female owned enterprises (n=39) came 
from KwaZulu-Natal and made up 26.8% of the total, while the fewest (n=1) were 
from the Western Cape. The most survey responses from enterprises owned by 
black males were from the Free State (n=27) and Gauteng (n=27), each of which 
constituted 24.3% of the total for black male owned.   
Table 5.3: Provincial Distribution of Business Location 
 (n = 259) 
Province 
One Province Two Provinces Three Provinces 
No. % No. % No. % 
Eastern Cape 44 17.0% 2 11.1% 0 0.0% 
Free State 49 18.9% 1 5.6% 0 0.0% 
Gauteng 48 18.5% 4 22.2% 1 50.0% 
KwaZulu-Natal 58 22.4% 3 16.7% 1 50.0% 
Limpopo 24 9.3% 1 5.6% 0 0.0% 
Mpumalanga 22 8.5% 4 22.2% 0 0.0% 
North West 4 1.5% 3 16.7% 0 0.0% 
Northern Cape 2 0.8% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Western Cape 8 3.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Total 259 100% 18 100% 2 100% 
Source: Survey Data 
Figure 5.2: Graphic Illustration of Business Location per Province
Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2 present survey data on the distribution of respondents 
across provinces. Respondents from K
Gauteng (48) and Eastern Cape (44) comprised 74% of the total number 
responses. Of the total, 
enterprises reported offices
Table 5.4: Time Period When Company Established 
(n =  250) 
Time Period
Pre-1960 
1961 to 1970 
1971 to 1980 
1981 to 1990 
1991 to 1993 
1994 to 1999 
2000 to 2005 
2006 to 2010 
Post 2010 
Total 
Source: Survey Data 
Chapter 5:  Results and Discussion of Survey Data
228 
Source: 
wa-Zulu Natal (58), Free State (49), 
18 enterprises have offices in two provinces and two 
 in three provinces. 
 
 Number 
2 
1 
2 
5 
3 
32 
142 
62 
1 
250 
 
 
 
Survey Data 
% 
0.8% 
0.4% 
0.8% 
2.0% 
1.2% 
12.8% 
56.8% 
24.8% 
0.4% 
100% 
Table 5.4 presents data on the time period when the enterprises were 
established. It shows that 95% of the responding enterprises were established 
post-1994. This suggests that new, emerging 
see business and career opportuni
election of a democratic government and the dismantling of discriminatory 
business practices and regulations.
Further analysis reveals that 81.6% of all the enterprises were established 
between 2000 and 2010, with 
2005. This finding indicates that
the preferencing system for categories of HDI’s in public sector procurement, 
served as an impetus for emerging HDI  contractors in
construction enterprises to service the public sector.  
The results also show a steady decline in the establishment of new businesses 
from 2006 -2010, with only one new business being established post
Figure 5.3:  Distribution of the number of years that the enterprise 
business 
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Figure 5.3 graphs the data on the number of years that the enterprise has been 
in business. It illustrates that most enterprises had been in business 6 to 10 
years, followed by the 11 to 15 year category and 0 to 5 years.  Very few 
businesses claimed to be over 20 years old.  
Table 5.5: Profile of HDI Shareholding   
HDI Category 
% HDI Shareholding Total HDI’s 
Surveyed 0% >0 ≤50% >51 <100% 100% 
Black Male 82 68 27 78 254 
Black Female 87 65 28 74 254 
White Female 244 10 0 0 254 
Disabled 244 10 0 0 254 
Non-HDI 235 11 8 0 254 
Source: Survey Data 
 Table 5.5 presents data on the HDI shareholding amongst the enterprises 
surveyed. The data show that a majority of responding enterprises had 100% 
ownership by either black males (78) or black females (74), which represents 
59.8% of the total. Interestingly, there were no enterprises with 100% ownership 
by white females. 
Table 5.6: Estimated Average Annual Turnover from 2006 to 2010 
CIDB 
Grade 
Turnover 
Threshold* 
Year 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
1 ≤R0.2 M 20 17.54% 17 12.98% 19 12.42% 26 15.20% 30 16.22% 22 14.87% 
2 >R0.2M to ≤ 0.65M  13 11.40% 17 12.98% 17 11.11% 24 14.04% 23 12.43% 19 12.39% 
3 >R0.65M to ≤ R2M  17 14.91% 27 20.61% 32 20.92% 25 14.62% 27 14.59% 26 17.13% 
4 >R2 M to ≤ R4M  12 10.53% 9 6.87% 15 9.80% 22 12.87% 21 11.35% 16 10.28% 
5 >R4 M to ≤ R6.5M  4 3.51% 6 4.58% 6 3.92% 9 5.26% 10 5.41% 7 4.54% 
6 >R6.5 M to ≤ R13M  1 0.88% 6 4.58% 8 5.23% 9 5.26% 12 6.49% 7 4.49% 
7 >R13 M to ≤ R40 M  9 7.89% 9 6.87% 9 5.88% 15 8.77% 20 10.81% 12 8.04% 
8 >R40 M to ≤ R130M  4 3.51% 3 2.29% 4 2.61% 5 2.92% 5 2.70% 4 2.81% 
9 >R130M  1 0.88% 1 0.76% 2 1.31% 3 1.75% 5 2.70% 2 1.48% 
Average  28.95%  27.48%  26.80%  19.30%  17.30%  23.97% 
Total 114 100% 131 100% 153 100% 171 100% 185 100% 150 100% 
* Annual turnover is based on CIDB grading turnover thresholds and refers to calendar year and not public sector financial 
year in SA 
Source: Survey Data 
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To construct Table 5.6 the researcher asked respondents to indicate their annual 
turnover in each year between 2006 and 2010. The researcher then correlated 
the responses with the turnover levels assigned to each CIDB Grade category. 
The result enabled the researcher to track the transition of enterprises between 
CIDB Grades based on their estimated average annual turnover over this time 
period. In a growth development scenario it would be expected that the number 
of respondents (i.e. enterprises) in the lower grades would decrease over time 
with a corresponding increase to higher grades as annual turnover increased.   
Annual turnover trends based on the threshold levels of Grades 5 to 7 indicate a 
consistent increase when compared to Grades 2 to 4 over the five year period. A 
plausible explanation for this is that respondents were able to obtain higher CIDB 
grading as their turnover increased each year, which presented an opportunity to 
tender on larger value projects. 
Table 5.7:  CIDB Grading Category of Surveyed Enterprises 
(N=234)  
 CIDB Grading Category 
CIDB Grade 
GB CE Other 
No. % No. % No. % 
1 4 1.7% 15 34.9% 4 25.0% 
2 86 36.8% 7 16.3% 6 37.5% 
3 31 13.3% 4 9.3% 4 25.0% 
4 44 18.8% 3 7.0% 0 0.0% 
5 28 12.0% 6 14.0% 2 12.5% 
6 20 8.6% 4 9.3% 0 0.0% 
7 13 5.6% 3 7.0% 0 0.0% 
8 6 2.6% 1 2.3% 0 0.0% 
9 2 0.9% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Total 234 100% 43 100% 16 100% 
Source: Survey Data 
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Table 5.7 presents data on the CIDB Grading of the surveyed enterprises. It 
should be noted that an enterprise can qualify for a grading in more than one 
category. The survey questionnaire was targeted at enterprises registered within 
the General Building (GB) Grades of the CIDB Register, so it was not unexpected 
that most of the responses (n=234) were from this category. The data show that 
most of the respondents (37%) were Grade 2 enterprises, followed by Grade 4 
(19%) and Grade 3 (13%). The fewest respondents (at <1%) were from Grade 9 
enterprises.  
Table 5.7 also demonstrates that many enterprises were registered in more than 
one activity Grade, with Civil Engineering (CE) being the most frequent as it is 
closely aligned to General Building works thereby providing additional work 
opportunities to sustain and potentially grow businesses. 
Table 5.8: Year of First Registration of Business with the CIDB 
(N=207) 
Year 
Pre - 
2004 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Post- 
2010 
Total 
No. 32 15 30 39 30 23 20 16 2 207 
% 15.5% 7.2% 14.5% 18.8% 14.5% 11.1% 9.7% 7.7% 1.0% 100% 
Cumulative 15.5% 22.7% 37.2% 56.0% 70.5% 81.6% 91.3% 99.0% 100.0%  
Source: Survey Data 
Table 5.8 presents data on the year in which the surveyed enterprises first 
registered with the CIDB. Since CIDB registration was introduced in 2004 it is 
presumed that the pre-2004 registrations shown in the table are either incorrect 
or else the question was simply misunderstood. The data show that from 2004 to 
2010 there was a steady annual increase in new CIDB registrations of 
construction enterprises, peaking in 2006 and declining steadily up to 2010. It 
seems likely that this initial surge was due, at least in part, to the mandatory 
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requirement that enterprises be registered with the CIDB in order to qualify for 
public sector tendering.  
Table 5.9: First Grade Designation of Construction Business  
 (n= 229) 
 CIDB Grade 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
No. 133 43 12 13 14 3 8 3 0 229 
% 58.1% 18.8% 5.2% 5.7% 6.1% 1.3% 3.5% 1.3% 0.0% 100% 
Source: Survey Data 
Table 5.9 presents data on the grade designation in which the surveyed 
enterprises first registered with the CIDB. The data show that the highest 
percentage of first registrations (58.1%) were in the Grade 1 designation, 
followed by 18.8% in Grade 2. A plausible explanation for this is that many first 
time registrants were new (start-up) and emerging enterprises in the 
construction industry that had little or no track record in the construction sector. 
Since the primary criteria for a first time registration with CIDB is the level of 
turnover in the previous year start-up enterprises would initially only qualify for 
Grade 1. The CIDB’s emerging contractor development strategy that promoted 
HDI new enterprise creation and development in the construction sector might 
have also been a contributing factor. 
5.2.2 Survey Results and Discussion 
Table 5.10: Level of Understanding of the Preferencing System 
 (n=234) 
Question 
Do not 
understand 
at all 
Understand 
somewhat 
Understand 
Very well 
No. % No. % No. % 
Question 2.6: 
Extent of understanding of the use of 
preference points to promote HDI owned 
businesses  
45 19.2% 87 37.2% 102 43.6% 
Source: Survey Data 
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Table 5.10 presents data on the responses by surveyed enterprises on their level 
of understanding of the preferencing system. The data show that 37.2% of 
respondents had some understanding and 43.6% had a very good understanding 
of the use of preference points in public sector procurement as a means to 
promoting HDI owned businesses. In total, 79.8% of the respondents had at least 
some knowledge of the preferencing system. However, 19.8% of respondents 
reported absolutely no understanding of the system.  So another way to look at 
the data is to say that 56.4% of respondents had no or only limited 
understanding of preferencing.  
Various factors might have contributed to this lack of understanding. Firstly, it 
could confirm the perception that either the preferential procurement system is 
overly complicated or that government was ineffective in communicating to the 
industry how the preference system could be used to benefit HDI owned 
businesses. More significantly, the lack of understanding on how to use and 
claim preference points means that 56.4% of these enterprises might not have 
made proper use of this advantage in tendering for public sector construction 
contracts. 
Table 5.11: Understanding of the BBBEE Scorecard 
 (n=234) 
Question 
Do not 
understand 
at all 
Understand 
somewhat 
Understand 
very well 
No. % No. % No. % 
Question 2.7: 
Extent of understanding of the use of BBBEE 
scorecard as it relates to preferential 
procurement 
58 24.8% 86 36.8% 90 38.5% 
Source: Survey Data 
Table 5.11 presents data on the responses by surveyed enterprises on their level 
of understanding of how the BBBEE Scorecard relates to preferential 
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procurement. The results are similar to that for their understanding of 
preferencing, with somewhat more respondents (24.8%) indicating that they had 
no understanding of the scorecard at all.  
The scorecard system became effective in December 2011 and forms the basis of 
the new preference points system in public procurement. While it is 
acknowledged that the very recent introduction of the new preferencing system 
might have contributed to the reported lack of knowledge, it is notable that 
61.6% of respondents have limited understanding of how the system works.  As 
with the previous preferencing system, it is highly likely that HDI enterprises are 
not making optimal use of this new preferencing arrangement to gain an 
advantage for their business.  
Table 5.12: Results of Responses to Yes or No Questions 
Question 
No. N= Question 
Response 
Yes % No % 
1.7 256 Is your company your main source of income? 226 88.3% 30 11.7% 
2.4 185 
Has the grading for your construction business ever 
gone down after you first registered with the CIDB? 
35 18.9% 150 81.1% 
2.5 230 
Do you think that the government’s procurement 
preference point system has helped your 
construction business get a higher CIDB grading? 
115 50.0% 115 50.0% 
2.8 243 
Does your construction business have a BBBEE 
(Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment) 
Scorecard rating Certificate? 
174 71.6% 69 28.4% 
2.8 b 187 
Is your Certificate from a SANAS accredited 
agency? 
137 73.3% 50 26.7% 
2.9 247 
Has your construction business ever submitted a 
tender for a construction contract with ANY 
government department? 
231 93.5% 16 6.5% 
2.10 245 
Has your construction business ever submitted a 
tender for a construction related contract with the 
NATIONAL government 
126 51.4% 119 48.6% 
2.10a 124 
If yes, did your business claim for any procurement 
preference points when it submitted the tender? 
101 81.5 % 23 18.5% 
2.10a.i 149 
If yes, do you think the preference points gave you 
a better chance in the tender? 
80 53.7% 69 46.3% 
2.11 244 
Has your construction business ever submitted a 
tender for a construction related contract with the 
PROVINCIAL government? 
202 82.8% 42 17.2% 
2.11a 197 
If yes, did your business claim for any procurement 
preference points when it submitted the tender? 
163 82.7% 34 17.3% 
2.11a.i 162 
If yes, do you think the procurement preference 
points gave you a better chance in the tender? 
121 74.7% 41 25.3% 
2.12 248 
Has your construction business ever submitted a 
tender for a construction related contract with the 
LOCAL government? 
193 77.8% 55 22.2% 
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Table 5.12: Results of Responses to Yes or No Questions 
Question 
No. N= Question 
Response 
Yes % No % 
2.12a 188 
If yes, did your business claim for any procurement 
preference points when it submitted the tender? 
154 81.9% 34 18.1% 
2.12a.i 152 
If yes, do you think the procurement preference 
points gave you a better chance in the tender? 
114 75.0% 38 25.0% 
2.17 234 
Has your construction business been part of a 
JOINT VENTURE or CONSORTIUM that was 
AWARDED a construction related tender? 
79 33.8% 155 66.2% 
2.17a 78 
If yes, were any of the contracts total value UNDER 
R500 000? 
18 23.1% 60 76.9% 
2.17b 78 
Have you been the LEAD PARTNER in a JOINT 
VENTURE or CONSORTIUM? 
49 62.8% 29 37.2% 
2.17c 77 
Have you been an EQUAL PARTNER in a JOINT 
VENTURE or CONSORTIUM? 
49 63.6% 28 36.4% 
2.17d 76 
Have you been a MINORITY PARTNER in a JOINT 
VENTURE or CONSORTIUM? 
35 46.1% 41 53.9% 
2.18 232 Do you undertake any sub-contracting work? 103 44.4% 129 55.6% 
3.1 247 
During the last 5 years has your construction 
business grown? 
183 74.1% 64 25.9% 
3.1.b 183 If yes, has it grown as big as you wanted it to grow? 61 33.3% 122 66.7% 
Source: Survey Data 
Table 5.12 presents data on the responses by surveyed enterprises to a series of 
yes or no questions related to their businesses. Only those results considered by 
the researcher to be of significance to the research objectives are discussed 
below.   
A majority of respondents (88.3%) reported that their main source of income 
was derived from their construction enterprises (Question 1.7). This means that 
the survival of their primary businesses, and therefore livelihoods, are 
dependent on the state, and vagaries, of the construction industry. It also implies 
that their success or failure is closely linked to government spend in the 
construction sector.  
A minority of enterprises (18.9%) had their CIDB grading downgraded during the 
period under review (Question 2.4). The majority, therefore, is assumed to have 
either maintained their CIDB grading or upgraded their grading. A follow-up 
question requesting respondents to provide perceived reasons for the 
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downgrading of enterprises on the CIDB Register of Contracts received 24 
responses. Exactly half those respondents (12) attributed their downgrading to 
not being able to access enough work to meet CIDB’s required annual turnover 
threshold. Other stated reasons included failure to comply with CIDB’s financial 
reporting requirements (5); failure to renew their Grade registration (2); and 
administrative problems with the CIDB (2). Three respondents did not indicate a 
reason for their downgrades.  
The responses to Question 2.5 show that equal numbers of respondents agreed 
and disagreed with the statement that the PPPFA contributed to a higher CIDB 
Grading for their enterprises. This suggests that 50% of respondents 
acknowledged the benefits of the preferencing system.  
A follow-up question asking respondents to explain how the preferential system 
enabled them to get a higher CIDB grading provided some interesting feedback.  
The majority (85%) of respondents who answered this question (n=80) felt that 
the tendering advantage offered through the points system substantially 
increased their volume of work in the public sector, and was therefore a major 
contributor  to achieving  a higher CIDB Grade. Others responses included that: 
tender submission requirements for the preference points system assisted in 
meeting criteria for a CIDB upgrade (5); it provided opportunities for joint 
ventures whereby, collectively, enterprises could undertake larger projects ( 2); 
and it provided training and skills transfer opportunities (2). One respondent 
acknowledged that the system offers benefits, but added that this was mitigated 
by corruption in the awarding of contacts.  
A majority (71.6%) of respondents to Question 2.8 indicated that their enterprise 
had obtained a BBBEE Certificate. This is noteworthy because in terms of the 
new regulations governing preference points this certificate is now a tender 
submission “responsive criteria” requirement. 
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The new tendering criteria require that a contractor or business obtain a BBBEE 
certificate approved by the South African National Accreditation System (SANAS) 
in order to claim preference points. The responses to Question 2.8b indicate that 
73.3% of respondents had obtained a SANAS approved BBBEE certificate. This 
means that the 26.7% who do not have an accredited certificate were not fully 
compliant with the new requirements for claiming preference points. It is likely 
that there is a link between the respondents who do not have an accredited 
certificate and those who lack a good understanding of the new BBBEE 
scorecard. 
The responses to Question 2.9 show that 93.5% of respondents had submitted 
construction related tenders to a government department. Of these, 51.4% had 
submitted tenders to a national government department (Question 2.10), with 
81.5% reporting that they claimed preference points.  
Most respondents to Question 2.10a.i (53.7%) perceived that the preference 
points system offered their enterprises an advantage in competing and being 
awarded contracts by national government departments.  
 While just over half the enterprises tendered for national government contracts, 
the responses to Question 2.11 indicate that a notably higher percentage (82.8%) 
of the respondents tendered for provincial government contracts. This might be 
the result of logistical and/or other constraints faced by provincial enterprises 
that are based outside the Gauteng province. Not only do national government 
departments convene compulsory tender briefings in the province (specifically 
the city of Pretoria), most also require tender documents to be collected and bid 
submissions to be hand-delivered to their offices. Such conditions pose a 
challenge to emerging and small businesses operating in other, outlying 
provinces. 
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Of those submitting tenders for provincial construction contracts, 82.7% 
indicated that they claimed preference points (Question 2.11a). Approximately 
three quarters of the respondents (74.7%) indicated that the preferencing 
system did provide them with an advantage in their tenders to provincial 
government departments (Question 2.11a.i). 
The responses to Question 2.12 show that 77.8% of respondents submitted 
tenders to local government departments.  Of these, 81.9% indicated that they 
claimed preference points (Question 2.12a). It is likely that the respondent 
enterprises who did not claim preference points (17.3% in the case of provincial 
tenders and 18.1% for local government tenders) do not understand or have 
limited understanding of how the preferencing system works and its benefits to 
HDI businesses. The responses to Question 2.12a.i show that 75% of respondents 
felt that their enterprises were advantaged by the preferencing system. 
Just over one-third of respondents (33.8%) indicated they were awarded a 
tender as part of a joint venture (JV) or consortium (Question 2.17).  The majority 
of those JV or consortium contracts (76.9%) were for a value greater than R500 
000 in which case the 90/10 preference point system was applicable (Question 
2.17a). Of those enterprises involved in a JV or consortium, 62.8% had been a 
lead partner, 63.6% had been equal partners and 46.1% had been minority 
partners (Questions 2.17b, 2.17c and 2.17d). 
Question 2.18 indicates that 44.4% of responding enterprises were involved in 
subcontracting work. This indicates that enterprises do not always submit 
tenders directly to government departments, but also secure work through other 
contractors who are awarded the main (i.e. principal) contract. 
Most respondents (74.1%) stated that their business had grown over the last five 
years (Question 3.1). Since most of the responding enterprises indicated that 
their primary source of annual turnover was derived from government contracts, 
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it can be speculated that their business growth was closely linked to the 
opportunities offered through public sector procurement in general, and the 
advantage offered through the preference scoring system in particular. Despite 
their businesses growing, 66.7% of respondents indicated that their business had 
not grown as big as they hoped it would. The reasons for this less than expected 
growth are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
Table 5.13: BBBEE Scorecard Rating of Construction Business 
(n = 159) 
 BBBEE Scorecard Rating (Level) 
 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 E* Total 
No. of 
Respondents 
11 19 99 22 3 0 2 1 2 159 
% 6.9% 11.9% 62.3% 13.8% 1.9% 0.0% 1.3% 0.6% 1.3% 100.0% 
* E = Exempt 
Source: Survey Data 
Table 5.13 presents data on the BBBEE Level of the enterprises. The data reveal 
that only 6.7% of the enterprises had a Level 1 BBBEE scorecard rating which 
allows them to claim the maximum preference points in public sector tenders. 
Most of the enterprises (62.3%) had a Level 3 BBBEE rating which doesn’t allow 
them to claim the maximum allowable preference points.  
It is interesting to note that two enterprises responded that they are exempt 
from the scorecard requirements. Given that no exemptions are provided for in 
the new PPPFA Regulations, it would appear that these respondents are strong 
examples of enterprises that have a mistaken understanding of the BBBEE 
scorecard rating system.   
Table 5.14: Date of First Tender Award from a Government Department 
(n = 210) 
 Time Period 
 Pre-
1994 
1994 -
1995 
1996 -
1997 
1998 - 
1999 
2000 - 
2001 
2002 - 
2003 
2004 - 
2005 
2006 - 
2007 
2008 - 
2009 
2010 - 
2011 
Total 
No. of 
Respondents 
4 0 4 7 12 30 37 65 33 18 210 
% 1.9% 0.0% 1.9% 3.3% 5.7% 14.3% 17.6% 31.0% 15.7% 8.6% 100.0% 
Source: Survey Data 
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Table 5.14 presents data on the year in which the enterprise was first awarded a 
government tender. The data show that a majority of enterprises (92.9%) began 
tendering for government contracts from 2000. This adds support to the claim 
that the introduction of the PPPFA in 2000 as well as other related enabling 
legislative and regulatory environment encouraging HDI owned businesses 
stimulated their participation in government related construction projects.  
Comparing this information with the dates that the enterprises were established, 
as shown in Table 5.4, suggests that most of the enterprises (82%) were 
established post-2000 partly as a result of being able to take advantage of the 
increased opportunities offered by the PPPFA. It can be noted that 31% of the 
enterprises submitted and were awarded their first tender in 2006/07. This 
coincides with the fact that the highest number of new businesses (18.8%) was 
registered with the CIDB in this reporting period as shown in Table 5.8. The data 
also show a trend towards a consistent increase in the number of enterprises 
submitting their first tenders from 2000 up until the end of 2007, which is 
consistent with the growing number of new CIDB registrations as indicated in 
Table 5.8. 
Table 5.15: Average number of Government Tenders Submitted from 2006 
to 2010 
  No. of Tenders Submitted 
N= Year* 
0 1 - 5 6 - 10 11 - 20 21 - 50 51 - 150 150 + 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
140 2006 36 25.7% 39 27.9% 28 20.0% 19 13.6% 10 7.1% 5 3.6% 3 2.1% 
145 2007 30 20.7% 37 25.5% 31 21.4% 18 12.4% 18 12.4% 6 4.1% 5 3.5% 
163 2008 19 11.7% 46 28.2% 33 20.2% 29 17.8% 22 13.5% 7 4.3% 7 4.3% 
184 2009 16 8.7% 55 29.9% 36 19.6% 30 16.3% 28 15.2% 11 6.0% 8 4.3% 
197 2010 21 10.7% 48 24.4% 39 19.8% 37 18.8% 29 14.7% 17 8.6% 6 3.0% 
* Refers to calendar year and not to the public sector financial year
 
 
Source: Survey Data 
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Table 5.15 presents data on the average number of tenders submitted by 
responding enterprises to government departments between 2006 and 2010. 
What is evident is that the annualized number of tenders submitted to 
government departments varies significantly over the five year period, and that 
every year some enterprises chose not to submit any government tenders. 
Table 5.16: Average Number of Private Tenders Submitted from 2006 to 
2010 
  No. of Tenders Submitted 
N= Year* 
0 1 - 5 6 - 10 11 - 20 21 - 50 51 - 150 150 + 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
130 2006 81 62.3% 33 25.4% 7 5.4% 5 3.8% 3 2.3% 1 0.8% 0 0% 
131 2007 71 54.2% 41 31.3% 13 9.9% 3 2.3% 3 2.3% 0 0.0% 0 0% 
142 2008 77 54.2% 47 33.1% 10 7.0% 4 2.8% 4 2.8% 0 0.0% 0 0% 
153 2009 78 51.0% 52 34.0% 13 8.5% 4 2.6% 6 3.9% 0 0.0% 0 0% 
162 2010 83 51.2% 42 25.9% 27 16.7% 4 2.5% 6 3.7% 0 0.0% 0 0% 
* Refers to calendar year and not to the public8 - 20 sector financial year
 
 
Source: Survey Data 
Table 5.16 presents data on the average number of tenders submitted by 
responding enterprises for contracts available in the private sector between 
2006 and 2010. The results show that every year over 52% of the respondent 
enterprises did not submit any tenders to the private sector. This is in contrast to 
the approximately 8% – 26% that did not submit any tenders to government 
departments over the various years, as shown in Table 5.15. This preference for 
pursuing government tenders suggests that respondents were influenced, at 
least in part, by the preferencing advantage available to them on public sector 
projects.   
The 48.8% of responding enterprises that tendered for at least one contract in 
the private sector suggests that they made a business decision not to rely solely 
on work opportunities in the public sector to grow and sustain their business.  
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Table 5.17: Success in Winning Government Tenders from 2006 to 2010 
  No. of Tenders Won 
N= Year* 
0 1 - 5 6 - 10 11 - 20 21 - 50 51 - 150 150 + 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
139 2006 51 36.7% 82 59.0% 4 2.9% 2 1.4% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
145 2007 51 35.2% 88 60.7% 4 2.8% 1 0.7% 1 0.7% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
172 2008 47 27.3% 116 67.4% 6 3.5% 2 1.2% 1 0.6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
187 2009 47 25.1% 132 70.6% 7 3.7% 0 0.0% 1 0.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
202 2010 61 30.2% 124 61.4% 13 6.4% 4 2.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
* Refers to calendar year and not to the public sector financial year
 
 
Source: Survey Data 
Table 5.17 presents data on the success rate in winning government tenders by 
responding enterprises between 2006 and 2010. Most of the enterprises (64.1%) 
won between 1– 5 contracts. The table also shows that every year a minimum of 
25% of the enterprises did not win any government contracts. 
Table 5.18: Success in Winning Private Sector Tenders from 2006 to 2010 
  No. of Tenders Won 
N= Year* 
0 1 - 5 6 - 10 11 - 20 21 - 50 51 - 150 150 + 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
123 2006 87 70.7% 33 26.8% 2 1.6% 1 0.8% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
122 2007 83 68.0% 36 29.5% 2 1.6% 1 0.8% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
127 2008 84 66.1% 41 32.3% 1 0.8% 1 0.8% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
136 2009 84 61.8% 47 34.6% 4 2.9% 0 0.0% 1 0.7% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
142 2010 85 59.9% 50 35.2% 4 2.8% 3 2.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
* Refers to calendar year and not to the public sector financial year
 
 
Source: Survey Data 
Table 5.18 presents data on the success rate by responding enterprises in 
winning private sector tenders between 2006 and 2010. The results show that 
every year over 61% of the respondent enterprises did not win any private sector 
tenders. Of those that were successful, every year at least 26% of enterprises 
won between 1 and 5 private sector contracts. During each of the five years 
there was a small, but steady, increase in the success rate.  
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Comparing the data in this table with that in Table 5.17 shows that the failure 
rate for responding enterprises was generally lower in the public sector than in 
the private sector. This was particularly true in the category of 1 - 5 contracts 
where in the public sector the success rate was usually about double the rate 
experienced in the private sector. 
Table 5.19: Government Tenders ≤R500 000 Awarded to Respondent 
Enterprises between 2006 to 2010 
  No. of Tenders ≤R500 000 Awarded 
N= Year* 
0 1 - 5 6 - 10 11 - 20 21 - 50 51 - 150 150 + 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
116 2006 78 67.2% 37 31.9% 0 0.0% 1 0.9% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
120 2007 74 61.7% 44 36.7% 1 0.8% 0 0.0% 1 0.8% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
129 2008 73 56.6% 52 40.3% 3 2.3% 0 0.0% 1 0.8% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
138 2009 73 52.9% 60 43.5% 2 1.4% 1 0.7% 2 1.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
142 2010 77 54.2% 56 39.4% 6 4.2% 2 1.4% 1 0.7% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
* Refers to calendar year and not to the public sector financial year
 
 
Source: Survey Data 
Table 5.19 presents data on the number of government contracts with a value 
≤R500 000 that were won by responding enterprises between 2006 and 2010. 
The data show that every year a minimum of 53% enterprises did not win any 
tenders with a value <R500 000 during this period. This result could either be 
interpreted as pointing to unsuccessful tender bids due to intense tendering 
competition from the low CIDB registered contractors, or that the enterprises 
were bidding for higher value projects in excess of R500 000. Of those 
enterprises awarded tenders valued ≤R500 000 most were awarded between 
one and five contracts. 
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Table 5.20: Government Tenders >R500 000 Awarded to Respondent 
Enterprises between 2006 to 2010 
  No. of Tenders >R500 000 Awarded 
N= Year* 
0 1 - 5 6 - 10 11 - 20 21 - 50 51 - 150 150 + 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
118 2006 72 61.0% 40 33.9% 4 3.4% 1 0.9% 1 0.9% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
119 2007 71 59.7% 43 36.1% 3 2.5% 1 0.8% 1 0.8% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
132 2008 65 49.2% 60 45.5% 4 3.0% 3 2.3% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
132 2009 53 40.2% 71 53.8% 7 5.3% 1 0.8% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
148 2010 57 38.5% 81 54.7% 9 6.1% 1 0.7% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
* Refers to calendar year and not to the public sector financial year
 
 
Source: Survey Data 
Table 5.20 presents data on the number of government contracts with a value 
>R500 000 that were won by responding enterprises between 2006 and 2010. 
The data show that every year a minimum of 39% of responding enterprises did 
not win contracts with a value >R500 000 during this period. As mentioned 
previously, a possible explanation for this is that the enterprises were 
unsuccessful in their tender bids due to competitive tendering. Of those 
respondents that were successful in winning tenders in this value category, the 
majority claimed to have won between one and five contracts. The data show a 
steady yearly increase in the success rate for contractors being awarded both 1-5 
and 6–10 contracts in this value category. 
Table 5.21: Estimated Contribution of Sub-contracting Work to Average 
Annual Turnover 
(n = 87) 
  % Range 
  0% 1 - 10% 11 - 20% 21 - 30% 31 - 40% 41 -50% >50% Total 
No of respondents 6 30 10 22 5 9 5 87 
% Turnover from Sub-
contracting 
6.9% 34.5% 11.5% 25.2% 5.8% 10.3% 5.8% 100.0% 
Source: Survey Data 
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Table 5.21 presents data on the impact that sub-contracting work had on the 
average annual turnover during the period 2006 – 2010 for responding 
enterprises. The data show that only 5.8% of the enterprises took on sub-
contracting work that contributed more than 50% to their average annual 
turnover. It seems apparent that the 6 respondents who indicated that sub-
contracting contributed 0% to their turnover misunderstood the question. 
Table 5.22: Reasons Contributing to Business not Growing as Expected 
N = Reasons 
Responses 
True Partly True Not True 
No. % No. % No. % 
52 Couldn’t get construction finance when needed 33 63.5% 1 1.9% 18 34.6% 
50 Couldn’t get credit from suppliers when needed 23 46.0% 5 10.0% 22 44.0% 
46 Couldn’t source competent managers when needed 6 13.0% 11 23.9% 29 63.0% 
46 Couldn’t get competent construction workers when  needed 9 19.6% 8 17.4% 29 63.0% 
46 Couldn’t get suitable training for myself when needed 14 30.4% 6 13.0% 26 56.5% 
46 Couldn’t get suitable training for my workers  when needed 12 25.0% 7 15.9% 27 59.1% 
Source: Survey Data 
Table 5.22 presents data on the perceptions of responding enterprises as to why 
their business didn’t grow as expected during 2006 - 2010. The most frequently 
stated reason (63.5%) for the lack of growth was an inability to raise construction 
finance when required. This reason was followed by a lack of available credit 
from suppliers, for which 46% of respondents indicated this was true and 10% 
indicated it was partly true.  A lack of suitable training for either the enterprise 
owner or the staff was also a frequently cited reason, as was the inability to 
source competent management and construction staff.  
Respondents were asked to identify the single most important reason why their 
business had not grown as they expected during the 5 year period. Table 5.23 
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presents data for their responses. The results show that the majority of 
respondents (42.4%) indicated that the inability to access necessary construction 
financing was their primary constraint. The responses of those respondents who 
chose to specify other reasons are listed in Table 5.24. 
 
Table 5.23:  Single Most Important Reason Why the Business Did Not Grow 
Reasons 
Responses 
No. % 
I couldn’t get CONSTRUCTION FINANCING when I needed it 81 42.4% 
I couldn’t get CREDIT FROM MY SUPPLIERS when I needed it 11 5.7% 
I couldn’t get SUITABLE TRAINING FOR MYSELF when I needed it 4 2.1% 
I couldn’t source COMPETENT MANAGERS when I needed them 3 1.6% 
I couldn’t get SUITABLE TRAINING FOR MY WORKERS when I needed it 3 1.6% 
I couldn’t source COMPETENT CONSTRUCTION WORKERS when I needed them 1 0.5% 
Other (Please specify) 88 46.1% 
Total  191 100% 
Source: Survey Data 
 
Table 5.24: Single Most Important Reason Why the Business Did Not Grow 
Reason 
No. of 
Responses 
The lack of tendering opportunities which, when combined with a surplus of competing 
businesses, resulted in too little work to go around; and price undercutting which 
adversely affected the business 
48 
Fraud and corruption 10 
Problems with financing due to late payments 8 
Lack of capacity/training 5 
Business administrative problems 4 
Poor economic climate 2 
Unable to get CIDB upgraded CIDB registration 2 
Finding tendering procedures and requirements not conducive to SMME’s 2 
All of the reasons were relevant; too difficult to select just one 1 
No response 11 
Source: Survey Data 
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5.3 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the results of the questionnaire survey data that was 
prepared in order to establish whether the preferential procurement policy 
helped HDI owned enterprises to grow their businesses and whether these 
enterprises, as beneficiaries of the policy, understood the application and 
intention of the preferential procurement policy. The interpretation and 
discussion of these results in relation to the research objectives are explored in 
the following chapter. 
 
 249 
CHAPTER 6: INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION OF 
RESULTS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter interprets and discusses the results set out in Chapters 4 and 5 in 
relation to achieving the research objectives and examining the propositions. The 
objective of this chapter is to summarise and highlight the most important 
patterns and insights emerging from the results which add to the body of 
knowledge on how to develop and implement effective preferential 
procurement policies in South Africa. 
6.2 TREASURY DATA 
6.2.1 Description of Data 
The data provided by National Treasury were collected from national 
government departments and all nine provincial governments and pertain 
specifically to building and construction contracts that were awarded over the 
five-year period from 01 April 2006 to 31 March 2011. According to National 
Treasury, data were not collected in a uniformed and structured format prior to 
April 2006, although the PPPFA was introduced in 2000. 
6.2.2 Distribution of Contracts in the ≤R500 000 and >R500 000 Value 
Categories 
The combined results for national and provincial government departments in 
Table 4.51 show that an almost equal number of contracts were awarded in both 
the ≤R 500 000 (49.5%) and >R500 000 categories (50.5%). However, the value of 
contracts awarded in the ≤R500 000 constituted only 2.6% of the total value of 
all contracts awarded over the five-year period.  
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The individual results for national and provincial governments shown in Table 4.2 
and Table 4.13 also reflect a similar trend of an almost 50% distribution in the 
number of contracts between categories. Likewise, the value of contracts 
awarded in the ≤R500 000 constituted only a small percentage of the total value 
(0.8% for national and 4.0% for provincial) 
When the PPPFA was enacted the intention of allocating a 25% price preference 
in the 80/20 preferencing formula for contracts ≤R500 000 was to promote the 
business development and growth of SMME’s and emerging HDI enterprises. If 
one considers this intention when analysing the data it appears that whilst the 
number of contracts awarded between the two value categories was almost 
equal, very little of the value of ≤R500 000 construction contracts was accessible 
to those enterprises. 
6.2.3 Distribution of all contracts awarded to HDI and non-HDI enterprises 
Table 6.1 presents a summary of the number of contracts awarded to HDI and 
non-HDI enterprises during the five-year period. The data indicate that 84.6% of 
the 9955 contracts awarded by national and provincial governments over the 
five-year period were awarded to HDI enterprises, with about equal percentages 
awarded by national (85.9%) and provincial governments (84.4%). Across both 
national and provincial governments, the trend was for HDI enterprises to 
receive over 80% of contracts awarded each year. 
Table 6.2 presents a summary of the total value of contracts awarded to HDI and 
non-HDI enterprises during the five-year period. The data indicate that 88.8% of 
the over R51.7 billion in contracts awarded by national and provincial 
governments over the five-year period were awarded to HDI enterprises. 
However, national government awarded a higher percentage of the value 
(92.7%) to this target group than did provincial governments (85.9%). Again, 
across both national and provincial governments, the trend was for HDI 
enterprises to receive over 80% of the value of contracts awarded each year. 
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The data show that there is no direct relationship between the number of 
contracts awarded to HDI enterprises and their value. An example of this is seen 
in 2008/09 when HDI enterprises received the highest value of contracts (91.7%) 
but the lowest number of contracts (80.7%). Furthermore, it suggests that the 
average value of the contracts awarded in 2008/09 was much higher than in the 
other four years. As previously noted, this can most likely be attributed to the 
high value of government projects initiated for the 2010 FIFA World Cup soccer 
tournament that was held in South Africa. 
A statistical analysis was done of the data and t-tests indicate a statistically 
significant difference in the contracts awarded to HDI enterprises in comparison 
to non-HDI enterprises. HDI’s received significantly more contracts at both 
provincial (p < 0.001) and national level (p < 0.001). 
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Table 6.1: Summary of the Number of Contracts Awarded to HDI and non-HDI Enterprises 
Financial 
Year 
Combined National and Provincial National Provincial 
Total No. 
of 
Contracts 
HDI non-HDI Total No. 
of 
Contracts 
HDI non-HDI Total No. 
of 
Contracts 
HDI non-HDI 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
2006/07 2 154 1 845 85.7% 309 14.3% 318 260 81.8% 58 18.2% 1 836 1 585 86.3% 251 13.7% 
2007/08 2 192 1 830 83.5% 362 16.5% 262 242 92.4% 20 7.6% 1 930 1 588 82.3% 342 17.7% 
2008/09 2 176 1 757 80.7% 419 19.3% 291 247 84.9% 44 15.1% 1 885 1 510 80.1% 375 19.9% 
2009/10 1 529 1 290 84.4% 239 15.6% 229 191 83.4% 38 16.6% 1 300 1 099 84.5% 201 15.5% 
2010/11 1 904 1 701 89.3% 203 10.7% 541 470 86.9% 71 13.1% 1 363 1 231 90.3% 132 9.7% 
Total 9 955 8 423 84.6% 1 532 15.4% 1 641 1 410 85.9% 231 14.1% 8 314 7 013 84.4% 1 301 15.6% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
 
Chapter 6: Interpretation and Discussion of Results 
253 
 
 
 
Table 6.2: Summary of the Total Value of Contracts Awarded to HDI and non-HDI Enterprises 
Financial 
Year 
Combined National and Provincial National Provincial 
Total 
Value of 
Contracts 
HDI non-HDI Total 
Value of 
Contracts 
HDI non-HDI Total 
Value of 
Contracts 
HDI non-HDI 
Value 
(ZAR 000’S) 
% 
Value 
(ZAR 000’S) 
% 
Value 
(ZAR 000’S) 
% 
Value 
(ZAR 000’S) 
% 
Value 
(ZAR 000’S) 
% 
Value 
(ZAR 000’S) 
% 
2006/07 R 5 831 321 R 4 931 245 84.6% R 900 076 15.4% R 1 121 264 R 912 934 81.4% R 208 330 18.6% R 4 710 057 R 4 018 311 85.3% R 691 746 14.7% 
2007/08 R 8 634 660 R 7 794 687 90.3% R 839 973 9.7% R 2 293 777 R 2 260 725 98.6% R 33 052 1.4% R 6 340 883 R 5 533 962 87.3% R 806 921 12.7% 
2008/09 R 22 737 886 R 20 840 053 91.7% R 1 897 833 8.3% R 14 003 600 R 13 421 995 95.8% R 581 605 4.2% R 8 734 286 R 7 418 058 84.9% R 1 316 228 15.1% 
2009/10 R 4 465 172 R 3 720 701 83.3% R 744 471 16.7% R 1 377 646 R 1 211 098 87.9% R 166 548 12.1% R 3 087 526 R 2 509 603 81.3% R 577 923 18.7% 
2010/11 R 10 059 323 R 8 668 493 86.2% R 1 390 830 13.8% R 3 454 418 R 2 815 557 81.5% R 638 861 18.5% R 6 604 905 R 5 852 936 88.6% R 751 969 11.4% 
Total R 51 728 362 R 45 955 179 88.8% R 5 773 183 11.2% R 22 250 705 R 20 622 309 92.7% R 1 628 396 7.3% R 29 477 657 R 25 332 870 85.9% R 4 144 787 14.1% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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6.2.4 Distribution of contracts awarded to HDI and non-HDI enterprises per 
province 
Table 6.3:  Summary of provincial contracts awarded to HDI and non-HDI 
enterprises over the five-year period 
Province 
HDI Enterprises Non-HDI Enterprises 
% Number % Value % Number % Value 
All Provinces 84.4% 85.1% 15.6% 14.9% 
KwaZulu Natal 87.0% 90.4% 13.0% 9.6% 
Limpopo 96.3% 94.5% 3.8% 5.5% 
Eastern Cape 76.9% 75.8% 23.1% 24.2% 
Mpumalanga 89.3% 93.1% 10.7% 6.9% 
Free State 70.5% 90.2% 29.5% 9.8% 
Gauteng 87.7% 83.2% 12.3% 16.8% 
Northern Cape 73.7% 78.8% 26.3% 21.2% 
North West 86.9% 89.0% 13.1% 11.0% 
Western Cape 90.6% 66.8% 9.4% 33.2% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 6.3 summarises the number and value of contracts awarded by provincial 
governments to HDI and non-HDI enterprises over the five-year period. The number 
of provincial contracts awarded to HDI enterprises was 84.4%. Six of the provinces 
(KZN, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, Gauteng, North West and Western Cape) awarded 
more than the provincial average of 84.4%. Limpopo awarded the highest number of 
contracts (96.3%) to HDI enterprises of all provinces, followed by Western Cape 
(90.6%)  
In terms of value of contracts awarded, HDI enterprises received 85.1%. Five of the 
provinces (Kwa-Zulu Natal, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, Free State and North West) were 
awarded more than the provincial average of 85.1%. Limpopo awarded the highest 
value of contracts (94.5%) to HDI enterprises of all provinces followed by 
Mpumalanga (93.1%). 
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6.2.5 Distribution of all contracts awarded over the five-year period, 
disaggregated by HDI shareholding categories 
Amongst other socio-economic targets, the PPPFA (2000) makes provision for price 
preferencing on the basis of race and gender. Therefore, in addition to analysing the 
data on the basis of the number and value of the contracts awarded to HDI 
enterprises, it is also important to identify and measure the race and gender 
elements of the data. 
6.2.5.1 Contracts awarded and disaggregated by HDI status 
Table 6.4 summarises the number and value of contracts awarded, disaggregated by 
HDI status. The combined data for national and provincial governments show that 
the majority of contracts, both in number (76.9%) and value (56.5%), were awarded 
to HDI enterprises with shareholding >50%. Across all enterprise types, black owned 
HDI enterprises with shareholding >50% were awarded the highest percentage of 
contracts in both number (74.4%) and value (53.5%). 
Looking at the data for national government, Table 6.4 shows the majority of the 
number of contracts (75.9%) were awarded to HDI enterprises with shareholding 
>50%, followed by non-HDI enterprises (14.1%) and HDI enterprises with 
shareholding ≤50% (10%). Furthermore, the highest number of contracts (71.6%) 
was awarded to black owned enterprises with shareholding >50%.  In terms of value, 
the majority of contracts (53.2%) were awarded to HDI enterprises with a minority 
shareholding of ≤50%, followed by HDI enterprises with shareholding >50% (39.5%), 
and non-HDI enterprises (7.3%). Furthermore, in terms of contract value the highest 
percentage (51.8%) was awarded to black owned HDI enterprises with shareholding 
≤50%.  It should be noted that although HDI enterprises with shareholding >50% 
received the highest number of contracts this group did not receive the highest 
value of contracts awarded by national government. This confirms the importance of 
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separately analyzing the award of contracts to HDI enterprises in terms of number 
and value. 
With regard to provincial government, Table 6.4 indicates a similar trend to that of 
national government in that the majority of contracts in number (77.1%) were 
awarded to HDI enterprises with shareholding >50%, followed by non-HDI 
enterprises (15.6%) and HDI enterprises with shareholding ≤50% (7.3%). 
Furthermore, the highest number of contracts (74.9%) were awarded to black 
owned HDI enterprises with shareholding >50%.   
In terms of value, Table 6.4 indicates that the majority of contracts (69.3%) were 
awarded to HDI enterprises with a shareholding >50%., followed by HDI enterprises 
with shareholding ≤50% (16.7%) and non-HDI enterprises (14.1%). Furthermore, 
black owned HDI enterprises with shareholding >50% received the highest value of 
contracts (66.1%). Unlike awards by the national government, HDI enterprises with 
shareholding >50% received both the highest number and value of contracts 
awarded by provincial government. 
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Table 6.4: Summary of contracts awarded, disaggregated by HDI status 
Enterprise 
Status 
Combined National and Provincial National Provinces 
No. % 
Value 
(ZAR 000’S) 
% No. % 
Value 
(ZAR 000’S) 
% No. % 
Value 
(ZAR 000’S) 
% 
HDI enterprises with ≤50% shareholding 
Black 695 7.0% R 15,590,923 30.1% 138 8.4% R 11 527 904 51.8% 557 6.7% R 4 063 019 13.8% 
White Female 44 0.4% R 170,101 0.3% 11 0.7% R 50 419 0.2% 33 0.4% R 119 682 0.4% 
Combined 32 0.3% R 984,212 1.9% 15 0.9% R 260 116 1.2% 17 0.2% R 724 096 2.5% 
Sub-Total 771 7.7% R 16,745,236 32.4% 164 10.0% R 11,838,439 53.2% 607 7.3% R 4,906,797 16.7% 
HDI enterprises with >50%  shareholding 
Black 7406 74.4% R 27,686,870 53.5% 1175 71.6% R 8 204 729 36.9% 6231 74.9% R 19 482 141 66.1% 
White Female 117 1.2% R 179,027 0.3% 26 1.6% R 72 410 0.3% 91 1.1% R 106 617 0.4% 
Combined 129 1.3% R 1,344,046 2.6% 45 2.7% R 506 731 2.3% 84 1.0% R 837 315 2.8% 
Sub-Total 7652 76.9% R 29,209,943 56.5% 1246 75.9% R 8,783,870 39.5% 6406 77.1% R 20,426,073 69.3% 
Non-HDI enterprises 
Non-HDI 1532 15.4% R 5,773,183 11.2% 231 14.1% R 1 628 396 7.3% 1301 15.6% R 4 144 787 14.1% 
Total 9955 100.0% R 51,728,362 100.0% 1641 100.0% R 22 250 705 100.0% 8314 100.0% R 29 477 657 100.0% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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Table 6.5:  Summary of number and value of contracts awarded to enterprises with 100% HDI shareholding in comparison to 
other HDI and non-HDI enterprises 
Enterprise Status 
Combined National and Provincial National Provinces 
No. % 
Value 
(ZAR 000’S) 
% No. % 
Value 
(ZAR 000’S) 
% No. % 
Value 
(ZAR 000’S) 
% 
HDI enterprises with 100% shareholding 
Black Male 3 767 37.8% R 12 386 849 23.9% 558 34.0% R 2 399 453 10.8% 3 209 38.6% R 9 987 396 33.9% 
Black Female 2 135 21.4% R 4 992 145 9.7% 270 16.5% R 720 488 3.2% 1 865 22.4% R4271657 14.5% 
Combined Black 
Male and Female 
1 113 11.2% R 4 242 482 8.2% 238 14.5% R 1 787 647 8.0% 875 10.5% R2 454 835 8.3% 
White Female 100 1.0% R 136 543 0.3% 24 1.5% R 62 820 0.3% 76 0.9% R73 723 0.3% 
Combined Black and 
White Female 
18 0.2% R 306 269 0.6% 8 0.5% R 29 917 0.1% 10 0.1% R 276352 0.9% 
Combined Black 
Male, Black Female 
and White Female 
32 0.3% R 134 953 0.3% 20 1.2% R 93 928 0.4% 12 0.1% R41 025 0.1% 
Sub-Total 7 185 72.2% R 22 394 063 43.3% 1 118 68.1% R5 094 253 22.9% 6 067 73.0% R17 299 810 58.7% 
Other types of HDI enterprises 
HDI enterprises with 
>50%  <100% 
shareholding 
467 4.7% R 6 815 880 13.2% 128 7.8% R 3 689 617 16.6% 339 4.1.% R 3 126 263 10.6% 
HDI enterprises with 
≤50% shareholding 
771 7.7% R 16 745 236 32.4% 164 10.0% R 11 838 439 53.2% 607 7.3% R 4 906 797 16.6% 
Non-HDI enterprises 
Non-HDI enterprises 1 532 15.4% R 5 773 183 11.2% 231 14.1% R 1 628 396 7.3% 1 301 15.6% R 4 144 787 14.1% 
Total 9 955 100.0% R 51 728 362 100.0% 1 641 100.0% R 22 250 705 100.0% 8314 100.0% R 29 477 657 100.0% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
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6.2.5.2 Analysis of contracts awarded on the basis of race and gender to 
enterprises with 100% HDI shareholding 
Table 6.5 summarises the number and value of contracts awarded to enterprises 
with 100% HDI shareholding in comparison to other types of HDI enterprises and 
non-HDI enterprises The combined data for national and provincial governments 
show that the majority of contracts, both in number (72.2%) and value (43.3%), 
were awarded to HDI enterprises with 100% shareholding.  
Within this 100% shareholding group, enterprises owned by black males only were 
awarded the most contracts by combined national and provincial governments both 
in number (37.8%) and value (23.9%). This was followed by enterprises owned by 
black women, which received 21.4% of the number and 9.7% of the value of all 
contracts awarded. In comparison, non-HDI enterprises were awarded 15.4% of the 
number and 11.2% of the value of the contracts. 
In terms of contracts awarded by national government, Table 6.5 also shows that 
although HDI enterprises with 100% shareholding were awarded the majority 
number of contracts (68.1%), these equated to only 22.9% of the value. Enterprises 
owned by black males were awarded the most national contracts both in number 
(34%) and value (10.8%) amongst HDI enterprises with 100% shareholding. 
Collectively, enterprises with 100% black shareholding only (male and female) were 
awarded the highest number (65%) and value (22%) of national contracts. 
Enterprises with 100% white female shareholding only received  1.5% of the number 
and 0.3% of the value of national contracts, whilst non-HDI enterprises were 
awarded 14.1% of the number and 7.3% of the value. 
In terms of contracts awarded by provincial government, Table 6.5 indicates that 
HDI enterprises with 100% shareholding were awarded the majority number of 
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contracts (73%) and value (58.7%). As with national government contracts, HDI 
enterprises with 100% shareholding by black males were awarded the most 
contracts both in number (38.6%) and value (33.9%). Collectively, enterprises with 
100% black shareholding only (male and female) were awarded the majority in 
number (71.5%) and value (56.7%) of provincial contracts. Enterprises with 100% 
white female shareholding only received 0.9% of the number and 0.3% of the value 
of provincial contracts, whereas non-HDI enterprises were awarded 15.6% of the 
number and 14.1% of the value. 
6.2.6 Analysis of contracts awarded based on Female Shareholding 
The clause in the PPPFA that makes provision for price preferencing based on 
gender includes white females in its definition of historically disadvantaged 
individuals. When the decision was made to include white females as HDIs for 
allocating preference points, concerns were raised as to whether they might benefit 
disproportionally in winning government contracts over other HDI groups. In the 
present study, the data show that over the five-year period the number and value of 
contracts awarded to enterprises with white female only shareholding were 
consistently less than those enterprises with black female shareholding. This can be 
seen in the data presented in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 for national government and 
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 for provincial government. 
6.2.7 Analysis of financial premiums incurred over the five-year period  
Data in Table 4.10 show that national government incurred an average financial 
premium of 2.0% over the five-year period, while data from Table 4.21 show that 
the premium for provincial governments was 1.0%.  
Statistical analysis of the data yielded t-tests showing that the low premium value 
was significant when compared to the total value of contracts awarded both at a 
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national (p < 0.001) and provincial (p < 0.001) level. Another significant outcome 
from statistical analysis was that although HDI enterprises received the majority of 
contracts, they did so with minimum assistance of the price preference points that 
were available to them. This is shown in the analysis of data that was restricted to 
those contracts awarded to HDI’s which yielded p < 0.001 at national level and also p 
< 0.001 at provincial level. 
Although the average financial premium for the five-year period was low, another 
dimension of data analysis focused only on those contracts that incurred premiums. 
This analysis revealed that at both national and provincial level contracts were 
awarded that exceeded the maximum allowable premium as established in PPPFA 
regulations.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, the PPPFA regulations applicable at the time established a 
preference point scoring system from which a formula was derived that calculated, 
among other things, the maximum price premium that could be incurred within the 
preferencing framework. Contracts with a value ≤R500 000 used the 80/20 points 
system that set the maximum allowable price premium at 25% of the lowest 
responsive tender. Contracts with a value >R500 000 used the 90/10 points system 
that set the maximum allowable price premium at 11.1% of the lowest responsive 
tender. 
Table 4.11 shows the distribution of premiums for contracts awarded by national 
government over the five-year period. The data show that in 2009/10 a premium of 
42.1% was incurred for contracts in the ≤R500 000 category, whilst in the >R500 000 
category a premium of 17.6% was incurred in 2006/07 and a premium of 20.4% in 
2010/2011. At a provincial level, Table 4.22 shows that for contracts in the 
>R500 000 category a premium of 13.4% was incurred in 2008/09 and a 12.3% 
premium in 2009/10. 
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The fact that the maximum premium levels were exceeded indicates either data 
error or incorrect application of the PPPFA provisions. Apart from common data 
reporting or capturing errors, a possible explanation for these results could be that 
the lowest tendered price which was not considered responsive was still used in the 
calculation of the price preference points. This would be procedurally incorrect. 
Policy guidelines and good practice recommend that only the lowest responsive 
price be used as the basis to calculate the price preference points for all other 
comparative tenders in order to avoid the situation of skewed price preference 
points and abnormal premium values. Another possible explanation could be 
fraudulent activities by government officials, subsequent to the adjudication process 
and tender recommendation that result in the award of a contract to a tenderer 
who submitted a much higher priced tender.  
It is most likely that if these types of data inconsistencies were corrected or adjusted 
the result would be a decrease in the premium percentage values obtained in the 
present study.       
6.2.8 Distribution of Premiums incurred per province over the five-year period  
Table 6.6 illustrates the premium percentage values across the nine provinces. The 
premiums range from a negligible 0.001% in the Northern Cape to a maximum of 
2.1% in the Eastern Cape. Five of the provinces are below the provincial average of 
1%. Of the five, four provinces are below 0.5% and would suggest that these 
provinces were able to implement preferential procurement at an extremely low 
cost. 
 
Table 6.6 also indicates a similar trend for contracts in the ≤R500 000 and >R500 000 
value categories. An interesting result is that Gauteng did not incur any financial 
premiums in the ≤R500 000 category and incurred a very low 0.01% premium in the 
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>R500 000 category. This suggests that most of the HDI enterprises that tendered in 
Gauteng did not need the price preference policy to compete successfully with non-
HDI enterprises. A similar observation applies to the Northern Cape that showed 
negligible premiums being incurred. The Eastern Cape incurred the highest 
percentage premium values in both the ≤R500 000 and >R500 000 value categories.  
 
Table 6.6:  Summary of Premiums Per Province incurred over the Five-Year 
Period 
Province 
All Contracts Contracts ≤ R500 000 Contracts > R500 000 
Premium 
% 
% No. of 
Contracts 
Awarded 
with 
Premiums 
Premium % 
% No. of 
Contracts 
Awarded 
with 
Premiums 
Premium % 
% No. of 
Contracts 
Awarded 
with 
Premiums 
All Provinces 1.0% 5.1% 1.1% 3.4% 1.0% 6.9% 
Kwa-Zulu Natal 0.4% 2.7% 0.1% 1.8% 0.5% 4.0% 
Limpopo 0.2% 1.4% 0.5% 1.2% 0.2% 1.4% 
Eastern Cape 2.1% 4.5% 4.9% 1.5% 2.0% 7.6% 
Mpumalanga 1.4% 20.5% 1.4% 33.0% 1.4% 15.6% 
Free State 0.8% 3.8% 0.9% 1.3% 0.8% 7.6% 
Gauteng 0.01%* 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.01%* 0.9% 
Northern Cape 0.001%* 0.9% 0.01%* 1.0% 0.001%* 0.8% 
North West  1.8% 20.8% 1.9% 15.2% 1.8% 23.6% 
Western Cape 1.5% 5.5% 1.1% 3.5% 1.5% 7.1% 
* This value is shown to 2 decimal places due to the percent premium incurred being very low. 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
With regard to the number of contracts awarded with premiums, Table 6.6 indicates 
that the provincial average was 5.1%, with the North West awarding the highest 
percentage number (20.8%) followed by Mpumalanga (20.5%). In contrast, the 
premium value percentages for these two provinces were relatively low at 1.7% and 
1.4%, respectively.  
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Table 6.7 presents data for those contracts that incurred premiums over the five-
year period. It shows the actual value of the premium incurred, expressed as a 
percentage, on those contracts. 
According to the price preference formula, the maximum premium that is permitted 
is 25% above the lowest responsive tender for contracts with a value ≤R500 00, and 
11.1% for contracts with a value >R500 000. The data indicate that these maximum 
premium were exceeded at national level for contracts >R500 000 (11.2%). At the 
provincial level, the maximum premium in the ≤R500 000 category was exceeded by 
Free State (175.0%) and Western Cape (46.9%). In the >R500 000 category the 
maximum premium was exceeded by Kwa-Zulu Natal (14.2%), Limpopo (12.8%), 
Eastern Cape (17.0%) and Mpumalanga (11.7%).   
6.2.9 Distribution of Contracts incurring premiums over the five-year period 
To understand the significance of the percentages in Table 6.7 it must be recognised 
that a percentage of 100% would mean that the value of the premium alone was 
equal to the value of the lowest priced tender. In the case of the Free State this 
means that the extremely high premium value was 1.75 times greater than the 
lowest price tender. If data reported by National Treasury are correct, these 
excessive premium values imply that the preferential procurement procedures were 
incorrectly applied. Disregarding the possibility of corruption, the incorrect 
application of procedures suggests that procurement officials may lack the skills, 
knowledge, understanding and systems to implement the preferential procurement 
policy correctly. If government is intent on implementing its policies successfully it 
must ensure that officials have the required knowledge, experiential training, 
resources and skills set. 
Chapter 6: Interpretation and Discussion of Results 
265 
Table 6.7: Summary of contracts incurring premiums over the five-year period 
Government 
Level 
≤ R500 000 > R 500 000 
Number of 
Contracts 
Incurring 
Premiums 
Value of Contracts 
incurring 
Premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Premium 
Amount 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of Premium on 
Contracts incurring 
Premiums 
Number of 
Contracts 
Incurring 
Premiums 
Value of Contracts 
incurring 
Premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Premium 
Amount 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of Premium on 
Contracts incurring 
Premiums 
National 52 R 15 093 R 1 915 14.5% 94 R 4 315 996 R  433 193 11.2% 
Provincial 141 R 368 159 R12 922 3.6% 285 R 2 752 296 R 272 785 11.0% 
Per Province 
Kwa-Zulu Natal 28 R 8 544 R 699 8.9% 48 R 140 873 R 17 558 14.2% 
Limpopo 5 R 187 910 R 458 0.2% 9 R 68 234 R 7 736 12.8% 
Eastern Cape 12 R 143 431 R 9 460 7.1% 61 R 733 026 R 106 543 17.0% 
Mpumalanga 69 R 21 039 R 1 027 5.1% 84 R 611 885 R 64 292 11.7% 
Free State 7 R 792*** R 504*** 175.0%*** 26 R 554 206 R 25 113 4.8% 
Gauteng 0 R 0 R 0 0.0% 2 R 4 611 R 391 9.3% 
Northern Cape 2 R 162 R 6 3.9% 1 R 2 453 R 12 0.5% 
North West  16 R 5 626 R 559 11.0% 49 R 423 681 R 32 124 8.2% 
Western Cape 2 R 655 R 209 46.9% 5 R 213 327 R 19 016 9.8% 
Source: Treasury data (2011) 
***  The table contains certain data (as reported by National Treasury) which appear to be incorrect. This discrepancy also renders the calculated 5-year average premium incurred (175%) 
unreliable for contracts in the ≤R500 000 category. In addition, it distorts the 5 year total of the premiums incurred for those contracts. However, the problem does not affect the 
reliability of other data in the table (including all other yearly data for ≤R500 000 contracts).  
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6.3 SURVEY DATA 
6.3.1 Sample Size and Response Rate 
The researcher observed a low response rate with a 0% response from some 
provinces despite numerous follow up reminders to respondents. Accordingly, 
data from the questionnaire survey are based on 259 responses received out of a 
sample size of 596. The return rate was deemed to be acceptable on a 6% margin 
of error and 95% confidence level based on a population size of 1985. The overall 
response rate for the study in relation to the sample size was 44%. 
6.3.2 Relationship of Public Procurement and CIDB Grading 
More than half of the survey respondents (58.1 %) started as Grade 1 
contractors. Of these, 56.4% progressed to Grade 2 and higher. This confirms 
that these contracting enterprises grew through success achieved in winning 
tenders. The results presented in Table 5.17 show a steadily increasing success 
rate by the respondents in winning government tenders between 2006 and 
2011.  
It is interesting to note, however, that half the respondents did not perceive the 
PPPFA as the primary contributor to a higher CIDB grading and attributed their 
success in achieving higher grades to other factors. This finding was not 
unexpected because the PPPFA is not directly linked to the requirements of the 
CIDB grading system. This view is supported by results shown in Table 5.10 
where more than half of the respondents (56.4%) professed to have no, or very 
basic, understanding of the workings of the PPPFA.   
6.3.3 Knowledge and Understanding of the PPPFA 
The survey findings indicate that respondents did not link the opportunities 
offered by the PPPFA to the growth and development of their enterprises. This is 
supported by the data presented in Table 5.10 that indicate 56.4% did not have 
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any, or very little, understanding  of the use of preference points to promote HDI 
owned enterprises. 
In terms of the newly revised PPPFA Regulations, the lack of knowledge and 
understanding of the workings of the BBBEE Scorecard System for awarding 
preference points is likely to hinder the implementation of newly revised PPPFA 
Regulations. This view is supported by data presented in Table 5.11 which show 
that 61.6% of respondents had no, or very basic understanding of how the new 
system works as it relates to the claiming of preferential points for government 
contracts.  
The survey results demonstrate the importance of government communicating 
its policies to target groups. This must include raising awareness on the purpose 
of a specific policy, the process and procedures that must be followed, and the 
expected benefits. In addition, the intended beneficiaries of a policy must have 
confidence, firstly, that the policy will benefit them and, secondly, that it will be 
applied fairly and effectively without any collusion and corruption affecting the 
process. 
6.3.4 Supply Side Constraints and Barriers to Entry 
The general findings suggest that HDI owned enterprises benefited and grew as a 
result of the PPPFA. However, 67% of the respondents indicated that supply side 
constraints limited the pace of anticipated business growth and expansion in the 
construction sector.  
Table 5.22 presents reasons that contributed to businesses not growing as 
expected. The most frequently stated reason (63.5%) was the inability to access 
finance when needed. Another constraint indicated by 56% of the respondents 
was the difficulty encountered in obtaining credit from suppliers. Other 
constraints identified by respondents included the lack of suitable training for 
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business owners and their employees, and in addition, the inability to source 
competent management and construction staff.  
These findings suggest that although increased procurement opportunities are 
offered by the preferential procurement policy, supply side constraints and 
related barriers to entry such as access to credit and competent human 
resources impact negatively on both business growth and the ability to perform 
successfully. Therefore, appropriate procurement mechanisms are needed to 
address these constraints in order for government to achieve its socio-economic 
objectives. This requires government to increase its attention on developing an 
enabling environment for the construction industry in order to optimise the 
benefits of preferential procurement. 
6.3.5 Relationship between CIDB Grade and number of contracts awarded 
Table 6.8:  Correlation between CIDB Grades and number of contracts 
received 
CIDB Grading No. of Contracts % of Contracts 
1 13 0.6% 
2 654 29.6% 
3 163 7.4% 
4 527 23.8% 
5 259 11.7% 
6 251 11.4% 
7 206 9.3% 
8 61 2.8% 
9 76 3.4% 
Total 2210 100% 
Source: Treasury data (2011) 
Chi square 320.3** 
Correlation 0.197** 
Linear regression  0.197** 
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Table 6.8 indicates that CIDB Grade 2 contractors received the highest number of 
contracts. Correlation tests were applied to identify relationships between the 
number of contracts received and the CIDB grading of a construction enterprise. 
Bi-variate tests indicate that there is a statistically significant relationship 
between the CIDB grading levels and the number of contracts awarded (p < 
0.01). There was a positive correlation between CIDB grading and number of 
contracts awarded to contractors (r = 0.19; p < 0.01). This indicates that as a 
contractor’s grade increases, the enterprise is more likely to be successful in 
being awarded a contract. Linear regression indicates that for every grade 
increase there is a 2.5 percent higher probability that the enterprise will be 
awarded a contract. Therefore, by increasing its CIDB Grade a construction 
enterprise will increase its chances of being awarded a contract. 
6.3.6 Relationship between CIDB Grade and business growth 
Chi-squared tests, to determine the relationship between CIDB grading and 
business growth, showed a statistically significant relationship between CIDB 
grading and business growth (p < 0.01). This highlights that as the CIDB Grade of 
a contractor increases the enterprise is more likely to grow. There is a positive 
correlation between CIDB grades and business growth (r = 0.24; p < 0.01). 
6.3.7 Relationship between CIDB Grade and an understanding of the 
preferential points system 
Statistical analysis to determine the relationship between CIDB grading and the 
respondents understanding of the use of preference points indicate that there is 
a statistically significant relationship between CIDB grading and understanding 
the application of preference points (p < 0.05). Correlation tests suggest that as 
the CIDB Grade of an enterprise increases, there is a greater understanding of 
the application of preference points (r = 0.17; p < 0.05).  
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6.3.8 Relationship between age of a business and average turnover per 
annum 
Table 6.9: Statistical tests to determine correlation values 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Correlation -0.453*** -0.244*** -0.249*** -0.265*** -0.169 
The correlation values from 2006 to 2009 indicate that the longer the enterprise 
has been operational the higher the annual average turnover. The statistical tests 
indicate that there was no significant relationship in 2010. 
6.3.9 Change in respondent’s CIDB Grading  
Table 6.10: Movement from first grading to present grading 
Movement in grading Frequency Valid Percent 
-4 1 0.5% 
-1 7 3.2% 
0 32 14.5% 
1 85 38.5% 
2 37 16.7% 
3 34 15.4% 
4 18 8.1% 
5 6 2.7% 
6 1 0.5% 
Total 221 100% 
The frequency distribution in Table 6.10 indicates the movement from first 
grading to present grading designation. It shows that 3.7% of the sample 
dropped in grades and 14.5% showed no movement. This indicates that 81.9% of 
the respondents obtained a higher CIDB grade compared to their first grading 
designation. 
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6.4 Examination of the Propositions 
6.4.1 Proposition 1 
The first proposition is that government policy has contributed to the increased 
participation of enterprises with HDI shareholding in public sector construction 
contracts through the application of the preferential procurement policy in terms 
of the PPPFA of 2000. 
The two research objectives that guided the research methodology and data 
analysis to examine this proposition were:   
i. To measure the number and value of government contracts 
awarded to construction businesses with HDI shareholding in 
comparison with the total number of contracts awarded; and 
ii. To analyse the distribution of contracts awarded to construction 
businesses with HDI shareholding  on the basis of race and gender 
as provided for in the PPPFA (2000) at both national and provincial 
levels. 
Data for national government departments and provincial governments obtained 
from National Treasury were used to examine Proposition 1. The data were 
categorized into contracts awarded to enterprises with HDI shareholding (i.e. 
black male; black male and white female). 
The objective of the PPPFA (2000) was to increase the participation of 
enterprises owned by HDI’s. As a result, the present study measured both the 
number and value of contracts that were awarded to enterprises with HDI 
shareholding and compared the results to the total number of contracts awarded 
as set out in the first research objective.  
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It was necessary to measure both the number and the related value of contracts 
awarded in order to assess increased participation, as well as to identify trends 
and anomalies between the various HDI groups. 
6.4.1.1 Number of contracts awarded to HDI and non-HDI enterprises over 
the five-year period 
Table 6.11 indicates that 8423 contracts (84.6%) of the 9955 construction 
contracts were awarded to HDI enterprises by both national and provincial 
governments during the period April 2006 to March 2011. Of these, 1410 (85.9%) 
out of 1641 contracts were awarded to HDI enterprises by national government 
departments and 7013 (84.4%) contracts out of 8 314 contracts were awarded to 
HDI enterprises by provincial government departments. 
Table 6.11:  Number of Contracts awarded to HDI and non-HDI enterprises over 
the five-year period 
Type of 
Enterprise 
Combined National 
and Provincial 
National Provincial 
No. of 
Contracts 
% 
No. of 
Contracts 
% 
No. of 
Contracts 
% 
HDI 
Enterprises 
8 423 84.6% 1 410 85.9% 7 013 84.4% 
Non-HDI 
Enterprises 
1 532 15.4% 231 14.1% 1 301 15.6% 
Total 9 955 100.0% 1 641 100.0% 8 314 100.0% 
Figure 4.1 indicates that more than 80% contracts (in number) were awarded 
annually to HDI enterprises by national government over the five-year period. 
The trend appears to be consistent over the review period with contracts 
awarded to HDI enterprises peaking at 92.4% during 2007/08. 
For provincial government, Figure 4.9 indicates a similar trend of more than 80% 
of contracts (in number) being awarded annually to HDI enterprises over the 
five-year period, with a peak of 90.3% in 2010/11.  
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Overall, the data show that construction enterprises with HDI shareholding were 
awarded a considerably higher number of contracts in each year of the five-year 
period by both national and provincial governments. 
6.4.1.2 Value of contracts awarded to HDI and non-HDI enterprises over the 
five-year period 
Table 6.12 indicates that R46 billion (88.8%) out of a total value of R51.7 billion in 
construction related contracts were awarded to HDI enterprises by both national 
and provincial governments during the period April 2006 to March 2011. Of this, 
R20.6 billion (92.7%) out of a total R22.3 billion were awarded to HDI enterprises 
by national government departments and R25.3 billion (85.1%) out of a total 
R29.5 billion were awarded to HDI enterprises by provincial government 
departments.  
Figure 4.2 indicates that more than 90% of the value of contracts was awarded 
annually to HDI enterprises by national government over the five-year period.  
The trend appears to be consistent over the review period with contracts 
awarded to HDI enterprises peaking at 98.6% during 2007/08. 
Table 6.12: Value of Contracts awarded to HDI and non-HDI enterprises over 
the five-year period 
Type of 
Enterprise 
Combined National 
and Provincial 
National Provincial 
No. of 
Contracts 
% 
No. of 
Contracts 
% 
No. of 
Contracts 
% 
HDI 
Enterprises 
R45 955 179 88.8% R20 622 309 92.7% R25 332 870 85.9% 
Non-HDI 
Enterprises 
R 5 773 183 11.2% R1 628 396 7.3% R4 144 787 14.1% 
Total R51 728 362 100.0% R22 250 705 100.0% R29 477 657 100.0% 
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 With regard to provincial government, Figure 4.10 indicates an annual trend of 
between 80% and 90% of the value of contracts being awarded annually to HDI 
enterprises over the five-year period. 
Overall, the data show that construction enterprises with HDI shareholding were 
awarded a considerably higher value of contracts in each year of the five-year 
period by both national and provincial governments. 
6.4.1.3 Distribution of contracts awarded over the five-year period, 
disaggregated by HDI shareholding and HDI status in terms of the 
PPPFA 
Notwithstanding that HDI enterprises did benefit significantly in the award of 
government contracts, the second research objective was necessary to identify 
the distribution of contracts awarded to HDI enterprises based on shareholding, 
and on the basis of race and gender as stipulated in the PPPFA.  
Data presented in Table 6.4 show that the majority number of contracts (76.9%) 
awarded by combined national and provincial governments over the five-year 
period went to HDI enterprises with >50% shareholding. The highest percentage 
number of contracts (74.4%) was awarded to black owned HDI enterprises with 
shareholding >50%. A similar trend is also evident when separating the contracts 
awarded by national and provincial governments, with black owned HDI 
enterprises with shareholding >50% being awarded 71.6% of the number of 
contracts by national government and 74.9% by provincial. 
In terms of contract value, data presented in Table 6.4 show that HDI enterprises 
with >50% shareholding were awarded the majority value of contracts (56.5%) by 
both national and provincial governments over the five-year period. This is 
followed by HDI enterprises with ≤50% shareholding (32.4%) and non-HDI 
enterprises (11.2%). The highest percentage value of contracts (53.5%) was 
awarded to black owned HDI enterprises with shareholding >50%. National 
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government awarded the majority value of contracts (53.2%) to HDI enterprises 
with a shareholding ≤ 50%. Provincial government awarded the majority value of 
contracts (69.3%) to HDI enterprises with shareholding >50%. 
Further analysis of Table 6.4 indicates that black owned HDI enterprises with 
shareholding >50% were awarded the highest percentage value of contracts 
(53.5%) from combined national and provincial governments. However, for 
national government, the highest percentage value of contracts (51.8%) was 
awarded to black owned HDI enterprises with shareholding ≤50%. Provincial 
governments awarded the highest percentage value of contracts (66.1%) to black 
owned HDI enterprises with shareholding >50% . 
Data presented in Table 6.5 show that enterprises with 100% shareholding by 
HDI’s were awarded the highest percentage number (72.2%) and the highest 
percentage value (43.3%) from combined national and provincial governments. 
HDI enterprises with ≤50% shareholding were awarded the highest percentage 
value (53.2%) of contracts by national government and followed by HDI 
enterprises with 100% shareholding (22.9%). The highest percentage value 
(58.7%) of contracts awarded by provincial governments went to HDI enterprises 
with >50% shareholding. 
Table 6.5 indicates that, collectively, HDI enterprises with 100% shareholding by 
black persons only (male and female) were awarded 65% of the number of 
contracts and 22% of the value of contracts by national government. HDI 
enterprises with 100% shareholding by white females only received 1.5% and 
0.3% of contracts in terms of number and value, respectively. Provincial 
governments awarded 71.5% in number and 56.7% in value of contracts to HDI 
enterprises with 100% shareholding by black persons only (male and female). In 
comparison, HDI enterprises with 100% shareholding by white females only 
received 0.9% and 0.3% of contracts in terms of number and value, respectively, 
from provincial government.  
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6.4.1.4 Summary of Results  
As shown, the results of the analysis of the five-year dataset for national and 
provincial government departments collected by the National Treasury confirm 
that construction enterprises with HDI shareholding benefited significantly in the 
award of public sector contracts. The results show that the majority of contracts 
awarded both in number (84.6%) and value (88.8%) went to construction 
enterprises with some degree of HDI shareholding. Furthermore, the results also 
show that HDI enterprises were consistently awarded the majority of contracts in 
both number and value in each year over the five-year period by national and 
provincial governments. 
A more detailed analysis of the data into the three HDI groups used for this study 
(i.e. black male, black female and white female) reveals that HDI enterprises 
owned by black persons were awarded the highest number and value of 
contracts. For national government, the highest percentage number of contracts 
(75.9%) was awarded to enterprises with >50% HDI shareholding and the highest 
percentage value of contracts (53.2%) was awarded to enterprises with ≤50% 
HDI shareholding. For provincial government, both the highest percentage 
number (77.1%) and highest percentage value (69.3%) of contracts were 
awarded to enterprises with >50% HDI shareholding.  
With regard to the distribution of contracts to HDI enterprises with 100% 
shareholding, enterprises owned by black males were awarded the most 
contracts both in number and value from national and provincial governments. 
Collectively, enterprises with 100% shareholding by black persons only (male and 
female) were awarded a significantly higher number and value of contracts from 
both national and provincial government than did enterprises with 100% white 
female shareholding.  
These results also suggest that the award of contracts to the different HDI race 
groups in terms of percentage number and value is relative to the population 
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demographics of South Africa, and therefore consistent with the objectives of 
advancing those persons that were historically disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination as envisaged in the constitution (RSA, 1996) 
The overall results confirm that construction enterprises with HDI shareholding 
benefited significantly in terms of winning government tenders through the 
application of the PPPFA (2000) which therefore contributed to the increased 
participation of these businesses in public sector construction contracts. 
Proposition 1 is true.  
6.4.2 Proposition 2 
The second proposition was that the application of preferential procurement 
resulted in excessive cost premiums in relation to that contemplated in the initial 
formulation of the policy. 
The research objective linked to this proposition was to determine the financial 
cost premiums incurred through the implementation of the PPPFA of 2000. 
According to the Oxford dictionary, the term “excessive” means more than is 
necessary, normal or desirable. However, at the time that the preferential 
procurement policy was formulated there appears to have been no pre-
determined amount as to what would be considered normal or necessary. What 
the preference price formula did establish was a maximum potential price 
premium that would be applicable in extreme cases. As explained in the 
literature review of the present study, the original formulation of the preference 
points formula set the maximum “theoretical” premium that government 
deemed to be acceptable at 25% for the ≤R500 000 tender category and 11.1% 
for >R500 000 tender category.  
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6.4.2.1 Analysis of premiums incurred for implementing preferential 
procurement 
 
Table 6.13: Summary of premiums incurred over the five-year period 
Data Source 
Total ≤R500 000 >R 500 000 
Premium 
Value % 
% No. of 
contracts 
awarded with 
premiums 
Premium 
Value % 
% No. of 
contracts 
awarded 
with 
premiums 
Premium 
Value % 
% No. of 
contracts 
awarded 
with 
premiums 
Combined 
National and 
Provincial 
1.4% 5.8% 1.1% 3.9% 1.4% 7.5% 
National 2.0% 8.9% 1.2% 6.7% 2.0% 10.9% 
Provincial 1.0% 5.1% 1.1% 3.4% 1.0% 6.9% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
 
Table 6.13 provides a summary of premiums incurred as applicable to the 
contracts awarded in both number and value at national and provincial levels 
separately, as well as combined. The analysis of the combined data show the 
percentage number of contracts incurring premiums was 5.8% and the 
percentage premium value was 1.4%. In terms of contracts with a value 
≤R500 000 the percentage number of contracts incurring premiums was 3.9% 
and the percentage premium value incurred was 1.1%. For contracts with a value 
>R500 000, the percentage number of contracts incurring premiums was 7.5% 
and the percentage premium value incurred was 1.4%.   
In the case of national government departments, Table 6.13 indicates that the 
percentage number of total contracts incurring premiums was 8.9% while the 
percentage premium value was 2.0%. In terms of contracts ≤R500 000, the 
percentage number of contracts incurring premiums was 6.7% and the 
percentage premium value incurred was 1.2%.  For contracts with a value 
>R500 000, the percentage number of contracts incurring premiums was 10.9% 
and the percentage premium value incurred was 2.0%. The distribution of 
premiums over the five-year period as shown in Table 4.10 indicates a minimum 
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percentage premium value of 0.8% during 2007/08 and a maximum of 6.5% 
during 2010/11. The results in Table 4.11 indicate that the premium incurred in 
the >R500 000 contract value category was higher (2.0%) than the premium 
incurred (1.2%) in the ≤R500 000 category, which suggests that HDI enterprises 
may have been more competitive in the lower value category.    
For provincial government departments, Table 6.13 shows that the percentage 
number of contracts incurring premiums was 5.1% while the percentage 
premium value was 1.0%. In terms of contracts with a value ≤R500 000, the 
percentage number of contracts incurring premiums was 3.4% while the 
percentage premium value incurred was 1.1%.  For contracts with a value 
>R500 000, the percentage number of contracts incurring premiums was 6.9%, 
while the percentage premium value incurred was 1.0%. The distribution of 
premiums as shown in Table 4.21 indicates a more consistent trend over the five-
year period with premiums ranging between 0.4% and 1.4%. The results in Table 
4.22 illustrate a different trend to that of national government in that the 
premium incurred in the >R500 000 category contract value category is 
marginally lower (1.0%) than that incurred (1.1%) in the ≤R500 000 category.    
6.4.2.2 Analysis of contracts incurring premiums   
The results reveal that the proportion of contracts that incurred premiums, 
together with the percentage premium value in terms of the total number of 
contracts for both national and provincial departments, was unexpectedly low. 
Notwithstanding this, it is important to determine the direct premium value on 
those specific contracts that incurred premiums to understand the actual value 
of premiums and to identify any anomalies in relation to the maximum 
“theoretical” premium of 25% for the ≤R500 000 tender category and 11.1% for 
>R500 000 tender category.  
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Table 6.14: Summary of contracts incurring premiums over the five-year period 
Data 
Source 
≤R500 000 >R 500 000 
Value of 
Contracts 
incurring 
Premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Premium 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of 
Premium 
on 
Contracts 
incurring 
Premiums 
Value of 
Contracts 
incurring 
Premiums 
(ZAR 000’s) 
Premium 
(ZAR 000’s) 
% of 
Premium 
on 
Contracts 
incurring 
Premiums 
Combined 
National and 
Provincial 
R 383 253 R 14 837  4.0% R7 068 292 R 705 978 11.1% 
National R 15 093 R 1 915 14.5% R 4 315 996 R 433 193 11.2% 
Provincial R 368 159 R12 922 3.6% R 2 752 296  R 272 785 11.0% 
Source: Treasury Data (2011) 
Table 6.14 presents data that indicates that, at combined national and provincial 
levels, the premium percentage value applicable to only those contracts that 
incurred premiums was 4% for contracts ≤R500 000 and 11.1% for contracts 
>R500 000. In the case of national government departments, the premium 
percentage value applicable to contracts that incurred premiums was 14.5% for 
contracts ≤R500 000 and 11.2% for contracts >R500 000. For provincial 
government departments, Table 6.14 shows that the premium percentage value 
applicable to only those contracts that incurred premiums was 3.6% for contracts 
≤R500 000 and 11.0% for contracts >R500 000.  
The results show that for contracts >R500 000, the premium values for combined 
(11.1%) and provincial (11.0%) levels were equal to or very close respectively to 
the maximum potential premium of 11.1%. For national government, the 
premium value (11.2%) exceeded the maximum value of 11.1%. For contracts 
≤R500 000, the premium values in the three groups were considerably lower 
than the 25% maximum premium.  
 
Chapter 6: Interpretation and Discussion of Results 
281 
6.4.2.3 Summary of Results 
The overall findings show that comparatively few contracts incurred premiums 
and that very low premiums were incurred across the different analysis 
categories (combined, national and provincial levels) over the five-year period 
under review. This proves conclusively that the application of preferential 
procurement did not result in excessively high cost premiums for government.  
The findings show that the premiums incurred in implementing the PPPFA were 
considerably lower than the maximum provided for in the original formulation of 
the points scoring formula in both ≤R500 000 and >R500 000 value categories.  
At the combined level of contracts awarded by both national and provincial 
governments over the five-year period, the results reveal that the average 
percentage premium value of 1.1% represents less than 5% of the maximum 
potential premium of 25% on contracts ≤R500 000 and that the average 
percentage premium value of 1.4% represents about 12% of the maximum 
potential premium of 11.1% on contracts >R500 000, both of which are well 
below the premiums contemplated in the initial formulation of the preferential 
procurement policy.   
Proposition 2 is false. 
6.4.3 Proposition 3 
The third proposition examined was that preferential procurement served as an 
effective mechanism for construction related enterprises with HDI shareholding 
to grow their businesses. 
The two research objectives linked to this proposition were: 
i. To establish whether the application of the PPPFA of 2000 had 
helped construction enterprises with HDI shareholding to grow 
their businesses; and  
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ii. To assess whether construction enterprises with HDI 
shareholding, as beneficiaries of the policy, understood the 
intention and application of the PPPFA (2000).   
The results of the survey data in Table 5.4 reveal that most enterprises 
participating in the survey were established post 1994, when various 
government programmes were introduced to provide and advance business 
opportunities for construction enterprises owned by HDI’s. Specifically, 82% of 
enterprises surveyed established their businesses in the decade from 2000 to 
2010 as shown in Table 5.4. This finding is important given that the PPPFA was 
enacted in 2000.   
The survey results in Table 5.6 conclusively demonstrate that in the period from 
2006 to 2010 turnover levels in enterprises with CIDB Grades 2 to 9, with the 
exception of Grade 3, were higher than or close to the five-year average.  The 
increased annual turnover enabled these contractors to advance to higher CIDB 
grading levels, which is a recognised indicator of business growth in the 
construction industry. It should be noted, however, that the data excluded start-
up enterprises registered with the CIDB as Grade 1GB.     
Table 5.9 indicates that more than half of the survey respondents (58.1 %) 
started as Grade 1 contractors. Of these, 56.4% had progressed to Grade 2 and 
higher at the time of the survey. This suggests that many of these contracting 
enterprises grew through success achieved in winning government tenders, as 
shown in Table 5.17.   
The results presented in Table 5.17 show a steadily increasing success rate in 
winning government tenders between 2006 and 2011. Of note, however, is that 
half the respondents did not perceive the PPPFA as the primary contributor to a 
higher CIDB grading and attributed other reasons for earning higher grades. This 
finding is not unexpected, because the PPPFA is not directly linked to the 
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requirements of the CIDB grading system. This view is supported by the results in 
Table 5.10 where more than half of the respondents (56.4%) professed to have 
either limited or no understanding the workings of the PPPFA. 
Almost all the respondents (94%) indicated that they submitted a construction 
related tender to a government department and close to 70% were successful in 
being awarded such tenders over the five-year period under review. Of the 
respondents who submitted tenders to national, provincial and local 
governments, over 80% claimed preference points in these tenders. The fact that 
respondents were claiming preference points indicates that they recognised the 
benefits in the adjudication and award processes. Of these respondents, 75% 
acknowledged that the preferencing system provided them with an advantage.  
Although 74% of respondents claimed that their enterprises had grown over the 
period under review, 67% indicated that the rate of business growth did not 
meet their expectations. The main reason identified by respondents for this slow 
growth was the inability to access construction finance when needed.  
The overall findings of the questionnaire data confirm that the application of 
preferential procurement served as an effective mechanism to grow HDI owned 
construction businesses. The findings also confirm that preferential procurement 
provided HDI enterprises with accelerated access to business opportunities 
through a pricing advantage that increased the chances of winning tenders. 
While the general findings support the premise that HDI enterprises benefited 
and grew as a result of the PPPFA, evidence also suggests that supply side 
constraints limited the pace of anticipated business growth and expansion in the 
construction industry.   
Proposition 3 is true. 
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6.5 OTHER FINDINGS 
6.5.1 Distribution of Contracts in the ≤R1 million and >R1 million value 
categories 
The findings on the value threshold distribution of tenders awarded by 
government in the ≤R500 000 category has significant implications for the new 
regulations governing the application of the PPPFA that came into effect in 
December 2012. The new PPPFA regulations increased the ≤R500 000 category 
threshold to R1million for the application of the 80/20 points scoring formula.  
A further analysis of the Treasury Data was conducted to determine the impact 
this reformulation of the points scoring system would have had on the 
consolidated results if the R1m value threshold had been applied. The results for 
national government in Table 4.9 show that 56.6% of the number of contracts 
awarded were in the ≤R1 million category and 44.4% in the >R1 million category, 
but that the monetary value of contracts awarded in the lower category was 
2.8%. For provincial government the results in Table 4.20 indicate that 66.8% of 
the number of contracts awarded were in the ≤R1 million category and 33.2% in 
the >R1 million category, but that the monetary value of contracts awarded in 
the lower category was 6%.    
Although the research findings conclusively indicate that construction 
enterprises with HDI shareholding benefitted significantly from the application of 
the PPPFA and were able to grow their businesses, the low percentage monetary 
value attached to almost half the number of contracts in the ≤R500 000 value 
category means that an important target group, i.e. SMME’s and emerging 
construction enterprises, benefitted only marginally from the total value of 
construction contracts that was made available by national and provincial 
government departments. 
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This comparatively low percentage monetary values in the ≤R500 000 contracts 
category, which used the 80/20 points scoring formula in order to provide the 
highest price preferencing advantage to the SMME and emerging enterprise 
sector, cannot be ignored. In terms of the new PPPFA Regulations (2011), this 
category has been increased to ≤R1 million for the use of the 80/20 points 
scoring formula. In order to establish whether this new value category will 
address the issue of low monetary value, the awarded contracts were 
disaggregated into ≤R1 million and >R1 million value categories. Table 4.2 and 
Table 4.9 indicate that, on this basis, both the percentage number and 
percentage value of the contracts awarded over the five-year period by national 
government would increase from 47.2% to 55.6% and 0.8% to 2.8%, respectively. 
For provincial government, Table 4.13 and Table 4.20 show an improved 
distribution with the number and value of the contracts awarded over the five-
year period increasing from 49.9% to 66.8% and 4.0% to 6.0%, respectively. 
6.5.2 Distribution of Contracts Disaggregated into CIDB grading categories 
The comparatively low monetary value in the ≤R500 000 contracts category also 
needs to be analyzed in relation to the CIDB grading categories. This is necessary 
because contractors are limited to the value of a contract they can tender for in 
the public sector based on their CIDB grading as shown in Table 4.8. 
From data shown in Table 4.8 it is evident that for national government 27.7% of 
the number of contracts awarded over the five-year period were in the Grade 1 
category, although this represented only 0.3% of the total value of contracts. An 
analysis of the CIDB Grade 2 category indicates a similar trend with 24.0% of the 
total number of contracts awarded in this category, but the value of those 
contracts representing only 0.7% of the total value.  
For provincial governments Table 4.19 shows that 29.1% of the total number of 
contracts awarded over the five-year period were in the CIDB Grade 1 category, 
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but they were worth only 1% of the total value. A slight improvement is evident 
for the CIDB Grade 2 category with 28.4% of the total number of contracts being 
awarded which equated to 3% of the total value. The national and provincial 
results imply that the monetary value of contracts awarded in the ≤R500 000 
category has a direct impact on contract opportunities for CIDB Grades 1 and 2 
contractors.  
The results indicate that over 50% of the total number of contracts were 
awarded in the CIDB Grades 1 and 2 categories, although they were not 
necessarily awarded exclusively to CIDB Grades 1 and 2 contractors. However, in 
terms of contract value this 50% made up only 1% and 4% of the total value of 
contracts awarded by national and provincial governments, respectively. It is 
important to note that contractors in Grades 3 to 9 can also compete for tenders 
in the lower value categories and often do so in tough economic times. 
In terms of the revised ≤R1 million category as per the new PPPFA Regulations 
(2011), which provides for the 80/20 points scoring formula, the distribution of 
contracts awarded would also include, in part, the CIDB Grade 3 category. As an 
indicator of potential contracts opportunities for CIDB Grade 1 to 3 contractors, 
the results for national government presented in Table 4.8 show that 66.2% of 
the number and 2.3% of the total value of contracts awarded were in this 
category. For provincial government, the results presented in Table 4.19 indicate 
that 77.3% of the number and 9.8% of the total value of contracts awarded were 
in this category. 
6.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter interprets the results and empirical findings as they relate to the 
Treasury Data and Questionnaire Survey. The findings relate to the stated 
research objectives and examine the three propositions in this study. Conclusions 
and recommendations based on these findings are discussed in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS  
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The present study examined the effectiveness of the application of preferential 
procurement policy in the South African construction industry. Preferential 
procurement objectives linked to public sector procurement policy were 
promulgated by the South African government through the Preferential 
Procurement Policy Framework Act (PPPFA) No.5 of 2000.  The desired outcome 
of the legislation was to achieve the socio-economic objectives linked to public 
sector procurement policy, as established in Section 217 of the South African 
Constitution.  
 
After 1994, the PPPFA was one of several mechanisms introduced by a   
democratically elected South African government to redress the racial and 
gender related discriminatory practices of the past. The primary intended 
beneficiaries of preferential procurement legislation were targeted groups (black 
males, black females and white females) that were previously prevented or 
restricted from accessing government contracts (Bolton, 2004). 
 
Although preferential procurement legislation was promulgated almost 12 years 
ago, a review of the literature shows a lack of research on the effectiveness of 
the application of preferential procurement legislation in SA in general, and in 
the construction industry in particular. The lack of empirical analysis of the 
challenges and achievements in the application of preferential procurement 
prescripts is particularly noteworthy given that the regulations pertaining to the 
PPPFA were significantly amended in December 2011. The present study sought 
to address this gap in empirical data and analysis, and extend the research 
conducted by Gounden in 2000. Gounden (2000) examined the implementation 
of the Affirmative Procurement Policy Programme as a precursor to the PPPFA.  
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Specifically, Gounden (2000) focused on the participation of Affirmable Business 
Enterprises (ABE’s) in contracts awarded by the National Department of Public 
Works. 
 
The primary aim of the present study was to assess the effectiveness of the 
PPPFA of 2000 in creating and growing business opportunities for HDI owned 
contractors in the construction industry through the application of a preference 
scoring mechanism in public sector procurement. The study focused on the 
awarding of public sector construction contracts to business enterprises with HDI 
shareholding.    
 
Primary and secondary research data were obtained and analysed to examine 
the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 1:  That government policy has contributed to the increased 
participation of enterprises with HDI shareholding in public 
sector construction contracts through the application of 
the preferential procurement policy in terms of the PPPFA 
of 2000; 
 
Proposition 2:  That the application of preferential procurement resulted 
in excessive cost premiums in relation to that 
contemplated in the initial formulation of the policy; and 
 
Proposition 3: That preferential procurement served as an effective 
mechanism for construction related enterprises with HDI 
shareholding to grow their businesses. 
 
A five-year dataset obtained from the National Treasury was used to examine 
propositions 1 and 2, while data from a survey questionnaire administered to 
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construction enterprises registered with the Construction Industry Development 
Board (CIDB) in the General Building (GB) Grades 2 to 9 categories formed the 
basis for examining proposition 3. 
 
The study was guided by the following research objectives:   
  
(i) To measure the number and value of government contracts awarded to 
construction businesses with HDI shareholding in comparison with the 
total number of contracts awarded; 
 
(ii) To analyse on the basis of race and gender the distribution of contracts 
awarded to construction businesses with HDI shareholding , as provided 
for in the PPPFA (2000), at both national and provincial levels; 
 
(iii) To determine the financial cost premiums incurred through the 
implementation of the PPPFA of 2000;    
 
(iv) To establish whether the application of the PPPFA of 2000 helped 
construction enterprises with HDI shareholding to grow their businesses; 
and  
 
(v) To assess whether construction enterprises with HDI shareholding, as 
beneficiaries of the policy, understood the intention and application of 
the PPPFA of 2000.   
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7.2 KEY FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
 
 
The first proposition examined was: 
 
that government policy has contributed to the increased participation 
of enterprises with HDI shareholding in public sector construction 
contracts through the application of the preferential procurement 
policy in terms of the PPPFA of 2000.   
 
The first two research objectives guided the research methodology and data 
analysis to examine this proposition.  
 
The results of the analysis of the five-year dataset for national and provincial 
government departments collected by the National Treasury clearly demonstrate 
that construction enterprises with HDI shareholding benefited significantly from 
the award of construction contracts over the five-year period of this research.  
The combined results for national and provincial government show that the 
majority of contracts awarded, both in number (84.6%) and total value (88.8%) 
went to construction enterprises with some degree of HDI shareholding. The 
results also indicate that enterprises with majority HDI shareholding >50% were 
awarded the majority of contracts over the five-year period both in number 
(76.9%) and total value (56.5%). Looking at the data more closely reveals that the 
76.9% was made up of 72.2% enterprises with HDI ownership of 100% and the 
balance of 4.7% comprised enterprises with HDI ownership between >50% and 
<100%. In terms of total value, the 56.5% was made up of 43.3% enterprises with 
HDI ownership of 100% and the balance of 13.2% consisted of enterprises with 
HDI ownership between >50% and <100%. Within this 100% HDI shareholding 
group, enterprises owned by black males only were awarded the most contracts 
by combined national and provincial governments both in number (37.8%) and 
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value (23.9%). This was followed by 100% black women owned enterprises which 
received 21.4% in number and 9.7% in value of all contracts. 
 
Overall, the results confirm that the application of the PPPFA (2000) contributed 
to the increased participation of enterprises with HDI shareholding in terms of 
winning government construction contracts. Therefore, the first proposition is 
true.   
 
However, although HDI enterprises were generally successful in winning 
contracts the percentage monetary value of the ≤R500 000 contracts was 
comparatively low. The consistently low percentage monetary values attached to 
almost half the number of contracts awarded in the ≤R500 000 category 
essentially means that an important targeted beneficiary group of preferential 
procurement, i.e., SMME and emerging enterprises owned by HDI’s, had access 
to a very low value of the total construction contracts made available by national 
and provincial government departments.   
 
The second proposition examined was:  
 
that the application of preferential procurement resulted in excessive cost 
premiums in relation to that contemplated in the initial formulation of 
the policy. 
 
The research objective linked to this proposition was to determine the financial 
cost premiums incurred through the implementation of the PPPFA of 2000. 
 
The combined results for national and provincial governments show that 5.8% of 
the total number of contracts were awarded with price premiums and incurred a 
premium percentage value of 1.4% of the total value of contracts awarded. 
Separate results for national government indicate that 8.9% of the total number 
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of contracts were awarded with price premiums and incurred a premium 
percentage value of 2.0% of the total value of contracts awarded. For provincial 
governments only, the results show that 5.1% of the total number of contracts 
were awarded with price premiums and incurred a premium percentage value of 
1.0% of the total value of contracts awarded. 
 
The results also show that the premiums incurred in implementing the PPPFA 
were considerably lower than that contemplated in the original formulation of 
the points scoring formula in both ≤R500 000 and >R500 000 value categories.  
As discussed in Section 2.5.5, the original formulation of the preference points 
formula set the maximum “potential” premium that government deemed to be 
acceptable at 25% for ≤R500 000 priced contracts and 11.1% for >R500 000 
priced contracts.    
 
These results suggest that a relatively small number of contracts were awarded 
with premiums and, more importantly, that they incurred consistently low price 
premiums across the different analysis categories (i.e. for combined, national 
and provincial levels) over the five-year period. The overall results confirm that 
the application of preferential procurement did not result in excessively high cost 
premiums for government. Therefore, the second proposition is false. 
 
The findings related to cost premiums suggest that HDI enterprises were 
consistently able to submit competitively priced tenders, particularly in the 
≤R500 000 pricing category. This category of enterprises did not necessarily need 
the advantage of price preference points to obtain the highest adjudicated 
scores to win government contracts. Other possible explanations for this result 
are that either there was a decline in the number of non-HDI enterprises that 
tendered for public sector contracts, or that their tenders were not competitively 
priced. The findings also suggest that in terms of submitting competitively priced 
tenders the “playing field” between established and emerging HDI owned 
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businesses might have been more level than presumed by government when 
formulating the provisions of the PPPFA of 2000.   
 
In relation to cost premiums for implementing preferential procurement, the 
findings are consistent with those of Gounden (2000).  Gounden reported that 
the financial premium incurred for the participation of the ABE’s in the 
Affirmative Procurement Policy Programme, as implemented by the National 
Department of Public Works, was between 0.2% and 0.87% for the period August 
1996 through July 1998.   
 
The findings of the present study are also significant because they confirm and 
extend the earlier findings of the World Bank CPAR of 2002 for South Africa.  The 
World Bank study (2003) reported that in the awarding of construction contracts, 
the “premium” for the State as a result of preferential policies was less than 1% 
of the contract value.  Even though the World Bank study was based on 
information gathered in the very early stages of the implementation of the 
PPPFA in South Africa, and included data from the Affirmative Procurement 
Policy Programme, it is important to note that the authors deemed the premium 
to be an acceptable cost in the pursuit of merging the dual economies of a post-
apartheid South Africa.   
 
Bolton (2010, 2004) adds to this discussion by presenting a persuasive argument 
that supports government decisions to incur financial premiums to achieve socio-
economic objectives through public procurement. According to Bolton (2004), 
such premiums should be considered as an integral part of a country’s growth 
and transformation and, in most cases, the question is not whether a country can 
afford to use procurement as a policy tool, but rather whether it can afford not 
to use it. 
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The third proposition examined was: 
 
that preferential procurement served as an effective mechanism for 
construction related enterprises with HDI shareholding to grow their 
businesses. 
 
The two research objectives linked to this proposition were: 
 
(1) To establish whether the application of the PPPFA of 2000 helped 
construction enterprises with HDI shareholding to grow their businesses; 
and  
 
(2) To assess whether construction enterprises with HDI shareholding, as 
beneficiaries of the policy, understood the intention and application of 
the PPPFA (2000).   
 
The results of the survey data reveal that most enterprises participating in the 
survey were established post-1994 when various government programmes were 
introduced to provide and advance business opportunities for construction 
enterprises owned by HDI’s. The increased annual turnover enabled these 
contractors to advance to higher CIDB grading levels which is a recognised 
indicator of business growth in the construction industry. As explained earlier, 
the data excluded start-up enterprises registered with the CIDB as Grade 1GB.     
 
The results confirm that construction related enterprises not only grew their 
businesses through success achieved in winning government tenders, but 
steadily increased their success rate in winning tenders between 2006 and 2011.   
   
Of the respondents who submitted tenders to national, provincial and local 
governments, over 80% claimed preference points in their tenders.  Of these, 
Chapter 7 – Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
295 
 
75% acknowledged that the preferencing system provided them with an 
advantage. The claiming of preference points suggests that HDI owned 
enterprises recognised that the preferential procurement policy benefited them 
in the tender award/adjudication process.   
 
The combined overall results of the analysis of the National Treasury dataset and 
survey questionnaire data confirm that the application of preferential 
procurement served as an effective mechanism in growing construction related 
enterprises with HDI shareholding. The results further confirm that preferential 
procurement provided HDI owned enterprises with accelerated access to 
business opportunities through a pricing advantage that increased their chances 
of winning government tenders.  Therefore, the third proposition is true.  
 
While the general findings support the premise that HDI owned enterprises 
benefited and grew as a result of the PPPFA, there is evidence from the survey 
research results which suggests that supply side constraints limited the pace of 
anticipated business growth and expansion in the construction industry.   
 
Although 74% of survey respondents claimed that their enterprises had grown 
over the period under review, 67% felt that the rate of business growth did not 
meet their expectations. The main reason stated by respondents for the 
perceived slow growth was the inability to access construction finance when 
needed. Although the access to finance issue was specifically acknowledged by 
government at the beginning of the procurement reform process, and explicitly 
referred to in the Ten Point Plan and subsequent Green Paper, the evidence 
shows that it persists as the major constraint hindering business growth in the 
construction industry.   
 
Other notable contributing constraints to slow business growth included the 
inability of government departments to pay construction enterprises on time, 
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followed by difficulties encountered in obtaining credit from suppliers, and the 
lack of suitable training for business owners and their employees.    
 
The list of constraints facing HDI owned enterprises is worthy of attention and 
further scrutiny  because it  signals that being awarded a tender is only the first 
step in running a successful construction business. The second step is to have the 
competence, capacity and resources to execute a contract. Failure to deliver on 
the contract within budget and on time reduces the chances of winning future 
contacts. Effective practices to support enterprise development must therefore 
include an integrated, supportive and responsive approach to business 
development in general, and emerging HDI enterprises in particular. The findings 
of the present study support the view that the benefits of preferential 
procurement policy cannot be optimized in the absence of an enabling 
environment that seeks to address and integrate both demand and supply side 
measures.   
 
Another noteworthy observation is the lack of knowledge and understanding 
amongst survey respondents of the workings of the new BBBEE scorecard system 
for awarding preference points. The survey results show that almost two-thirds 
of respondents reported that they have either no or very basic understanding of 
how the new system works in relation to the claiming of preferential points for 
government contracts.  
 
It is likely that this situation is widespread amongst HDI enterprises, not just in 
construction but across the different economic sectors, and will therefore hinder 
the implementation of the new PPPFA Regulations (2011).    
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7.3 LIMITATIONS 
 
The public procurement system in South Africa evolved from a formal tendering 
system defined in terms of National and Provincial Acts. It was inevitable that the 
resulting system yielded different interpretations as to what constitutes 
procurement reform. The analysis of the National Treasury dataset confirms that 
the adoption of different interpretations and implementation approaches in 
addressing procurement reform on national and provincial levels resulted in a 
lack of cohesion and a fragmentary approach. The lack of uniformity in 
application posed serious data collection challenges to National Treasury and 
resulted in it limiting its data collection to HDI categories based on race and 
gender, and excluding disability. 
 
In terms of the National Treasury data any enterprise with black male, black 
female or white female shareholding was defined as an HDI and preference 
points were awarded accordingly based on adjudication criteria. This effectively 
meant that contracts were awarded to two types of enterprises, viz. enterprises 
with any amount of HDI shareholding and non-HDI enterprises with no HDI 
shareholding. In order to get a more accurate picture of the HDI component of 
the enterprises,   the Treasury data were disaggregated into HDI enterprises with 
≤50% and >50% shareholding. Enterprises with 100% HDI shareholding were also 
identified. Where possible, the results were disaggregated further into 
enterprises with only black male shareholding, only black female shareholding, 
only white female shareholding, and a combination of these HDI categories.   
 
The present study acknowledges that provision is made in the PPPFA for organs 
of state to develop their own preferential procurement frameworks within the 
broader guiding principles and fundamental requirements and objectives of the 
Act. However, for practical reasons an assumption was made when analysing the 
Treasury dataset that all national and provincial government departments 
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applied a uniform system of price preferencing and allocation of points to HDI 
groups.   
 
7.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR PREFERENTIAL PROCUREMENT IN THE 
PUBLIC SECTOR  
 
7.4.1 New PPPFA Regulations (2011) and the BBBEE Scorecard 
 
One of the key observations of the present study was that the mere collection of 
data without regular analysis and reporting of results precludes government 
departments from effectively assessing the outcomes of the implementation of 
government policies, including the PPPFA. It also constrains government from 
making informed decisions based on empirical results about amendments to 
policy and associated regulations.  Given that the National Treasury dataset had 
not been analysed nor reported on until the present study was undertaken, it 
can be assumed that no comprehensive empirical evidence informed the review 
process of the PPPFA Regulations of 2000 and amended PPFA Regulations of 
2011, which replaced the preferential points scoring system with the BBBEE 
scorecard. The recently introduced scorecard system has already shown serious 
flaws with regard to adequately addressing the gaps of the previous system and 
has been criticized for other shortcomings.  
 
The findings on the value threshold distribution of tenders awarded by 
government in the ≤R500 000 category has significant implications for the new 
regulations governing the application of the PPPFA that came into effect in 
December 2011. The new regulations increased the ≤R500 000 category 
threshold to R1million for the application of the 80/20 points scoring formula. 
The analysis in this study indicate that, if the R1 million value threshold would 
apply, the monetary value of contracts awarded in the lower category is still 
relatively low, being 2.8% of the value of contracts awarded by national 
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government and 6% of those awarded by provincial governments. This suggests 
that the newly revised value category of R1 million still fails to address the 
important issue of low value of contracts that are accessible to SMME and 
emerging HDI owned enterprises. 
 
In questioning the logic of the upwards adjustment of the ≤R500 000 category to 
≤R1million category, it is  contended that the decision to double the threshold 
value after a period of 11 years was most likely based on inflationary 
considerations rather than reliable empirical data analysis. This study offers a 
compelling motivation for government to review the R1 million threshold value 
based on empirical data and other verifiable information in order to increase the 
possibilities of more effectively achieving the PPPFA objectives. This research 
also suggests that government should consider the merits of introducing an 
additional category that uses an 85/15 points scoring system. 
 
This study identifies the lack of knowledge and understanding within the 
construction sector of the workings of the recently introduced BBBEE scorecard 
system. The survey results show that almost two thirds of respondents have 
either very basic or no understanding of how the new system works in relation to 
claiming preference points for government contracts. 
 
7.4.2 Meeting the Constitutional Provisions pertaining to Procurement 
  
An important question raised by this research is whether the awarding of 
preference points in terms of the BBBEE scorecard system complies directly with 
the requirements of the Constitution. The Constitution, as noted in Table 2.6, 
makes provision, inter alia, for implementing a procurement policy that provides 
for the protection and advancement of persons disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination. Such persons are also referred to as HDI’s and are categorized on 
the basis of race, gender and disability. As illustrated in Table 2.12, the new 
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PPPFA Regulations (2011) provide for preference points to be awarded on the 
basis of the tenderer’s BBBEE scorecard and, by extension, not strictly on his or 
her HDI status. If one applies the new regulations to determine the BBBEE status 
level of an enterprise the outcome suggests the possibility that an enterprise in 
one of the lower “Contributor” levels, e.g. Levels 7 and 8, could be awarded 
preference points. This possibility is problematic because it appears to be 
contrary to the constitutional provisions which stipulate that procurement be 
used to rectify previously unfair discrimination. 
 
For example, a construction business with an annual turnover of less than R5 
million can be classified as an Exempted Micro Enterprise (EME) and is 
automatically eligible to be a Level 4 Contributor, irrespective of any race, gender 
or disability considerations regarding its ownership. All EME’s qualify for either 
12 preference points (out of 20) or 5 points (out of 10) depending on the 
estimated value of the tender. Accordingly, it seems highly likely that future 
situations will arise in which non-HDI enterprises, which automatically qualify as 
EMEs, will claim and receive preference points for their tenders. It also follows 
that anomalies such as these will likely result in legal challenges regarding their 
constitutionality. 
 
7.4.3 Meeting the RDP Goals through Public Procurement 
 
Provision was made in the PPPFA (RSA, 2000a) to achieve two specific socio-
economic goals: (i) contracting with HDI’s, and (ii) implementing the objectives of 
the RDP. Organs of state were allowed to develop their own preferential 
procurement frameworks in order to best incorporate these two specific goals. 
An examination of the data collected by National Treasury strongly suggests that 
data were captured for only those tenders with provision for HDI preferencing. 
The new PPPFA Regulations (2011), however, make no provision for 
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implementing RDP goals and the awarding of preference points on the basis of 
the BBBEE scorecard is prescriptive. 
 
This research identifies this limitation as a serious impediment towards 
implementing the procurement strategies needed to increase business 
opportunities for emerging enterprises on higher value contracts, i.e. those that 
exceed the R1 million threshold. The results of the data analysis for national 
government departments show that 55.6% of the number of contracts awarded 
were in the ≤R1 million value category, while 44.4% were in the >R1 million 
category. More importantly, the percentage total values in the two categories 
were 2.8% and 97.2%, respectively. The low value attached to almost half the 
contracts that were in the ≤R1 million category suggests that the original 
intended beneficiaries of the preferential procurement policy, i.e. the SMME 
sector, are likely to be excluded under the new regulations. The lack of flexibility 
to reward those tenderers that choose to unbundle their contracts to meet the 
country’s socio-economic goals in line with the objectives of the RDP, as 
provided for in the PPPFA needs, to be addressed. 
 
7.4.4 Legal Framework and Enabling Environment 
 
The findings of the survey data suggest that preferential procurement cannot be 
implemented in isolation. The successful implementation of policies requires 
effective institutions, leadership, clarity of purpose and well defined processes 
and mechanisms. Being awarded a tender is only one component of the 
procurement process. An integrated approach that creates an enabling 
environment with appropriate institutional mechanisms which also addresses 
supply side constraints is required to implement an effective public procurement 
system that seeks to incorporate socio-economic objectives.   
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This view is supported by one of the key findings of the World Bank’s Country 
Procurement Assessment Report (2003) for South Africa, which indicated that 
new legislation and regulations were passed without addressing the significant 
blockages and problems inherent in the legal and institutional framework. The 
report identified a conflicting legislative environment which compromised the 
efficiency of procurement because it weakened procurement practices. The 
findings of this research confirm the observations and predictions made in the 
World Bank Study (2003).  In particular, this thesis confirms that a coherent 
legislative and enabling environment is necessary to contribute positively to the 
effectiveness of preferential procurement. This view is supported by Gounden 
(2000) who maintained that procurement related failures linked to the 
promotion of social policies occur when principles of good governance are 
ignored, and where institutional mechanisms are lacking. 
 
7.4.5 Monitoring and Evaluation of Policy Implementation 
 
A requirement of the PPPFA is that all socio-economic goals be measurable, 
quantifiable and monitored for compliance (RSA, 2000a). The findings of this 
thesis suggests that the establishment and implementation of effective systems 
to monitor, evaluate, report and improve on the application of the PPPFA did not 
receive the attention it warranted. The evidence shows that prior to this study 
the National Treasury data were not systematically and comprehensively 
analyzed or communicated in the public space. This research also found serious 
limitations and inconsistencies in the data that were collected by National 
Treasury. It suggests that the extremely important elements that make up the 
measurable components for effective monitoring, evaluation and reporting were 
not well defined and established at the conceptual and planning stages of 
implementation.   
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This research supports the view that good practice in monitoring and evaluation 
in government promotes efficient, economic and effective use of public 
resources. It is recognized that, collectively, procurement personnel in organs of 
state possess a great deal of knowledge and experience. Ensuring that this is fully 
shared within and between organs of state is likely to prove mutually beneficial 
to all roleplayers. The thesis suggests that it is necessary for government to put 
in place an effective and efficient information management system to collect and 
process accurate and reliable data to facilitate active exchange of information 
among public sector procurement officials on the success and failures of 
implementing preferential procurement, so that lessons learned can lead to 
improved performance.     
 
Apart from a HDI Declaration Form (Refer to Appendix 7.1 and 7.2 for sample 
forms) that is submitted in a tender, there does not appear to be any formal 
verification process to confirm HDI ownership. The study was unable to 
determine the extent to which HDI status was verified at tender award stage, 
and whether there was any monitoring to ensure that the claimed HDI status was 
maintained during the execution of the contract. The development of an 
effective control process that monitors and ensures compliance through every 
step of the contracting process should be instituted as a prerequisite to the 
proper application of a monitoring and evaluation system for the application of 
the PPPFA. The design of such a control process should include a facility to 
generate accurate, pertinent and timely records and assessment reports that 
reflect the current status and performance of all relevant parties and 
beneficiaries. 
 
A well considered framework for monitoring, evaluating and disseminating 
results is necessary to inform national, provincial and local government 
leadership of progress and achievements in the implementation of socio-
economic policies in general, and the PPPFA in particular. This framework should 
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include specific mechanisms for monitoring progress and ensuring contract 
compliance during implementation. It is important to establish the measurable 
components for effective monitoring and evaluation. The regular assessment of 
data is fundamental to identifying the success or otherwise of such policies and 
to inform policy changes.  
 
The Malaysian experience of over 30 years in implementing procurement reform 
through a preferencing mechanism demonstrates that a “speedy” but informed 
response from government, combined with appropriate mechanisms for analysis 
and implementation, contributes to improved outcomes (Yusof and Bhattasali, 
2008) various reform policies. The continuous assessment process included 
preferential procurement, in the context of Malaysia’s broader economic 
performance and specific targets, that resulted in tangible and measurable 
benefits.  
 
It will be useful for the SA government to re-visit the general good practice 
approaches, especially those relating to integrated planning and continuous 
assessment and improvement, adopted by Malaysia and other countries. These 
“tried and tested” good practices can inform and improve the implementation of 
South African government policies in general, and public procurement reform in 
particular. 
 
Effective monitoring to ensure contract compliance also minimizes the impact of 
fraud and corruption. Some of the survey respondents in the present study 
indicated that their businesses did not grow as expected due to fraudulent 
tender awards and corruption by government officials. This view is possibly 
influenced by the perception that there is insufficient or no vigilance in the 
procurement system to prevent and respond to tender fraud and corrupt 
practices. 
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On a positive note, the South African government in recent years has observably 
increased its emphasis on policy implementation, improved service delivery, and 
monitoring and evaluation by establishing a National Planning Commission 
located within the Office of the President. This action was based on a recognition 
that national policies, plans and implementation strategies have to adapt to 
changing economic and socio-political conditions and imperatives in order to 
achieve specified national objectives. In its formulation of a National Five-Year 
Plan, (RSA, 2011a) the Commission acknowledged that a protracted and non-
integrated approach to policy implementation hinders economic growth.    
 
7.4.6 Skills Development and Training 
 
The research findings identified gaps in the implementation of preferential 
procurement which can be linked to inadequate training and skills development 
among government officials involved in the procurement process. The 
excessively high premiums incurred on some contracts, in some cases exceeding 
the maximum theoretical premium in terms of the preferencing policy, suggests 
a general lack of knowledge and understanding of preferential procurement, and 
how price preference points are calculated. 
 
In order to optimize the outcomes of preferential procurement and socio-
economic policies it is essential to offer suitable education and training 
programmes to government personnel to ensure they understand the 
fundamental principles and prescripts of the public procurement system, and the 
range of strategies which can be adopted for  procuring goods, services and 
works. Such initiatives should provide a comprehensive training and skills 
development programme to ensure that officials and external service providers 
who engage in preferential procurement are competent and conversant with all 
aspects of the policy. 
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7.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY AND 
PRACTICE 
  
7.5.1 Introduction 
 
The procurement of Construction Works is generally more complex than that for 
Goods and Services, as this type of contract requires elements of both Goods and 
Services to be combined and arranged for the performance of the contract. 
Construction contracts require assets to be constructed in specific locations, and 
specify requirements which are very industry specific. For these reasons, and 
because the construction industry’s role in public sector procurement is 
significant, specific issues which need to be addressed in construction projects 
are raised in the following discussion. 
 
Having been instrumental in developing the preferential procurement 
recommendations in the Green Paper on Procurement Reform (RSA, 1997), the 
researcher maintains that a simplistic and uninformed view was taken when 
government decided to use a single approach to procure goods, services and 
works in the public sector. It is widely accepted in the construction sector that 
the process of procuring construction works is multi-dimensional because it 
involves a range of considerations and provides for multiple business 
opportunities through down-streaming activities, commonly referred to as 
subcontracting or outsourcing.  
 
Latham (1994) in his report on procurement and contractual arrangements in 
United Kingdom also refers to the complexity and challenges of the construction 
process, but recognizes the opportunities for structured outsourcing (sub-
contracting) arrangements and identifies the importance of fair contractual 
conditions between the main contractors and sub-contractors in order to 
improve profitable outcomes throughout the construction supply chain. 
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7.5.2 Promoting Contractors in the Lower CIDB Grades 
 
As an indicator of potential contracts opportunities for CIDB Grades 1 to 3 
contractors, the results for national government show that 66.2% of the number 
of contracts awarded were in this category, but with a very low monetary value 
of 2.3% of the total value of awarded contracts. For provincial governments the 
results indicate that 77.3% of the number of contracts awarded were in this 
category, but with a low monetary value of 9.8% of the total value of awarded 
contracts.  
 
To counter one of the biggest barriers of entry (i.e. market access), a powerful 
mechanism available to support contractor development in the construction 
industry is public sector procurement as supported by the PPPFA. The 
distribution of public sector contracts awarded to CIDB registered contractors, in 
particular, those owned by black persons and women reflects the potential 
effectiveness of the price preferencing policy. The ability to use public sector 
procurement to influence contractor development underpins one of the 
underlying objectives of socio-economic reform. While public sector 
procurement can be used as a key driver for contractor development, it should 
also take into account how such development occurs across the various CIDB 
grades so that the target enterprises are not just isolated in the lower tender 
grades but have sustainable growth paths over time.  
 
The current practice of accepting a tenderer in terms of price and BBBEE 
Scorecard status only, is inflexible and will restrict the degree to which smaller 
enterprises can access the procurement process. For construction projects, it will 
be beneficial that tenders be awarded on both a direct and indirect points 
preferencing system. One of the ways of implementing an indirect preferencing 
system would be to award contracts in terms of a development objective / price 
mechanism in which tenderers are allocated points in the first instance for their 
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financial offer and, in the second instance, for their offer to meet specified 
participation targets for engaging contractors in the lower CIDB grades and also if 
necessary, on the basis of their HDI enterprise status. 
 
7.5.3 Unbundling of Contracts and Promoting the Goals of the RDP 
 
Although the PPPFA (2000) made provision for implementing socio-economic 
goals in accordance with RDP objectives, it would appear that preferential 
procurement focussed primarily on promoting businesses owned by HDI’s. This 
view is supported by the fact that Treasury decided to collect data relating only 
to contracts awarded to enterprises with HDI ownership. 
 
It is evident from the results of this research (as set out in Table 2.9) that the 
attainment of socio-economic goals of the RDP through preferential 
procurement as envisaged were not fully realised. The goals of the RDP can be 
categorized as follows: 
 The promotion of SMME’s, in particular, those owned by HDI’s 
 Job creation and labour intensive methodologies  
 Targeting local enterprises and local labour 
 Training and skills development; and 
 Community based development. 
 
The amended PPPFA Regulations (2011) allocate price preference points to 
enterprises based exclusively on their BBBEE scorecard status. The apparent 
underlying rationale for this approach is to counter the prevalence of fronting, 
fraud and corruption in the procurement process. While some observers may 
contend that the goals of the RDP are indirectly achieved through the BBBEE 
scorecard process, others will argue that this is not necessarily so because these 
goals, if incorporated in the scorecard, are not  readily measurable, quantifiable 
and monitored for compliance, as required in terms of the PPPFA. 
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Furthermore, the results of the present study confirm that a very low percentage 
value of contracts were awarded in the ≤ R500 000 value category which was 
primarily,  although not exclusively, intended for the SMME sector. This view is 
also supported by the result which showed a low value of contracts awarded in 
terms of the CIDB Grades 1 and 2 contractor categories. 
 
In addition, and despite the new PPPFA Regulations (2011) increasing the ≤R500 
000 to ≤R1 million, the results derived from further analysis of the Treasury data 
reveal that the percentage value of contracts awarded is still likely to remain 
relatively low for contracts ≤R1 million. 
 
In terms of the revised ≤R1 million category as per the new PPPFA Regulations 
(2011), which provides for the 80/20 points scoring formula, the distribution of 
contracts awarded would also include, in part, the CIDB Grade 3 value category.  
 
Data for national government indicate that a low percentage number of 
contracts (12.2%) accounted for the majority percentage value of contracts 
(88.6%) based on CIDB Grading categories 7 to 9. This implies that these 
contracts were only accessible to Grades 7, 8 and 9 contractors unless 
appropriate voluntary joint ventures were formed. Of note is that Grade 8 and 9 
contractors had access to 75.5% of the value of contracts although they 
accounted for only 3.9% of the number of contracts. This finding is supported by 
the results for provincial governments that show that 5.1% of the number of 
contracts account for the majority percentage value (65.4%) in CIDB Grades 7, 8 
and 9. Therefore, to achieve the objectives of Section 217 of the Constitution and 
the goals of the RDP, would require some innovative procurement approaches 
within the framework of the PPPFA. 
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The outcomes of the present study indicate that an unbundling strategy of large 
value contracts is necessary to provide greater business opportunities than are 
presently available for the SMME and related sectors. In support of this strategy, 
Kajimo-Shakantu (2007) suggests that the unbundling of contracts into smaller 
packages through appropriate procurement policies can create many more 
business and employment opportunities which would not otherwise have 
occurred through the traditional procurement process. Moreover, the outcomes 
of implementing the Affirmative Procurement Policy (APP) showed that business 
opportunities can also be created through subcontracting, joint venture 
relationships and structured material supply arrangements (Gounden, 2000). The 
APP encouraged contractors on large projects to commit to a participation 
parameter that required a certain percentage of the contract value to be 
outsourced to targeted businesses and/or targeted labour for which price 
preference points were awarded. The increased access to business opportunities 
provided the impetus for SMME’s to grow and develop. It is useful to note that 
the unbundling of large contracts into smaller contracts was part of the 
government’s 10 Point Plan developed in 1995. The strategy was  successfully 
implemented by the National Department of Public Works prior to the 
introduction of the PPPFA through the APP using Targeted Procurement 
(Manchidi & Harmond, 2002; Gounden, 2000). However, when the PPPFA (2000) 
was enacted it did not make definitive provision for the unbundling of contracts 
in the construction sector. The negative consequences of this oversight are 
evident in the results of the present study. 
 
In light of the research results, it is suggested that Targeted Procurement be re-
considered as a mechanism to affect the unbundling of contracts in the 
construction sector based on an informed understanding of the challenges of the 
industry and how it operates. The Targeted Procurement specifications which are 
presently available as SANS documents (www.sans.org.za) provide a structured 
mechanism to achieve the stated socio-economic objectives of the RDP in a 
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manner that can be measured, quantified and monitored for compliance, as 
required in the PPPFA. 
 
In support of this, the Gounden (2000) study on the Affirmative Procurement 
Policy as implemented by the National Department of Public Works found that 
ABE participation was the highest in contracts exceeding R2 million where 
business opportunities were predominantly secured through sub-contracting. 
Ofori (2001) also supports the “distribution of involvement” concept which 
encourages the formation and growth of targeted enterprises and suggests that 
local participation in contracts be encouraged and tracked with measurable 
outcomes. 
 
7.6 RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
In this section of the thesis, recommendations are made based on the research 
results that could improve the effectiveness, predictability and transparency of 
the preferential procurement policy. The intention is to address some of the gaps 
in the current policy that were identified in the present study by suggesting 
possible improvements to the public procurement system and institutional 
framework in general, and the application of preferential procurement, in 
particular. 
 
The following provides a list of key recommendations informed by the results of 
this research: 
(i) To revisit the recommendations of the Green Paper in terms of 
addressing the fragmentation and lack of coherence in the legal and 
institutional framework upon which public procurement practice and 
preferential procurement is premised. This will contribute to improving 
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procurement policies, documentation procedures, application of 
preferences, control measures and monitoring within all organs of state. 
 
(ii) To develop an effective monitoring, evaluation and reporting system for 
public procurement. This system will need to monitor preferential 
procurement outcomes regularly by collecting, managing and analysing  
data, and then using it as the basis for communicating relevant and timely 
information to decision makers in order to inform policy changes and 
improvements. 
 
(iii) To gather more details on the shareholding profile of the tendering 
entities when collecting preferential procurement data. This data will 
enable National Treasury to ascertain whether the PPPFA’s primary 
objective of promoting HDI owned businesses is being met. 
 
(iv) To develop benchmarking criteria with clear performance measurement 
indicators to assess the extent to which socio-economic objectives are 
being achieved through preferential procurement. This will facilitate the 
setting of goals on a short, medium and long term basis.  
 
(v) To reconsider the introduction of Targeted Procurement as a 
procurement strategy and the unbundling of large construction projects 
in order to facilitate access to markets and increase work opportunities 
for emerging contractors and others in the lower CIDB grading categories. 
 
(vi) To revisit the preference points system and consider allocating a portion 
of the points to SMME’s and on CIDB grading levels for the construction 
sector. This will provide emerging enterprises in the construction sector 
with an added price advantage when competing with larger and more 
established contractors, in particular on projects of lower value. 
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(vii) To identify gaps linked to the inadequate skills and competencies of 
public procurement officials and then develop needs-based skills 
development and training programmes that make the implementation of 
preferential procurement policy more effective.  This will ensure that 
government personnel who engage in preferential procurement are 
competent and conversant will all aspects of the policy in order to 
minimize  poor decision making. 
(viii) To introduce prescribed skills level standards and competencies linked to 
training programmes and continuous contractor development as part of 
the CIDB contractor registration requirements in order to ensure that 
contractors have, at minimum, the necessary management skills, basic 
contractual knowledge and understanding of PPPFA objectives. 
 
(ix) To consider the aggressive imposition of sanctions for corrupt and 
fraudulent actions. Such sanctions will deter fraudulent representation 
regarding issues such as equity ownership and management control 
which hinder the attainment of socio-economic objectives. 
 
(x) To address the supply side constraints related to access to finance, credit 
and business development and entrepreneurial training. In addressing 
the financial constraints faced by contractors, government must ensure 
prompt payment for work done in accordance with contracts and, where 
possible, implement a quicker turnaround of payments to SMMEs and 
HDI owned businesses. 
 
(xi) To review and consider increasing the value of contracts that will be 
available in the 80/20 points category by increasing the R1 million 
threshold that differentiates the 80/20 and 90/10 points scoring system. 
Based on the results of this research, it is suggested that the threshold 
value be increased to not less than R2 million. 
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(xii) To record the CIDB Grading Levels of contractors when awarding 
construction contracts. This will help National Treasury to identify how 
effective the preferential procurement policy is in distributing contracts 
to emerging contractors. 
 
(xiii) To set targets for the total number and value of contracts awarded to 
contractors in CIDB Grades 1 to 3. This information can be used as a 
performance indicator to measure whether the goal of promoting 
emerging enterprises in the construction sector is being attained. 
 
7.7 POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
 
It is proposed that the empirical results of this study can serve a number of 
useful purposes, including the following:  
 
 To inform National Treasury and other government departments on the 
effectiveness of past efforts to implement the PPPFA. 
 
 To interrogate the recent changes made to the PPPFA and the underlying 
data and assumptions on which the amended regulations were 
formulated. This interrogation should specifically include issues related to 
the BBBEE scorecard and the R1 million threshold.   
 
 To emphasise the importance of establishing and implementing effective 
systems for monitoring, evaluating and reporting which can provide the 
data and information needed by National Treasury to produce 
comprehensive, detailed and accurate reports for submission to 
Parliament. Although a reporting requirement already exists, it appears 
that to date the reports have been lacking the quantity and quality of 
information required to make informed decisions. 
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 To provide empirical data to government which prove that the 
application of the PPPFA did not result in substantial or excessive cost 
premiums. This evidence could be used to counter the argument made by 
detractors of preferential policy that procurement reform measures are 
unnecessarily expensive. 
 
 To provide empirical evidence that demonstrate that the PPPFA has 
achieved its constitutional objective of advancing and promoting HDI 
owned businesses. 
 
7.8 AREAS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION 
 
Based on the findings of the present study the following areas of research are 
proposed as potential topics for further investigation: 
 
1) Extend the present study to investigate the effectiveness of the PPPFA in the 
local government sphere, and determine whether the present research 
findings apply to construction contracts awarded by municipal entities.  
 
In this study, the data set obtained from Treasury applied specifically to 
national government departments and the nine provincial governments.   
According to National Treasury, local governments have preferential 
procurement frameworks that are location specific and which often require 
them to use a combination of socio-economic factors.  Further studies will 
indicate whether the outcomes at local government level are consistent with 
or different to the findings of this research. 
 
2) Undertake a more in-depth study on the impact of PPPFA on its intended 
beneficiaries with regard to business development and sustainability.  
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The list of constraints facing HDI owned enterprises require a more detailed 
study because the award of a tender is only the first step towards a 
successful completion of a construction contract. While the general findings 
support the premise that HDI owned enterprises benefited and grew as a 
result of the PPPFA, there is evidence from the survey results which suggests 
that supply side constraints limited the pace of anticipated business growth 
and expansion in the construction industry.   
 
3) Conduct a comparative investigation and analysis of how different organs of 
state used preferential procurement in terms of the provisions of the PPPFA 
prior to the introduction of the new PPPFA Regulations (2011).  
 
The present study acknowledges that provision is made in the PPPFA for 
organs of state to develop their own preferential procurement frameworks 
within the broader guiding principles of the Act. Provision was made in the 
PPPFA for an Organ of state to develop its own preferential procurement 
framework in order to best incorporate the two specific socio-economic 
goals: (i) contracting with HDI’s and (ii) implementing the objectives of the 
RDP which resulted in different approaches to achieving the aims and 
objectives of the Act. 
 
4) Examine whether the Construction Sector Charter and BBBEE Scorecard 
System are being applied effectively to achieve socio-economic objectives in 
the construction industry as contemplated in the PPPFA. 
 
Given that the National Treasury dataset had not been analyzed nor reported 
on until the present study was undertaken, it can be assumed that no 
comprehensive empirical evidence informed the amended PPFA Regulations 
of 2011. This study identifies the lack of knowledge and understanding within 
the construction sector of the workings of this recently introduced 
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preference scoring system. The survey results show that almost two thirds of 
respondents have either very basic or no understanding of how the new 
system works in relation to claiming preference points for government 
contracts. 
 
7.9 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE  
 
 
The original PPPFA legislated in 2000 made provision for organs of state to 
pursue socio-economic goals through public procurement. This legislation 
included the establishment of a preference point system for the awarding of 
government contracts. In December 2011 new PPPFA Regulations were issued 
that fundamentally changed how and to who price preference points are 
awarded. 
 
Prior to the new regulations price preference points were primarily allocated to 
enterprises based on HDI ownership. During the 11 years between the 
implementation of the PPPFA (2001) and this study, no detailed data or rigorous 
research on the outcomes of the PPPFA were published. This study is the first to 
analyze and report on the outcomes of the PPPFA as it relates to the 
construction industry. The research findings provide relevant empirical data that 
can be used to review current practices and inform future government policy 
changes. According to Weiner (1993), policy programmes to effect social change 
should be regarded as experimental and be reviewed regularly to guide 
government in revising its programmes, re-defining its targets and re-assessing 
sunset clauses. This view is supported by the present research as it provides 
important indicators with regard to intended and unintended consequences of 
the government’s preferential procurement policy. 
 
The literature review on promoting socio-economic policy through public 
procurement showed a general lack of empirical data on the outcomes of this 
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policy both internationally and in South Africa. To date the only published study 
on South Africa preferential procurement policy was by Gounden (2000) who 
conducted research on the impact of NDPW’s Affirmative Procurement Policy. 
However, the Gounden study preceded the promulgation of the PPPFA in 2000 
and its new system of price preferencing. This research sought to address this 
gap by providing empirical evidence based on analyses of a 5-year National 
Treasury dataset backed by carefully designed field survey in order to gain 
deeper insights into this topic, and to contribute to the debate on whether public 
procurement can be used effectively as an instrument of social policy.  
 
In the absence of detailed and verifiable data, there continues to be widespread 
concern and criticism within South Africa that the main objectives of the 
preferential procurement policy have not been achieved. In addition, questions 
have been raised about the costs incurred by government to implement 
preferential procurement. While it is acknowledged that costs will likely apply 
when public procurement is used as a social policy tool, it is necessary that these 
costs be quantified and assessed against the actual benefits of social policy 
programmes. According to Marion (2007), the evidence regarding the costs, both 
theoretical and empirical, associated with preferential contracting arrangements 
is inconclusive. This research provides measurable outcomes of both HDI 
participation in public procurement, and the associated financial premiums 
incurred on construction contracts awarded by national and provincial 
governments.  
 
The benchmarking process is recognised as a powerful tool that can be used by 
organs of state as a catalyst for change to improve policies and enhance 
performance. It can be used on an ongoing basis to measure preferential 
procurement policy objectives against outcomes and to assess any additional 
financial costs associated with policy. This thesis provides a substantial portion of 
the initial benchmarking data needed to measure future performance 
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improvements or otherwise of preferential procurement policies. As a result, 
benchmarking can contribute to future strategy formulation, policy development 
and process innovation. In this way government can achieve a dynamic rather 
than static programme of continuous improvement in achieving socio-economic 
goals through public procurement. 
7.10 SUMMARY 
 
This study indicates that the application of the preferential procurement policy 
contributed to increased participation of HDI-owned construction enterprises in 
the government tendering process. In addition, the findings also show that the 
financial premiums incurred in implementing the PPPFA were low and 
substantially less than that contemplated by government when the preference 
points scoring formula was originally formulated. While the study sought to 
examine the propositions around effectiveness of the application of preferential 
procurement in the construction industry, a more in-depth consideration of the 
research findings suggest that gains made by the PPPFA might have been 
superficial rather than comprehensive. An important finding in this study 
indicates that a strategy of unbundling large public sector construction contracts 
is necessary in order to provide greater business opportunities for small and 
medium-sized construction enterprises. This research provides relevant empirical 
data to review current preferential procurement practices and inform future 
policy decisions. 
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